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EMOTION PROCESSING AND SOCIAL COGNITION IN DEAF CHILDREN 
By ANNA JONES 
December 2013 
Understanding others’ emotions and false beliefs, known as Theory of Mind (ToM), and 
to recognise and produce facial expressions of emotion has been linked to social 
competence. Deaf children born to hearing parents have commonly shown a deficit, or 
at best a delay in ToM.  The emotion processing skills of deaf children are less clear. 
The main aims of this thesis were to clarify the ability of emotion recognition in deaf 
children, and to provide the first investigation in emotion production.  
While deaf children were poorer than hearing controls at recognising expressions of 
emotion in cartoon faces, a similar pattern was found in both groups’ recognition of real 
human faces of the six basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and 
surprise). For deaf children, emotion recognition was better in dynamic rather than 
static, and intense rather than subtle, displays of emotion. With the exception of disgust, 
no differences in individual emotions were found, suggesting that the use of 
ecologically valid dynamic real faces facilitates deaf children’s emotion recognition.  
Deaf children’s ability to produce the six basic emotions was compared to hearing 
children by videoing voluntary encodings of facial expression elicited via verbal labels 
and emotion signed stories, and the imitation of dynamic displays of real facial 
expressions of emotion. With the exception of a poorer performance in imitation and the 
verbally elicited production of disgust, deaf children were consistently rated by human 
judges overall as producing more recognisable and intense expressions, suggesting that 
clarity and expressiveness may be important to deaf individuals’ emotion display rules.  
In line with previous studies,  results showed a delay in passing the first and second 
order belief tasks in comparison to age matched controls, but not in comparison to a 
group of ‘age appropriate’ hearing control children.  These findings encouragingly 
suggest that while deaf children of hearing parents show a delay in ToM and 
understanding disgust, emotion processing skills follow a broadly similar pattern of 
development to hearing control children. Language experience is implicated in 
difficulties faced in social and emotion cognition, with reduced opportunities to discuss 
more complex emotional and mental states.   
Key words: Emotion recognition, emotion production, Theory of Mind, deafness 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Emotional competency can be identified by the optimal functioning of the 
‘emotion mechanism’ in two key domains – emotion production and emotion 
perception (or recognition) (Scherer, 2007). Proficiency in emotion production refers 
to the appropriateness of facial and bodily changes in response to an event, whereas 
proficiency in emotion perception refers to the skill of accurately recognising and 
interpreting emotional states of others in social interactions (Bänziger, Grandjean & 
Scherer, 2009). The studies in this thesis aim to investigate emotion competency and 
understanding in deaf children through these two key aspects of emotion processing. 
 
Children with severe or profound deafness born to hearing parents have been 
shown to display delays in their development of some social cognitive abilities. It is 
thought that the relative paucity of exposure to emotional and mental state language 
is due to lack of access to overhearing conversations of others (Marschark, 1993). 
There is substantial evidence indicating that deaf children, in particular, late-signing 
or oral deaf children, have at the very best a delay, or a deficit in theory of mind 
(ToM) (i.e. understanding of other’s beliefs, intentions and actions; Peterson & 
Siegal, 1995).  Less clear is the exact reasons for these delays and whether they 
extend to and include difficulties in understanding and recognising others’ emotions 
(Dyck, Farrugia, Shochet & Holmes-Brown, 2004). This ability is an important 
consideration because being unable to gauge the emotional state of another may lead 
to a lack of awareness of the individual’s impact on others, a lack of empathy and 
inappropriate social skills (Mellon, 2000). It is hoped that by extending the study of 
emotion processing to include emotion recognition, emotion production and ToM 
ability, it will inform our understanding of atypical emotion development in a deaf 
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population. This may provide important clues not only as to whether children show a 
delay, a deficit or even an intact understanding of emotions, but it may also be 
revealing in terms of the processes involved in their emotional development. 
Deafness 
Each year approximately 840 children in the UK are born with moderate to 
profound deafness (Royal National Institute for the Deaf, 2006; Meristo, Hjelmquist 
& Morgan, 2012a). The medical condition of deafness focuses on the severity of 
hearing loss, measured by the unaided hearing threshold in puretone decibel (dB) for 
the noise in the better ear. More than half of childhood deafness is genetically 
determined. Other causes include pre-natal complications such as rubella, and post-
natal causes such as premature birth, lack of oxygen during birth or meningitis. The 
result of this is that up to 40% of deaf children have additional or complex needs 
(Action on Hearing Loss, 2011). The deaf children participating in the current thesis 
had no additional needs other than deafness; they had either moderate (40 -69 dB) to 
severe (70 – 94 dB) or profound (≥95 dB) hearing loss, meaning all children would 
at least have difficulty following speech without hearing aids. While deafness can be 
acquired later in child or adulthood, the children involved in the studies of this thesis 
were pre-lingually deaf, being either born deaf or acquiring deafness before spoken 
language acquisition.   
Deaf children’s methods of communication 
What determines a child’s preference of communication mode (sign 
language, oral communication) is heavily dependent upon both the deaf child’s 
family and their local school provision (Meristo et al., 2012a). For example, the vast 
majority (over 90%) of deaf children are born to hearing parents. Only a minority of 
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children grow up as ‘native signers’, who share a common language with their 
caregivers involving naturally adapted sign language (van Gent, Goedhart, Knoors & 
Treffers, 2012). The official language of the Deaf community in the UK is British 
Sign Language (BSL). It is in every sense just as much a human language as English 
or French, however, it is visuo-spatially organised, using movements of the hands, 
face, head and body rather than using speech (Sutton-Spence & Woll, 1999): its 
articulators are visual rather than oral. It has vocabulary, grammar and syntax, fully-
functional, yet distinct from English. BSL is able to express complex concepts and 
ideas like any other language. Many of the signs are arbitrary in their meaning, 
making it incomprehensible to an English person, or someone who communicates in 
another sign language, such as American Sign Language (ASL).  
Since the majority of deaf children grow up in hearing families and attend 
mainstream schools (approximately 85 %; National Deaf Children’s Society, 2010), 
BSL is not often the primary method of communication that is adopted. An oral deaf 
person is defined by those who live in the hearing world by reading lips and learning 
how to speak. With hearing amplification – increasingly, the use of cochlear 
implants (CIs) – oral deaf children rely on lip-reading in addition to residual hearing 
to communicate in a hearing environment; in some school settings, with the use of 
only English (Lachs, Pisoni, & Kirk, 2001). To accompany this, many deaf children 
additionally learn some form of sign language: most commonly, Sign Supported 
English (SSE). Using some BSL signs alongside spoken English, SSE follows 
English word order as well as using additional sign markers to show English 
grammar (e.g. prepositions such as ‘with’) (Sutton-Spence & Woll, 1999). It is 
considered straightforward for English users to learn.  
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While BSL is a fully developed, natural language, manual encodings of 
spoken language (such as SSE) are not, but they are often used in providing 
simultaneous translation and in communication with hearing signers. As highly 
qualified human hearing signers are a scarce and undervalued resource, it has been 
shown that deaf children tend to experience communication along a continuum of 
‘dialects’, ranging from SSE to BSL (Pezeshkpour, Marshall, Elliott, & Bangham, 
1999).  Among these children, oral and late signing deaf children who know little 
sign may be at a disadvantage compared to those more experienced signers, as 
communication with others is often poorer in content. Even when a family learns to 
sign with their deaf child, it is rare that fluency is reached and signed communication is 
limited to interacting directly with the child. Therefore, for many, due to this reduced 
opportunity for everyday conversation, deafness may have an impact not only on 
spoken language development, but also educational achievement and social-
emotional development (Marschark, 2007). 
Cochlear Implementation: increased language access? 
A fairly recent and notable development affecting the deaf community is the 
increased use of neonatal screening for deafness (Young & Tattersall, 2007); severe 
and profoundly deaf children of hearing parents are increasingly more likely to 
receive CIs at younger ages (Spencer & Marschark, 2003), potentially altering the 
prognosis of development.  A CI is an electronic device surgically implanted in the 
cochlea, which directly stimulates the auditory nerve, enabling sensitivity to sound 
for even profoundly deaf individuals (Remmel & Peters, 2008). CIs, however, do not 
result in natural hearing and have sparked a debate of controversy.  Caution is drawn 
to interpreting cochlear implementation as a ‘cure’ for deafness (National 
Association of the Deaf, 2000). Auditory information is coarse, extensive speech and 
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language therapy is required and outcomes have been variable and not effective for 
all deaf children (Christiansen & Leigh, 2002; Bat-Chava & Deignan, 2001).  
 
A number of factors have been implicated in the variability of outcomes such 
as: duration of cochlear implantation; age at implantation; residual hearing before 
implantation; technical, physiological and technological factors, and children’s 
cognitive skills (Schorr, Fox, van Wassenhove & Knudsen, 2005). Yet in general, 
much literature has shown that cochlear implantation seems to accelerate spoken 
language acquisition (Geers, 2006) and these devices have been shown to be 
effective in improving deaf children’s perception of speech (Lee, Charles, & 
Michael, 2010; Sharma, Dorman, & Spahr, 2002). Potentially greater access to the 
hearing world may additionally result in improvements in deaf children’s socio-
emotional development (Tasker, Nowakowski & Schmidt, 2010), but this is yet to be 
firmly established.  
The social impacts of deafness 
The overwhelming focus on the implications of deafness has understandably 
centred on its impact on hearing, language acquisition and speech development.  
Much less consideration has been given to what Marschark (1993) refers to as the 
“secondary effects” of deafness, namely the resultant effects on social, emotional 
and cognitive functioning.  The basis of the development of these functions is 
dependent on a child’s interaction with their environment. As such, if a child is born 
to parents who are skilled in non-verbal communication – typically, those deaf 
children born to deaf signing parents, it is possible that little or no impact of deafness 
on the mother-infant interactions and early interactions may be found. Yet, while 
there is increased awareness of sign language (Morgan & Woll, 2002), the majority 
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of deaf children are born to hearing parents who have no previous knowledge of sign 
language and little understanding of how to adapt their spoken language to make 
communication more accessible for their infant in the first few years of life (Mitchell 
& Karchmer, 2004).  
Children’s early interaction with others has been shown to be crucial to 
acquiring the necessary social skills, including the ability to take multiple 
perspectives, and to initiate and sustain friendships (Anita & Kreimeyer, 2003). Deaf 
children of hearing parents in mainstream schools have been shown to have poorer 
ratings of social competence as measured by lower ratings of pro-social behaviour 
and higher levels of socially withdrawn behaviour in comparison to hearing children 
(Wauters & Knoors, 2008). Although not disliked by hearing peers, deaf children 
have been shown to be likely to have fewer friends and experience isolation in 
mainstream schools in the UK (Nunes, Pretzlik & Olsson, 2001).  
 
A study with Israeli deaf children revealed that speech intelligibility of deaf 
children has been shown to strongly correlate with a perceived sense of loneliness, 
suggesting that poorer language abilities impedes building social connections (Most, 
Ingber & Heled-Ariam, 2012).  In a small-scale observational study examining the 
performance of deaf children with CIs  on a Peer Entry task1, better outcomes were 
revealed in one-on-one situations in comparison with interactions with two or more 
others (Martin, Bat-Chava, Lalwani & Waltzman, 2011). This suggests that social 
situations are more challenging for deaf children due to difficulty in tapping into 
multiple simultaneous conversations, which clearly includes conversations revolving 
around emotions and mental states. Research specifically documenting deaf 
children’s social skills is relatively sparse and is heavily reliant on self-report (peer 
 
1
 Measures the ability to enter a group of peers  
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and teacher) measures. To date, the vast majority of research on deaf children’s 
social functioning has focused on the social-cognitive skill of ToM.
 
Theory of Mind  
A distinguishing characteristic of human social cognition is our inclination to 
look beyond external behaviour and to consider the psychological states of others. A 
tendency to focus on people’s emotions, desires, intentions and thoughts, and to refer 
to these when predicting and explaining behaviour, is what constitutes Theory of 
Mind (ToM) (Slaughter & Peterson, 2012). This ability is important in aiding us to 
understand ourselves and others, and a vital basis of self-organisation and affect 
regulation. ToM encompasses all skills required to effectively manage social 
communication and relationships in humans and nonhumans (Korkmaz, 2011).  
A deficit in ToM was originally associated with children with the 
neurological developmental disorder, autism, and this includes the high functioning 
autistic children with normal intelligence and other intact cognitive abilities (Frith & 
Frith, 2003). Yet deaf children of hearing parents (Peterson & Siegal, 1995), as well 
as congenitally blind children (Hobson, Lee & Brown, 1999) and children with 
cerebral palsy (Dahlgren, Dahlgren Sandberg & Hjelmquist, 2003), are other groups 
of atypically developing children demonstrating similar ToM difficulties, suggesting 
a neurobiological explanation does not alone account for such problems in 
understanding others’ mental states. In the absence of a cognitive deficit resulting in 
impaired social interaction, deaf children of hearing parents instead are 
disadvantaged in terms of opportunities to communicate in everyday situations. 
 



How is Theory of Mind measured? 
This ability is typically measured by enacting a social scenario and 
questioning a child on the thoughts and actions of the protagonist, commonly 
presented in a story with the use of pictures or acted out with puppets. The litmus 
test of ToM – the ‘false-belief’ task – relies on the assumption that people can have 
beliefs about the world that are inaccurate (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  In essence, 
passing the task requires an understanding that the character in question will have a 
false belief due to being unaware of a crucial ‘change-in-location’ (e.g. the ‘Maxi 
task’ or the ‘Sally Anne’ task of Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith,1985), or a 
contradiction in ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ (e.g. Smarties task: Perner, Leekam & 
Wimmer, 1987). Where many 3-year-old children tend to fail measures of ToM 
reasoning, typically developing 4- and 5-year-old children reliably pass such tests 
with ease (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001). By 7-years old, children have typically 
extended their understanding to appreciate multiple perspectives (Selman, 1980). A 
‘second-order’ false belief task requires the attribution of a first-order belief (Person 
A thinks X) to another person (Person B thinks “Person A thinks X”) (Baron-Cohen, 
1989). 
A broader concept of Theory of Mind 
The paradoxical contrast between the readily apparent social skills of 
children under the age of three and a failure to pass the false belief tasks has called 
into question the usefulness of defining ToM purely based upon success on the false 
belief task (Ashington, 2001). Consequentially, a number of researchers have sought 
to broaden this definition to encompass a wider range of mental states including 
perception, intention, cognition and emotion (Hughes & Leekam, 2004). For 
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instance, Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) proposed a two part model of ToM that 
can be separated into social-cognitive and social-perceptual components of ToM, 
and together they constitute ‘social knowledge.’ The social-cognitive component 
entails a representational understanding of the mind (most commonly signified by 
passing the false belief task), which emerges alongside other cognitive abilities, 
including working memory and general and specific language abilities (Tager-
Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).  
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) term the second component, social-
perceptual ToM, as it is more closely related to the affective system: the ‘rubric of 
person perception’, including the ability to rapidly make an implicit judgement of a 
person’s mental state via facial and bodily expressions. There is evidence that the 
social-perceptual component begins to emerge at an earlier stage of development; for 
example, new born infants have been shown to attend to social stimuli within the 
first few weeks of life (Mehler & Dupoux, 1994). 
There is debate surrounding the relationship between the social-perceptual 
skills emerging from infancy, such as joint visual attention, social referencing, 
imitation, communicative vocalisations and gestures, and the later emerging social-
cognitive ToM (Hughes & Leekam, 2004).  A number of theorists have argued that 
the social-perceptual component of ToM is an essential building block for the later 
emergence of social-cognitive ToM (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Frith & Frith, 2003; 
Hobson, 1993). This nativist perspective suggests that a child’s social environment 
can trigger but not essentially determine ToM development, which instead occurs as 
a maturational progress with universal developmental milestones (Frith & Frith, 
2003). Thus a faulty mentalising capacity is associated in children with autism 
(Baron-Cohen, 1997; Leslie, 1994). For instance, Hobson (1991) proposed an 



association between primitive forms of relatedness – ‘affectively charged 
interpersonal relations’ - and ToM. Hobson argued that being able to differentiate 
between the self and others occurs via the innately determined ability of affect 
perception, i.e. the ability to perceive affect in the behaviour and bodily appearances 
of others.  
Alternatively, other accounts place a greater emphasis on the process of 
socialisation: a notable account that takes environmental experience into 
consideration is ‘simulation theory’ (Harris, 1991). According to simulation theory, 
acquisition of ToM is dependent upon a child’s capacity for pretence so to be able to 
imagine another person’s position in a hypothetical scenario (Hughes & Leekam, 
2004; Kormaz, 2011). This theoretical standpoint indicates that differences in 
children’s social environment with varying levels of opportunity to engage in 
pretend play impacts on ToM development. Indeed, in a longitudinal study, 
McAlister and Peterson (2007) found that number of siblings predicted performance 
on formal tests of ToM. 
Theory of Mind in deaf children: performance on false belief tasks 
 The widely documented difficulty in ToM found in congenitally deaf 
children of hearing parents offers an insight into the role social interaction skills may 
play in ToM development. Contrasting performance between native and late-signing 
deaf children on the false belief task provides a strong indication that language 
experiences mediate ToM development. The great majority of deaf children are born 
to hearing parents, and these children show delays in false belief understanding. In 
contrast, native signing deaf children show comparable performance to hearing 
children (Courtin & Melot, 1998; de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000; Figueras, Cost & 
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Harris, 2001; Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2000; Schick, De Villiers, De 
Villiers & Hoffmeister, 2007).  
 
Peterson and Siegal (1995, 1997, 1998) first demonstrated that deaf children 
age 8-13 years were failing the false belief task in comparison to 5 year old hearing 
children and showed comparable performance to autistic children. In an attempt to 
overcome the potential language barrier because of the highly verbal nature of the 
false belief task, Woolfe, Want and Siegal (2002) presented the false belief task in 
non-verbal task in a series of ‘thought pictures’ to deaf children between 4 and 8 
years old. The late-signing deaf children were still shown to display a deficit in false 
belief understanding, even when controlling for executive functioning, syntax and 
non-verbal ability.  
 
However, not all studies investigating false belief understanding in deaf 
children have indicated such poor performance. Schick et al. (2007) found that while 
oral and late-signing deaf children’s overall performance was poorer than that of 
native signers and hearing children, by age 7 the oral children’s performance on the 
low verbal false belief tasks was equivalent to the comparison group’s and the late-
signing deaf children were comparable on both the low verbal and verbal false belief 
tasks. A key difference is that Schick was a native signer, whereas many other 
studies investigating deaf children’s false belief tasks have relied upon an interpreter, 
which adds an additional demand on children’s attention as switching back and forth 
between the interpreter and experimenter is required (e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 
1999; Peterson, 2002, 2004, 2009; Peterson & Slaughter, 2006). 
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Studies investigating false belief understanding among deaf children with CIs 
have also revealed inconsistent findings. Peterson (2004) found that deaf children 
with CIs were delayed in ToM acquisition by 3 to 5 years, whereas Peters and 
colleagues found that children aged 3 – 12 years revealed only marginal delays 
(Peters, Remmel & Richards, 2009; Remmel & Peters, 2008). These studies showed 
that some children with CIs paralleled hearing children in false belief performance 
and positive correlations were found with duration of implantation and task 
performance. More recently, Ziv, Most and Cohen (2013) found that false belief task 
performance of younger deaf Israeli children with CIs aged 5- 7 was also higher than 
previous studies with deaf oral children without cochlear implants. However, Ziv et 
al. (2013) highlighted that caution needs to be applied in interpreting these results 
due to great variance within the group of CI wearers, a number of whom showed 
poorer performance and low verbal ability.  
Experience with language is clearly implicated in the development of 
mentalising abilities in deaf children of hearing parents. It has been highlighted that 
those children with fluent sign language, most notably native signing deaf children, 
will have experienced the grammatical framework of formalised sign language that 
contains the necessary structure to communicate point-of-view and visual 
perspective (Courtin, 2000). In contrast, the late-signing and oral deaf children have 
limited or no skills in sign and so lack a common language, leading to a reduced 
opportunity to overhear conversations and a reduced faculty to converse about 
mental states (Vaccari & Marschark, 1997).  One prominent view is that 
understanding of mental states evolves out of conversational exchanges with others 
(Peterson et al., 2000; Woolfe et al., 2002).  Moeller and Schick’s (2006) study 
provided evidence for a link between mother’s mental state talk and deaf children’s 
ToM, and Woolfe et al. (2003) found that number of siblings was a positive 
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predictor of false belief performance.  Vocabulary and understanding syntactic 
complements have been shown to be significant predictors of ToM performance (De 
Villiers & De Villiers, 2000; Schick et al., 2007), yet the exact role of language 
remains unclear. 
Beyond false belief: deaf children’s non-verbal communication with others 
Some researchers have criticised solely focussing on the false belief task as a 
measure of ToM. For example, Bloom and German (2000) highlighted that besides 
simply passing a false belief task, ToM ability encompasses a wide range of abilities 
such as deception and pretend play. While research with children with perceptual 
impairments draws particular attention to the importance of communication 
experiences for a representational ToM, it is difficult to precisely determine which 
element or multiple elements contribute to false belief understanding (Hughes & 
Leekam, 2004). One of the strongest arguments is that failure on false belief task is 
attributable to a lag in the mastery of the syntax of sentential complements (De 
Villiers & De Villiers, 2000; Schick et al., 2007). Yet this argument faces difficulties 
upon the consideration that deaf children have performed worse than hearing 
controls in pre-verbal belief attribution tasks. For instance, in a non-verbal looking 
study, Meristo, et al. (2012b) found that hearing infants outperformed deaf infants in 
anticipating a character’s false belief by tracking their gaze to the search location.  
The view that early conversational experiences lead to a grasp of mental state 
concepts could explain this outcome, particularly given the recent finding that 
hearing mothers of hearing children use significantly more references to mental 
states when talking to their infants than hearing mothers of deaf infants (Morgan, 
Meristo, Mann, Hjelmquist, Surian & Siegal, 2014). Meristo et al. (2012b) reasoned 
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that the relatively impoverished early communication between deaf infants and 
hearing parents impacts on preverbal deaf infants’ early visual attention, which 
mirrors later delays on social-cognitive ToM tests. What is not precisely clear is 
whether it is conversation itself that is the crucial linguistic mediator or whether non-
verbal interactions play an important role (Hughes & Leekham, 2004).
Careful consideration needs to be given to the early social-perceptual skills of 
deaf children that may contribute to later difficulties in ToM. One important early 
social interaction for an infant is joint attention.  Joint attention skills involve sharing 
attention with a caregiver through pointing, showing and coordinating looks between 
objects of interest and people (Tomasello, 1995). The interaction between deaf 
infants with deaf parents appears to take a different developmental pathway to deaf 
infants with hearing parents (Koester, Papousek & Smith-Gray, 2000; 
Prezbindowski, Adamson and Lederberg, 1998). Deaf infants from deaf families 
have been shown to have skilful abilities in shifting attention or gaze between 
objects, the environment and their parents, creating sequences of shared, symbolic 
and linguistic meaning in comparison to deaf infants with hearing mothers (Koester 
et al., 2000; Loots, Devise & Jacquet, 2005). Koester and colleagues found that 
strategies employed by deaf parents include the use of exaggerated facial expressions 
of emotion and greater use of physical contact. On the other hand, hearing-mothers 
of deaf infants engage in a sequence involving shifting visual attention between the 
environment and their communication partner, thus restricting the co-ordinated joint 
attention that hearing children perform in a visual-auditory way. It is noteworthy, 
however, that there is individual variation within the population of hearing mothers 
of deaf infants, and some mothers have shown effective compensatory strategies for 
the lack of auditory input (Tasker et al., 2010; Traci & Koester, 2003). 
 

	

It is possible that differences in deaf children’s early experiences of inter-
subjectivity may lead later delays in passing the false belief task. Interestingly, in a 
longitudinal study, symbolic joint attention was shown to later predict preschoolers’ 
ToM (Nelson, Adamson & Bakeman, 2008). While it may seem logical that non-
verbal behaviour in the visual domain could be preserved and even optimised in deaf 
children, research has highlighted that the majority of hearing parents are not 
sufficiently proficient in sign language and gestural communication to initiate and 
sustain social interactions and conversation revolving around others’ beliefs 
(Spencer & Harris, 2006; Vaccari & Marschark, 1997). With an absence of the 
pragmatic context of verbal and gestural communication, it is far harder for deaf 
children to grasp mental state and language referring to others’ emotions (Meristo et 
al., 2012). 
 There is a clear rationale to consider broader aspects of ToM, as illustrated by 
examples of differences in joint attention and implicit ToM as measured by direction 
of gaze. Studies with blind children who are delayed (but later they parallel sighted 
peers) in word acquisition (e.g. Landau & Gleitman, 1985), draws attention to the 
likelihood that non-verbal cues (e.g. joint attention and emotion perception) play an 
important role in language acquisition given that blind children are lacking access to 
these signals. Thus for deaf children, too, these early non-verbal skills may be 
pivotal to early conversational experience and understanding mental states. One area 
of research that has far less comprehensive attention is that of deaf children’s non-
verbal abilities in emotion perception and production.  
Emotion processing 
A crucial element of social interaction that is worthy of a greater focus of 
research attention is emotion (Hughes & Leekam, 2008). Perceiving and interpreting 
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other people’s emotional states is critical for effective social communication 
(Atkinson & Adolphs, 2005; Bänziger et al., 2009). The ability to effectively 
produce emotions has received less consideration but is also of importance as 
children who are able to better communicate their feelings have been shown to 
display better social skills and interactions (Boyatzis & Satyaprasad, 1994). There is 
a link between mind and emotion in making sense of people’s actions in everyday 
situations. For instance, an individual’s emotional reaction (such as happiness or 
surprise) is connected to and moulded by various mental states (such as the other 
person’s desires or beliefs) (Wellman & Banerjee, 1991).  
What are emotions and what is their function? 
A lack of consistency in determining differences between explicit and 
implicit definitions of emotion has dominated this field of research. There is, 
however, a general consensus that emotions have motivational and regulatory 
functions and can be separated into basic emotions, which manifest in infancy and 
early childhood, and later emerging more complex emotions, often involving higher-
order cognition (Izard, 2007). Izard (2007) defines a basic emotion as a set of neural, 
bodily/expressive, and feeling/motivational components. The basic emotions are 
produced rapidly and spontaneously without consciousness when the perception of 
an ecologically valid stimulus occurs.  
 
The origin and function of emotions is hotly debated. Russell and colleagues 
(Widen & Russell, 2003, 2008a) argue that emotion is to be understood on a 
continuous dimension in the brain measured in terms of valence (positive/pleasurable 
vs. negative/displeasurable) and arousal in response to stimuli. In contrast, others 
maintain that emotions fall into discrete categories that are innate (even though not 
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initially verbalised or labelled) and produce an explicit prototypical response; this 
includes an emotion specific pattern of facial expression (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 2007, 
2009). For discreet emotion theorists, there is a general consensus that there are six 
universal basic emotions – happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise –that 
emerged in early ontogeny determined from evolutionary adapted neurobiological 
systems (Ekman, 1994, 1999; Izard, 1971, 2007). Barrett contests that these 
‘psychological phenomena’ or ‘events’ (i.e. happiness, sadness etc.) are not posed in 
this stereotypical fashion in everyday life, proposing that language provides a 
context to reduce the ambiguity of this information (Barrett, Lindquist & Gendron, 
2007). Rather, Barrett at al. (2007) argue that these events are constructed from at 
least two basic psychological processes: a primitive, biologically based system called 
‘core affect’ that varies on the basis of positive or negative states, and a human 
conceptual system for emotion (i.e. knowledge about emotion), which includes a role 
for language. 
 
Other research on emotions has focused on their inherent social function, 
arguing this is paramount given that emotions are elicited and evolve within social 
contexts (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). Fischer and Manstead (2008) posit that 
emotions have two important social functions: that of distancing the self from 
another, and affiliating the self with another. The appropriateness of a particular 
reaction will, however, vary from social context to social context, between cultures, 
and be somewhat dependent on social appraisal2. The function of sadness for 
example, is to gain support and consolation from others, yet crying in certain public 
situations may result in the individual being ridiculed. The processes of mimicry and 
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2
 Social appraisal refers to an individual’s belief about a particular event (Widen & Russell, 
2008a) 
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emotional contagion, for example, can be interpreted as having an affiliative function 
in social relations. Fischer and Manstead (2008) explain that mimicry refers to the 
automatic processing of others’ nonverbal displays, causing an individual to produce 
similar non-verbal displays. Emotion contagion, on the other hand, explains the 
tendency of others’ emotions to influence an emotional experience. Indeed, both 
have been shown to increase when an individual feels able to identify with, or show 
empathy towards, another person (Fischer, Rotteveel, Evers & Manstead, 2004; 
Sonnby-Borgström, 2002). 
Importance of socialisation in developing emotion understanding in deaf children 
As the expression of emotion is a social signal, an important aspect of social 
development is the understanding of emotions felt by the individual, as well as those 
expressed by others. Given the theoretical viewpoint that suggests that emotion 
signals are understood as a process of socialisation and develop in parallel with 
language, deaf children’s reduced opportunities for social experience may mediate 
their development of skills in non-verbal emotion perception.  
To understand another person’s emotion perspective an individual is required 
to be able to imagine how that person may feel without directly experiencing or 
sharing that person’s perspective (Harris, 1991). Crucial to the process of emotion 
understanding are interpreting facial and vocal expressions of emotion as well as a 
comprehension of situations that are likely to elicit a given emotion reaction (Saarni, 
Mumme & Campos, 1998). Denham and Dunn have stressed the role that parents 
take in the development of a young child’s emotion understanding (Denham, 
Mitchell-Copeland, Strandberg, Auerbach & Blair, 1997). The reciprocity of the 
parent-child relationship in infancy, including interactive strategies such as joint 
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attention and infant directed speech, familiarises the child with social messages with 
emotional content (Dunn, Brown & Beardsall, 1991). Peers are also important in 
social and emotional development as pretend play provides a context for children to 
socialise and use mental state talk (Brown, Donelan-McCall & Dunn, 1996).  
Harris (1989) presents a framework of emotion understanding that explains 
the development from the first interactive states with caregivers during infancy, to 
the practice and refinement of these routines with peers at school, to the later 
emergence of the cognitive ability to take the emotion perspective of another person, 
known as ‘imaginative understanding.’ As a typical child proceeds through 
childhood there are increasing opportunities for emotional learning of greater 
complexity by conversing about emotions and emotional experiences with others. 
The generally held view is that deaf children of hearing parents encounter a 
barrier to engaging in social interaction, resulting in fewer opportunities to learn 
about emotion and emotional experiences.There is evidence to suggest that children 
with pre-lingual deafness with hearing parents consequences in less frequent and 
shorter conversational parent-child interactions (Gray, Hosie, Russell, Scott & 
Hunter, 2007; Lederberg & Everhert, 1998; Lederberg & Mobley, 1990; Wedell-
Monnig & Lumley, 1980). Meadow (1976) found that communication between deaf 
children and their hearing parents was limited to concrete situations with an available 
visual referent. It is therefore not surprising that this limited conversation does not 
extend to emotion experience and that hearing parents with deaf infants use fewer 
mental state terms (Morgan et al., 2014).  
It has also been shown that parents and caregivers of deaf children are less 
likely to give justifications of their emotions (Gregory, 1976). Deaf children have 
been shown to spend less time in cooperative play (Higginbotham & Baker, 1981; 
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Vandell & George, 1981) and are less likely to initiate play interactions than hearing 
children, and as a result, this makes it more difficult to practise play based skills, in 
particular pretend play (Anita & Kreimeyer, 2003). In addition to a reduction in 
opportunities to engage in these types of interactions that results in natural, 
spontaneous discussion of emotion, deaf children in hearing environments cannot 
overhear other conversations unless they are directly involved (Gray et al., 2007).  
Deaf children’s abilities in emotion recognition and production may be 
revealing in terms of how emotion understanding develops. If emotion does originate 
from a genetically evolved response system organised into discrete emotion 
categories, deaf children should demonstrate no differences. Conversely, differences 
in deaf children’s emotion processing may indicate the importance of interaction 
with the environment in understanding and displaying emotion facial configurations. 
Indeed, even if emotion perception occurs unconsciously it may be that emotionally 
and socially relevant conceptual knowledge is able to effectively shape perception 
either with or without awareness, meaning that visual processing is not in itself 
sufficient (Atkinson & Adolphs, 2005). 
Facial emotion recognition in typically developing children 
One of the key areas of a young child’s emotional development is the ability 
of emotion recognition: that is, to be able to accurately process and decode emotional 
information produced by the self and others (McClure, 2000). On the basis of the 
universality argument (Ekman, 1972; Izard, 1971), the study of facial expressions 
has been dominant in assessing emotion recognition abilities. Being able to rapidly 
recognise facial expressions of emotion with accuracy is thought to be vital for 
successful social interaction and to appropriately respond to another person’s signal 
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(Herba & Phillips, 2004). A deficit in emotion facial recognition has been linked to 
impairments in social functioning and has been shown to be a potential risk factor for 
psychopathy in adulthood (Green, Kern, Robertson, Sergi & Kee, 2000).The face is 
believed to be the most important channel of emotion expression in humans 
(Mehrabian, 1981; Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000). This is because faces, in particular 
the eye region, convey a multitude of cues that are crucial in enabling us to 
disambiguate the beliefs and intentions of others (de Gelder & Vroomen, 2000). 
 
A number of studies using habituation/preference methodologies have 
illustrated that children as young as three months old are able to discriminate happy 
and sad faces from surprised faces (Young-Browne, Rosenfeld, & Horowitz, 1977). 
By six or seven months, Nelson & De Haan (1997) found that young infants were 
able to distinguish between faces displaying mild or intense expressions of emotion; 
by seven months infants are also able to discriminate between dynamic presentations 
of happy and angry faces (Soken & Pick, 1992).  
 
Yet there are methodological differences that result in differences of opinion 
in terms of at what age children can perceive and understand emotions through an 
emotion recognition task. Habituation/preference tasks with infants requires 
attentional and perceptual abilities, while matching emotion facial expressions is 
more dependent on visual and spatial abilities (Herba, Landau, Russell, Ecker & 
Phillips, 2006). Categorisation of emotions with a verbal label is arguably more 
revealing in terms of emotion understanding. By the age of four years, typically 
developing children have been shown to be able to label prototypical facial 
expressions of happiness, anger and sadness and are becoming more proficient at 
recognising surprise (Widen & Russell, 2003). Markham and Adams (1992) 
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emphasised that differences in performance materialise as a result of variation in 
experimental paradigms that differ in their dependency on cognitive, visual 
perspective and emotional vocabulary. 
 
Widen and Russell’s (2003) differentiation model posits that children’s 
‘errors’ in categorisation is particularly informative of children’s developing emotion 
understanding and draws attention to the fact that the errors made are not random. 
Emotion concepts are initially broad and children ‘mistakenly’ label emotions of the 
same valence i.e. positive emotions are usually labelled as ‘happy’ and negative 
emotions as ‘sad’ until children’s understanding becomes more sophisticated (Widen 
& Russell, 2008b). Disgust has been shown to be more problematic, even for adults 
(Widen & Russell, 2008c; 2013).  
 
Although some research suggests that by aged 10 the ability to recognise 
emotions has reached adult levels (e.g. Durand, Gallav, Seigneuric, Robichon & 
Baudouin, 2007), there appears to be some variation depending on task demands. 
Researchers in the field of children’s emotion recognition have recently responded to 
the criticism that the use of posed static facial stimuli lacks ecological validity 
(Russell, 1994). One such example is by exploring speed of processing – between 
the age of 7 and 10 children have been shown to make increasingly rapid responses, 
in particular in response to negative emotions. A second example is the increased 
task demand resulting from reducing the intensity of expression - adults process 
emotions twice as fast as children when identifying subtle rather than intense, 
prototypical facial expressions of emotion (De Sonnerville et al., 2002; Gao & 
Maurer, 2010).  
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Deaf children’s facial emotion recognition 
There is a dearth of studies testing facially expressed emotions in individuals 
who are deaf. These studies have tested a broad age range of children from pre-
schoolers to adolescents and have produced equivocal findings. Although some 
research has indicated deaf children can identify supposedly ‘basic’ emotions that 
are carried reliably by characteristic facial expressions (Hopyan-Misakyan, Gordon, 
Dennis & Papsin, 2009; Hosie, Gray, Russell, Scott, & Hunter, 1998; Ziv et al., 
2013), other studies have indicated that deaf children make more errors than hearing 
children (Bachara, Raphael & Phelan, 1980; Dyck & Denver, 2003; Dyck et al., 
2004; Most & Michalis, 2012; Schiff, 1973; Wiefferink, Rieffe, Ketelaar, De Raeve 
& Frijins, 2013).  
Hosie et al. (1998) compared hearing children in two age groups (4-8 years 
and 8-12 years) with age-matched deaf children born to hearing parents and using a 
total communication method (i.e. sign and speech). Both groups had greatest 
difficulty in labelling some of the later developing basic emotions, in particular fear, 
disgust and surprise, yet the overall performance was similar between groups. Hosie 
concluded that these results may be an indication that there are clear and 
unambiguous discrete facial expressions for the six basic emotions (Izard, 1971), 
while also recognising that this could also mean that these deaf children may have 
been able to capitalise on their environmental experiences. 
In contrast, Dyck, et al. (2004) tested emotion recognition of 6 – 18 year old 
deaf children on a facial emotion recognition task comprising morphed images of the 
the six basic emotions plus contempt. A deficit was found in deaf children across the 
age range, but this was no longer significant when language was considered as a 
covariate. This strongly implicates language in emotion recognition. Ludlow, 
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Heaton, Rosset, Hills and Deruelle (2010) similarly found a deficit when comparing 
emotion recognition in upright and inverted faces of human and cartoon (human or 
non human like) faces. Deaf children demonstrated a similar processing style to 
hearing children as they made more errors in inverted than upright images and 
cartoons than human faces.  
As deaf children exhibit social difficulties, Ludlow et al. (2010) proposed 
that the advantage for human faces found in hearing children would not exist for deaf 
children as they would not be dependent on the ‘social’ nature of the stimuli. This 
was not the case, however, and it seems that deaf children similarly rely on the clear 
and detailed features of real faces. The lower performance of deaf individuals when 
distinguishing visual emotional information could be explained by the necessity of 
spoken language as a context for emotion perception. When an infant views a facial 
expression he/she simultaneously matches the vocalization and by doing so, more 
readily identifies the emotion (Walker-Andrews & Lennon, 1991). 
Studies comparing deaf children with different types of hearing amplification 
(CIs versus hearing aids (HAs) have also produced mixed findings. In a recent study, 
Most and Michaelis (2012) investigated emotion recognition in preschool oral deaf 
children (4-5 years) in comparison to hearing peers. The emotions, happiness, 
sadness, anger and fear were presented via neutral sentences by an actor in three 
modes: auditory, visual and auditory-visual combined. The results revealed that 
hearing children outperformed deaf children with CIs in all three modes. An earlier 
study with a similar methodology found that older deaf children (aged 10 to 17 
years) were no different from hearing controls (Most & Aviner, 2009). However, 
regardless of type of hearing amplification, deaf participants, unlike the hearing 
controls, were no better at auditory-visual perception of emotion than the visual-only 
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perception. Hence deaf children, in particular, those who are profoundly deaf, rely 
heavily on the visual mode for emotion perception. 
 
The discrepancy between these studies is likely to be partly attributable to 
methodological differences.  Two key differences emerge. First, deaf children 
demonstrate poorer performance with the use of cartoons as stimuli (Ludlow et al., 
2010; Wiefferink et al., 2013) or morphed faces (Dyck et al., 2004). With a reliance 
on the human face in non-verbal communication (sign language and lip-reading) it 
may be that the face is of particular importance to deaf individuals. Second, Dyck et 
al. (2004) was the only study to test reaction time, which reflects an increased 
processing demand.   
A limitation to research investigating deaf children’s emotion recognition to 
date is the reliance on the use of static images (e.g. Hosie et al., 1998; Ludlow et al., 
2010). While static images are revealing in terms of knowledge about visual emotion 
perception and its neural basis (Adolphs, 2002), the account of emotion perception 
and its neural substrates is left incomplete (Atkinson & Adolphs, 2005). Atkinson 
and Adolphs (2005) highlight two key shortcomings. First, static images do not take 
into account movements of the body and face that make important contributions to 
emotional and other non-verbal communication. Second, dynamic facial expressions 
are greater in ecological validity as there is a great deal of movement in facial 
expressions and bodily posture in social interactions. There is increasing evidence 
for a neural system, crucially including the superior temporal sulcus (STS), 
responsible for the perception of high-level motion stimuli, particularly face and 
body movements (Kilts, Egan, Gideon, Ely & Hoffman, 2003; Klesser, Doyen-
Waldecker, Hofer, Hoffmann, Traue & Abler, 2011; Krumhuber & Manstead, 2013; 
Puce & Perrett, 2003). Motion may be of particular importance to deaf individuals 
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given the importance motion processing has for sign language (Bosworth & 
Dobkins, 2002). 
Emotion production  
An entirely new area of research that merits investigation is that of deaf 
children’s ability to produce or encode facial expressions of emotion. While knowing 
someone’s emotional state is helpful as it enables reliable predictions of the other 
person’s intentions and likely actions, there is also an implied benefit for having 
greater control over facial expressions – it is suggested that this allows the effective 
portrayal of one’s own intentions towards others in everyday social contexts (Mehu, 
Mortillaro, Bäziger & Scherer, 2012). Ekman and Friesen (1971) claim universality 
in terms of when emotions are deliberately posed, suggesting that a cultural specific 
set of display rules emerge which prescribe situations in which emotions can be 
shown and to whom they can be shown. Typically developing children who are good 
at emotion recognition have been shown to also be able to effectively encode 
emotion facial expressions (Boyatzis & Satyaprasad, 1994). Children’s emotion 
production research has also shown that positive expressions are easier to voluntarily 
produce (Field & Walden, 1982; Lewis, Sullivan & Vasen, 1987) and imitate 
(Ekman, Roper & Harper, 1980) than negative emotions, improving steadily with 
age.  
A study testing the ability of congenitally blind children, who face similarly 
difficulties with social-cognitive ToM as deaf children, found that they produced 
significantly less accurate voluntary encodings of the six basic emotions elicited by 
emotion stories (Roch-Levecq, 2006). These results suggest a role for a process of 
socialisation: blind children’s limited access to people’s facial expressions and the 
contexts that induce them, results in restricted facial expressiveness. Similarly, deaf 
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children have limited access to a different sensory input – that of conversation which 
may be critical in linking facial expressions to emotion context.  
Indeed, deaf children have been shown to have difficulties in assigning labels 
to stories eliciting prototypical emotions (Gray et al., 2007).  Display rules have also 
been shown to develop more slowly in deaf children of hearing parents as they have 
been shown to be less likely to conceal their anger for pro-social reasons (Hosie et 
al., 2000). These findings coupled with deaf children’s potential difficulties in 
emotion recognition (e.g. Dyck et al., 2004; Ludlow et al., 2010) warrant exploration 
of deaf children’s ability to accurately encode emotions. 
Outline of the thesis 
In the first section of this thesis, chapter two details the characteristics of the 
whole pool of participants and general methodology; chapters three, four and five 
present a series of studies aiming to clarify deaf children of hearing parents’ emotion 
recognition abilities. Chapter three explores the effect of motion on the recognition 
of happiness, sadness and anger in deaf children by comparing a static with a 
dynamic presentation. The emotion stimuli are presented  on a continuum from real 
human faces to human-like cartoon faces to non-human like cartoon faces, to 
determine whether there is a particular reliance on the real human face for deaf 
children. Chapter four again explores emotion recognition of static and dynamic 
clips of real human faces, extending to include three later developing emotions – 
fear, disgust and surprise. The effect of intensity (from subtle to intense expressions 
of emotion) and a reduced display time (500ms) is explored in chapter five. 
 
In the second section of this thesis (chapter six), the aim is to explore a novel 
area of research: deaf children’s emotion production abilities. The voluntary 



encoding of the six basic emotions is investigated via three elicitation methods: a 
verbal label, in the context of an emotion signed story and through the imitation of 
dynamic clips of real human faces. Face Reader™ software and human judgements 
are employed to decode the children’s emotion encodings and provide ratings of 
intensity of expression.   
 
In chapter seven, there is a return to the false belief paradigm to examine deaf 
children of hearing parents’ social-cognitive ToM. A battery of tests is compiled, 
extended to include a second order false belief task. Chapter seven aims to address 
the problems placed on deaf children’s attention when using an interpreter by 
presenting the tasks in pre-recorded clips enacted by a hearing native signer: a 
CODA (child of deaf adult).  The final chapter will draw together all the results from 
these studies and provide a critical discussion, outlining the main conclusions 
regarding deaf children’s emotion processing and social cognition, and highlighting 
social implications and avenues for further research. 
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Chapter Two  
Participant characteristics and methodology  
Overview 
This chapter explains recruitment to the studies in this thesis and describes the 
characteristics of the total pool of participants. The background measures used to 
match deaf and hearing control participants and tests of language and 
communication ability are outlined. The general procedure and statistical methods 
employed are detailed, and issues of statistical power and ethical considerations are 
highlighted. 
Participants 
 
Deaf children 
A total of 42 high-functioning deaf children (i.e. IQs of 70 and above) took 
part in the studies presented in this thesis. This group comprised 25 females and 17 
males aged between 5 years 9 months and 12 years 1 month. The children were 
predominantly white Caucasian. These children were recruited from six primary 
schools, with a special unit for hearing impaired children, across the East and South 
East of England. A questionnaire was designed to screen whether the deaf children 
met the participation criteria and to gather information pertaining to deafness and 
communication (see Appendix A). The questionnaires were completed by a teacher 
of the deaf at each of the participating schools. Deaf children were recruited if they 
had the presence of congenital/pre-lingual hearing loss at a moderate-to-severe 
(>60db; N = 26) or profound level (>90db; N = 16) in their better ear. None of the 
deaf children had any known concomitant disorders such as autism, attention deficit 
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disorder or cerebral palsy. Three children were excluded because their non-verbal IQ 
was below 70. 
Participating deaf children were predominantly oral in their communication 
preference: 29 deaf children preferred to communicate orally and 13 preferred to 
communicate with sign language (BSL and/or SSE). None of the children were 
native signers. The majority of the oral deaf children also communicated with some 
SSE or BSL. Twenty-seven children had family members who had sign language 
skills, but the vast majority had only basic signing skills or Level 1 BSL (N = 21), 
five family members had Level 2 BSL (level required for teacher of the deaf) and 
one parent had Level 3 (reaching fluency). All deaf children received auditory 
amplification: 21 children wore Hearing Aids (HAs) and 21 children wore Cochlear 
Implants (CIs). Fifteen of the 21 with CIs were bilaterally implanted and the majority 
received their first implant late (i.e. after two years; N = 15). 
 
Typically developing hearing controls 
 A total of 61 typically developing hearing children (35 female) took part in 
the studies in this thesis3. The hearing control group were aged between 6 years 1 
month and 11 years 9 months.  The children were predominantly white Caucasian. 
Control group children were recruited from four local primary schools in the East of 
England. Class teachers of this participant group were asked whether the children 
had any psychological or developmental disorders. None of the children presented 
with either developmental or psychological disorders. Two children with a non-
verbal IQ below 70 were excluded from all studies.  
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 An additional control group of younger hearing children took part in Study 5 (Theory of Mind)  
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Group matching 
Chronological Age 
Subsets of this participant pool took part in each of the studies in this thesis, 
matched for chronological age (CA), gender and non-verbal ability.  The studies in 
this thesis were conducted at different points in time and attrition was dealt with by 
continuing to recruit new children. Table 1 displays the mean CA and number of 
children taking part in each group (deaf and hearing controls) for each study. No 
significant difference in CA between deaf and hearing groups was found (all ps 
>.05). 
Table 1.Mean and SDs of CA (yrs.mths) and Number of Deaf and Hearing Children 
in each Study 
 Children  
 Deaf Hearing  
Study 1 8.4 (1.8) (N = 30) 8.11 (1.6) (N = 32) t (60) = -1.65, p = .10 
Study 2 8.8 (1.7 (N = 27) 9.0 (1.5) (N = 26) t (51) = -.865, p = .39 
Study 3 9.3 (1.6) (N = 28) 9.3 (1.8) (N = 28) t (54) = -.03, p = .99 
Study 4 8.6 (1.9) (N = 5) 8.2 (1.3) (N = 5) t (8) = .33, p = .75 
Study 5 9.0 (1.6) (N = 27) 8.8 (1.6) (N = 23) t (48) = .77, p =.45 
 
 
Raven’s Progressive Colour Matrices 
 The children were matched on non-verbal ability based on scores 
derived from Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (CPM) (Raven, Court & 
Raven, 1990). The test comprises 36 items in three sets of 12 matrix designs, 
assessing non-verbal spatial ability. Ravens Progressive Matrices tests have been 
shown to be valid when utilised with deaf individuals (Blennerhassett, Strohmeier & 
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Hibbett, 1994). The instructions are minimal and the task is very visual. Each test 
item has three pieces and one piece missing. The child is presented with six pieces 
underneath to choose from to logically complete the pattern of the test item. The test 
items were presented via a computer interface to increase ease of administration and 
interest to the child. Each child had to point to the chosen piece, the experimenter 
clicked on the response and the programme automatically moved onto the next item. 
The raw scores were then converted into standardised scores.  Table 2 displays the 
mean standardised scores of the whole pool of participants. An independent t-test 
revealed no significant difference between groups, t (101) = -1.15, p = .26.  
Language measures  
The deaf children’s language ability was measured using the BSL Receptive 
Skills Test (Herman, Holmes & Woll, 1999) and the control group children were 
tested using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) 3rd edition (BPVS III) 
(Dunn & Dunn, 2009).  Deaf children were also tested on lip-reading ability using 
the Craig Revised Lip-reading Inventory (Updike, Rasmussen, Arndt & German, 
1992). These measures were chosen in order to gain the best estimate of language 
ability in each of the groups. Table 2 displays the mean scores for language 
measures. Both the deaf and hearing control group children scored within the 
average range on these measures.  
BSL Receptive Skills Test 
Deaf children who communicated via sign language (including SSE) were 
tested for their level of receptive skill in the syntax and morphology of BSL with the 
BSL Receptive Skills Test (Herman et al., 1999). At the time of testing, this was the 
only available standardised measure that could be used with deaf children (aged 3 to 
11) to estimate their ‘verbal’, or signing, age. Six grammatical features of BSL are 
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assessed by the 40 test items: spatial verbal morphology (e.g. “travel by car”), 
number/distribution (e.g. “one teddy”), negation (e.g. “not sleep”), size/shape 
specifiers (e.g. “pencil thick”), noun/verb distinctions (e.g. “boy drink”) and 
handling classifiers (e.g. “eat thin sandwich”) (Sutton-Spence and Woll, 1999). The 
test takes approximately 20 minutes to administer and ends when a child gets four 
consecutive incorrect answers. The raw score is converted to a standardised score to 
calculate a child’s ‘signing age’. 
The task was administered by the experimenter following the standardised 
procedure. The test is signed on a pre-recorded video to ensure consistency in 
administration.  The task was paused after each initial instruction to confirm the 
children had understood the task. This test begins with a vocabulary check (e.g., the 
signs for items such as “apple” and “umbrella”) to ensure that children are able to 
both comprehend and generate the signs relating to objects and people that are 
subsequently used in the test. If a child failed to pass the vocabulary check, the test 
itself was not administered. Test scores for 34 of the deaf children were obtained.  
The remaining 8 children did not obtain a sufficiently high score on the vocabulary 
check to continue with the test. As the test can only be conducted once a year, 
standardised scores were collected from schools for some of the participants to avoid 
practice effects and ensure validity.  
Craig’s Lip-reading Inventory 
 As the majority of deaf children were oral, they were also tested on their lip-
reading ability using the Craig Revised Lip-reading Inventory (Updike et al., 1992). 
Craig’s Lip-reading Inventory tests word and sentence recognition to ascertain the 
communication level of deaf children. The test includes a word test, used to record 
selected phonemes, and a sentence test to measure lip-reading for more intricate 
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language patterns. The word recognition task consists of two subsets of words each 
with 33 items (e.g. “white”, phoneme: /wh/). The sentence recognition task also 
contains two subsets each with 24 items (e.g. “a frog is hopping away from a boat”). 
Each word is accompanied by a pencil drawing to account for potential differences 
in reading ability.   
When administering the lip-reading test, the experimenter ensured that the 
child was sat facing them so that each child was able to clearly see the 
experimenter’s face.  The test began with a sample question to ensure that the task 
was understood. The experimenter asked “show me…” before each test item.  A 
multiple choice response form was provided and the child was asked to point to their 
response. 
British Picture Vocabulary Set 
 Verbal ability of the control children was tested with the British Picture Vocabulary 
Scale (BPVS) 3rd edition (BPVS III) (Dunn & Dunn, 2009). This test measures 
receptive (hearing) vocabulary of Standard English of children aged 3- 16 years. The 
test contains full colour pictures. For each test item the test administrator says a word 
and the child responds by pointing to (or reading the number of) the picture that they 
think explains the meaning of the word. The test words cover a range of content 
areas such as actions, animals, toys and emotions, and parts of speech such as nouns, 
verbs or attributes, with an increasing level of difficulty as the test progresses.  The 
test follows a standardised format of verbal instruction and begins with two test 
items to check understanding.  The raw scores are then converted into standardised 
scores to calculate a child’s verbal age.  
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Table 2.Mean and SD of Non-verbal Ability and Language Measures of Deaf and 
Hearing Children 
 Children 
 Deaf (N = 42) Hearing (N = 61) 
Non-verbal IQ 95.26 (15.85) 98.61 (13.64) 
BSL Receptive Skills  93.94 (19.49) (N = 34) -- 
Lip-reading  95.74 (21.2) -- 
BPVS -- 97.36 (14.12) 
 
 
Methodology 
Ethical statement 
 This project was approved by the Research Ethics Sub-Committee at Anglia 
Ruskin University. Informed, written consent was obtained from parents for all 
children to participate, and additional consent to be videoed was obtained for those 
children who were filmed.  The participant information sheet and consent forms 
were initially sent to participating schools who in turn forwarded these to the 
children’s parents.  Once the parents had consented, schools were contacted and 
individual testing sessions at the school were arranged. Each study was explained to 
the children prior to beginning the testing session in the appropriate language (BSL, 
SSE or English). Written consent was obtained from children aged seven and above. 
The experimenter checked with the children that they were happy to be filmed, and 
informed them that they could withdraw at any time. 
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Design and statistical analysis 
 This thesis presents five studies with novel paradigms designed to assess 
different aspects of emotion processing and social cognition in deaf children. Studies 
1 and 2 investigate the effect of motion, and study 3 investigates the effect of 
intensity, on emotion recognition. Studies 4a to 4c are exploratory studies 
investigating the emotion production abilities of deaf children when initiated by a 
verbal prompt (4a), a signed emotion story (4b) or through mimicry of facial 
expressions of emotion (4c). Study 5 investigates deaf children’s ToM abilities 
through first- and second-order false belief tasks. Studies 1, 2, 3 and 5 were assessed 
through accuracy of response and Study 4 was assessed through how easily 
recognisable and intense the expressions that the deaf children produced were 
according to both human raters and face-reading software.  
Design 
 The design of all the studies in this thesis was mixed-model. Group (deaf and 
hearing) was the dependent variable in each analysis, and the independent variables 
varied between presentation of face (human vs. cartoon), motion (static or dynamic), 
emotion (six basic emotions), intensity of expression (subtle or intense) and task of 
false belief (unexpected location/content, second order). The order of presentation of 
experimental stimuli was either counterbalanced or randomised to avoid practice and 
fatigue effects.  
Statistical analysis  
Where it was possible, parametric tests were applied using repeated measures 
ANOVAs or independent t-tests. If data did not present a normal distribution (studies 
1 -3), logarithmic transformations were applied in order to normalise the data. No 
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differences in the analysis were found so the original data was used throughout this 
thesis. The human ratings in Study 4 and ToM tasks in Study 5 produced nominal 
and ordinal data and so non-parametric equivalent tests were carried out. Post-hoc 
tests were employed to investigate the specific differences between groups. 
Bonferroni corrections were applied, and effect sizes reported, throughout.   
Due to the heterogeneous nature of deaf children, within group differences 
were explored, regrouping children according to background data collected (e.g. 
level of deafness, type of hearing amplification, whether or not a family member 
signed). For all children, further analyses (correlation and linear regression) were 
carried out to explore the relationship between language, non-verbal ability, age and 
the independent variables described above. For deaf children, additional background 
factors such as type of hearing amplification and lip-reading ability were also added 
as predictors. It should be noted that these comparisons were exploratory in nature 
due to small sample sizes.  
Statistical power  
Statistical power is often an issue in research with clinical populations: due to 
small sample sizes there can be a high degree of variability of individual 
performance. Low statistical power increases the likelihood of Type II error and so 
questions the reliability of the results. The novel experimental paradigm created for 
the studies in this thesis makes it difficult to calculate a prediction of statistical 
power. A literature review of previous research investigating emotion recognition in 
deaf children showed that studies have included groups of children with between 18 
and 30 participants. The sample of deaf children in this thesis (ranging from 27-30 in 
each study) was therefore considered sufficient to ensure adequate statistical power 



(Hosie et al., 1998; Hoypyan-Misakyan et al., 2009; Ludlow et al., 2010; Most & 
Aviner, 2009; Most & Michaelis, 2012; Ziv et al 2012).  
Outliers  
Due to the heterogeneous nature of the population of deaf children, individual 
differences according to different backgrounds were of particular interest. For this 
reason, outlier data was not removed for the deaf group of children as these cases 
may be reflective of this heterogeneity. To reduce the chance of outliers occurring 
due to boredom, fatigue or failure to understand a task, the experimenter encouraged 
all children with positive reinforcement, practice items were administered with 
feedback given, and breaks were allowed within tasks if necessary. 
General procedure 
All participants were tested individually at school in a quiet room, separate 
from the main classroom e.g. speech and language therapy room. This provided the 
children with a space free from distraction from others, but also a familiar 
environment so to make them feel at ease. For all computer based tasks, the children 
were seated at approximately 60cm in front of a 14-inch portable computer screen. 
All testing sessions were carried out by the author of this thesis. 
The experimenter communicated with the children in English, BSL or SSE 
depending on each child’s preferred method of communication. The experimenter’s 
signing level (Level 2 BSL) was sufficient to carry out the testing. However, in some 
cases in which a child’s communication was less clear, a teaching assistant 
experienced in communicating with the child was also present. This was to ensure 
full understanding and accuracy in interpreting the child’s responses. 
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In the first testing session, participants were tested on non-verbal and verbal 
ability. This session lasted between 20-30 minutes for all participating children (for 
those children with a larger vocabulary, the test lasted slightly longer). The 
additional lip-reading measure administered to deaf children lasted a further 10 
minutes. The session began with general conversation to build rapport, the 
experimenter then explained the session to the child and obtained verbal or written 
consent (7+). The Ravens CPM was conducted first as children find the interactive 
element engaging, and then the laptop was removed to avoid further distraction.  The 
children were given short breaks between tasks if necessary. The procedure for 
subsequent experimental testing sessions can be found in the individual chapters.  
 
  
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Chapter Three 
Study One: Emotion recognition of deaf and hearing children 
Overview 
 
While deaf children have demonstrated a delay in performance on false belief tasks 
testing social-cognition ToM (e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1998), less clear is their 
ability to label facial expressions of emotion: a skill thought to be an important 
aspect of understanding the mental states of others that underpins a more complex 
understanding of emotions and social-cognitive abilities. This chapter presents a 
study investigating the emotion recognition of higher functioning deaf children. The 
understanding of three emotions (happy, sad and angry) was tested using static 
images and dynamic videos of real human faces, human-like cartoon faces and non-
human cartoons. All children benefitted from the use of dynamic stimuli compared 
to the static presentation of the cartoon faces, and motion also aided emotion 
identification of human faces for the deaf children. Results indicated that while the 
deaf children showed a similar pattern of performance to hearing controls for the 
human faces, they were significantly poorer at recognising emotions in dynamic 
human cartoons.  
Introduction 
 
Facial expressions of emotion are a primary signal in alerting us to the 
affective states of others, crucial to making inferences in social interactions 
(Krumhuber et al., 2013). In emotion recognition research, actors display 
stereotypical configurations of emotions that are thought to be universal, predefined 
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patterns of muscle activation (Ekman, 2003). It is commonly held that being able to 
label facial expressions of emotion is to show a basic understanding of the mental 
state of others that is fundamental to later developing a more complex understanding 
of emotions (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Feshbach, 1982; Frith et al., 1991; Hobson, 1993). 
Emotions are strongly connected to beliefs and desires (Ashington, 1993; Wellman, 
1990); a facial expression sends a signal that indicates whether or not a desire has 
been fulfilled (e.g. happiness or pride, vs. sadness or disappointment), or whether 
someone has had a false belief as something unexpected has occurred (i.e. a 
surprise).    
While deaf children have been reported in the literature to display delays in 
the social-cognitive component as measured by the archetypal false belief task 
(Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1998), less clear is the development of the perceptual 
component, typically measured through emotion recognition. Some evidence 
suggests that deaf children are delayed or have a deficit in emotion identification in 
comparison to hearing controls (Dyck & Denver, 2003; Dyck et al., 2004; Ludlow, et 
al., 2010; Wiefferink et al., 2013). An explanation of these findings has been 
attributed to the lack of auditory input, providing less opportunity to converse and 
learn about emotions, leading to a poorer understanding of them (e.g. Peterson & 
Siegal, 1995; Weisel & Bar-Lev, 1992). Yet studies testing facial emotion 
recognition in children who are deaf are relatively sparse and have yet to produce 
conclusive findings given that the results of some studies has indicated deaf children 
can identify emotions as well as hearing children (Hosie, et al., 1998; Hopyan-
Misakyan et al., 2009; Ziv et al., 2013). 
Different patterns of performance observed by deaf children compared to 
hearing children may partly be attributable to the types of stimuli used to test their 
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emotion recognition. First, an important consideration is the potential advantage 
using real human faces may exhibit over the use of morphed or cartoon faces.  The 
use of ‘real human faces’ is clearly a better representation of emotion recognition in 
everyday life.  The human face is an important source of social information. Humans 
have been shown to pay increased attention to faces in comparison to other objects 
from an early age (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis & Morton, 1991). Our ability to 
quickly and accurately identify and recognize facial expressions is believed to 
depend on the tendency to pay attention to faces (Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006).  
 
Cartoons and synthetic stimuli do not have social cues and key facial 
features, such as skin wrinkling and bulging that are crucial in natural facial 
expression (Ekman, Friesen & Hager, 2002). Indeed, the majority of studies that 
have shown deaf children to have an emotion recognition deficit have utilised 
cartoon (Ludlow et al., 2010; Schiff, 1973; Wiefferink et al., 2013) or morphed 
images (Dyck et al., 2004). Ludlow et al. (2010) compared deaf children’s ability to 
recognize the basic emotion expressions of happiness, sadness and anger, and found 
that deaf children were better at recognizing emotions on real human faces compared 
to cartoons with similar human-like features. A similar pattern was found for hearing 
children, yet deaf children’s performance was significantly poorer. Although not the 
specific aim, a recent study by Wiefferink et al. (2013) measured deaf children’s 
emotion recognition with use of line drawings and found they performed 
significantly worse than controls. Dyck et al.’s (2004) study also found a deficit in 
deaf children’s emotion recognition using the comparatively more complex Fluid 
Emotions test, which comprises static images of the six basic emotions - happiness, 
sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise - plus contempt.  While containing 
photographs of real faces, the test measures how well a person can detect a change in 
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expression of stimuli which morph from one facial expression of emotion into 
another. Sometimes the two morphed images differ in nationality and clearly vary 
hugely from the natural expressions seen in everyday life (Glenn, 2007). 
 
For deaf individuals, the face is particularly important due to its role in the 
conveying of grammatical and syntactical information of sign language. Signers 
must rapidly identify and discriminate between linguistic and affective facial 
expressions of others (Emmorey & McCullough, 2009). In an eye tracking study, 
Muir and Richardson (2005) found that deaf people have a tendency to fixate on the 
face rather than hand movements demonstrating that the face is the most important 
region for sign language, most likely to detect facial movements related to 
expression and lip-reading patterns. Further evidence of the importance of social 
information gathered from face, in particular the eyes, was illustrated by Watanabe, 
Matsuda, Nishioka & Namatame’s (2011) study exploring gaze fixation in Japanese 
deaf and hearing adults. The deaf adults tended to fixate on the eye region, contrary 
to the hearing adults who fixated on the central part of the face, as is normal within 
Japanese culture where excessive eye contact is viewed as being rude (Blais, Jack, 
Scheepers, Fiset & Caldara, 2008). For the deaf community, eye contact has been 
shown to be vital in communication, and avoidance disrupts communication more 
significantly than in hearing communities (Mindess, 2006). Deaf individuals may 
have a particular expertise with faces, as demonstrated by previous findings of 
superior detection of subtle differences in facial features, distinguishing among 
similar faces (e.g., the Benton Faces Test) and in discriminating local facial features 
(Arnold & Mills, 2001; Arnold & Murray, 1998; Bettger, Emmorey, McCullough, & 
Bellugi, 1997). This suggests that experience with 
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status for emotion recognition in deaf children and that their ability may depend on 
the social relevance of the stimuli. 
 
A second consideration is that much of the research addressing emotion 
recognition in deaf children has largely utilized static photographs (e.g. Hosie et al., 
1998; Ludlow et al. , 2010) or morphed pictures (Dyck et al., 2004). Although Dyck 
et al.’s (2004) stimuli contained motion as the images morph from one to another, 
viewing the transformation from one face to another does not reflect the experience 
of emotion perception in everyday life. While studies have shown that static facial 
features are sufficient for recognizing facial expressions of emotion (e.g. Ellison & 
Massaro, 1997; McKelvie, 1995; White, 2002), many researchers have argued that 
the use of static photographs and images lack ecological validity (e.g. Ambadar, 
Schooler, & Cohn, 2005; Atkinson & Adolphs, 2005). One explanation for this lack 
of validity is that during social interactions our emotions involve a great deal of 
movement; therefore it is expected that we learn to discriminate and interpret 
emotional displays through these interchanges. In comparison, static images largely 
correspond to clear, distinct and identifiable peaks of socially meaningful 
movements (Atkinson, Dittrich, Gemmell & Young, 2004).  
 
Some studies have shown the dynamic presentation of facial expressions to 
improve the recognition of emotional expressions compared to static image 
presentations (Harwood, Hall, & Shinkfield, 1999). Motion signals associated with 
the emergence of facial expressions have been shown to be a useful cue in correctly 
labelling a target subtle emotion expression in adults (Ambadar et al., 2005; Bould & 
Morris, 2008) and with the use of synthetic stimuli (Wehrle, Kaiser, Schmidt, & 
Scherer, 2000).  Yet the effect of motion has not been uniform across studies. Where 
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clear prototypical human faces have been utilized, a non-motion effect has been 
found in both adults (Kamachi et al., 2001; Kätsyri & Sams, 2008) and children 
(Nelson & Russell, 2011).  It has been reasoned that when clear facial expressions 
are posed by human actors, identification of basic emotions is already close to 
ceiling (Ekman & Friesen, 1978) leaving dynamic information redundant.  
 
There is particular reason to consider dynamic emotion recognition in deaf 
children given the vital role movement appears to play. For example, the deaf and 
hard of hearing rely more heavily on motion cues while gauging when to cross a 
busy road. Deaf people are also reliant on motion for language, both when 
comprehending critical linguistic information in the hand movements of sign 
language (Corina et al., 2007), and when reading the movement of lip patterns in the 
absence of auditory cues (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2002). Deaf signers have 
been shown to have a strong left hemisphere advantage for motion processing which 
has been linked to experience in sign language (Bosworth & Dobkins, 2002).  
 
There is logic in supposing that the development of visual attention in the 
absence of auditory input will be different in deaf children, considering that the 
coordination of hearing and vision appears to be an important factor in the 
development of visual attention in hearing children (Smith & Breazeal, 2007). It 
appears that a greater sensitivity to motion is a notable consequence of the impact of 
absence on audition in the development of deaf individuals’ visual attention. As a 
result they seem to be more sensitive to some kinds of information: neuroimaging 
studies and electrophysiological data have shown increased activation in motion 
sensitive areas (medial superior temporal (MST) area and media temporal (MT) 
area) in deaf individuals when monitoring motion flow fields to detect velocity 
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changes in peripheral stimuli (Armstrong, Hillyard, Neville & Mitchell, 2002; 
Stevens & Neville, 2006). Movement may also be important for emotion recognition 
such that real life facial expressions are dynamic and they indicate moment to 
moment changes in emotional states of other individuals (Sato & Yoshikawa, 2004).  
Considering that dynamic properties of facial expressions strongly influence 
perception of hearing individuals (Kamachi et al., 2001), it is important to address 
how this might impact upon emotion processing in a deaf population. 
 
A final consideration is the uneven IQ profile amongst studies finding a 
deficit in deaf children’s emotion recognition in facial expressions, meaning that 
currently the disparity cannot solely be attributed to differences in social cognition 
(Dyck et al., 2004; Ludlow et al., 2010). Although Ludlow et al.’s (2010) study 
involved the use of more synthetic stimuli as cartoons were included in addition to 
human faces, a deficit in the three basic emotions of happiness, sadness and anger 
was still found even in human faces. It is surprising that no differences in age were 
found despite the age of the children spanning ten years with the oldest being aged 
sixteen.  It is noteworthy that the mean average IQ of the deaf participants was two 
SDs below the deaf national average. In contrast, Hosie et al. (1998) tested deaf and 
hearing children, matched for non-verbal ability, on recognition of the six basic 
emotions in real human faces and found no overall differences. While the matching 
task used is based more upon perceptual skills than emotion understanding, no 
difference was also found on the following task asking children to freely label 
emotions in faces. 
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Study 1 
The primary aim of the present study was to assess whether differences in 
emotion recognition would be observed in a group of higher functioning deaf 
children. The study was in part a replication of a previous study looking at the 
importance of facial features in emotion recognition (Ludlow et al, 2010). The aim 
was to investigate emotion recognition for the three basic emotions (happiness, 
sadness, anger) presented in photographs of real faces, human-like cartoon faces, and 
cartoon faces that were not human-like. This continuum provides a way to identify 
the importance of features in processing emotions, such that cartoons contain fewer 
and more distinguishable features than real faces. In order to account for the reality 
that emotion is rarely static in nature, the use of dynamic images was included.   
 
A number of predictions were made based on the research here outlined.  
Hypothesis one: Deaf children were predicted to display worse performance 
at identifying emotion in cartoon faces than hearing children, but that performance 
would be similar between groups for the human faces showing the three basic 
emotions of happiness, sadness and anger. 
 Hypothesis two: It was expected for both groups that there would be an 
advantage for human faces over cartoons.  
Hypothesis three: It was predicted that the use of dynamic images would 
facilitate emotion understanding in both the deaf and hearing children in the cartoon 
conditions. Considering the importance of motion to deaf children, it was predicted 
that motion would facilitate deaf children’s performance on human faces, but not 
hearing children’s. 
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Method 
Participants 
Thirty deaf children (18 girls) aged between 5 years 11 months and 11 years 
6 months (mean CA = 8 years 4 months; SD = 1 years 8 months) participated in the 
study.  Each child attended one of three mainstream schools with special units for 
hearing impaired children. The criteria for selection was the presence of prelingual 
hearing loss at either a moderate-to-severe (>60db; N = 20) or profound level (>90 
db; N = 10) in their better ear. None of the deaf children were native signers.  The 
majority of children were oral in their communication preference (N= 20). The 
majority of children also used some sign language (either BSL and/or SSE). Ten 
children communicated mainly via sign (BSL and/or SSE). All children received 
auditory amplification: 16 children wore cochlear implants and 14 wore hearing aids. 
None of the deaf participants had known associated medical disorders at the time of 
testing.  
 
A group of 32 control children (18 girls) with no hearing loss, matched to the 
deaf children by gender, non-verbal IQ and CA  (aged 6 years 1 month - 11 years 9 
months: Mean CA = 8 years 11 months, SD = 1 years 6 months) also participated in 
the study. Table 3 displays the mean CA, non-verbal ability and language scores for 
the deaf and control group participants. There was no significant difference between 
standardised Raven’s CPM scores of the deaf and control group children, t (60) = -
1.65, p = .10. The hearing control group was also closely matched in CA to the deaf 
group with no significant difference between the two groups, t (60) =-1.49, p =.14.  
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Table 3. CA, Non-verbal IQ, Verbal IQ and Language Measure Mean Scores and 
SDs for Deaf and Control Group Children (Study 1) 
 Children 
 Deaf Hearing 
CA (yrs.mnths) 
Non-verbal IQ 
8.4 (1.8) 
94.17 (17.67) 
8.11 (1.6) 
101.09 (15.33) 
Verbal IQ  104.59 (12.03) 
Lip Reading 97.2 (15.59)  
BSL Receptive 96.96 (14.04) (N = 28)  
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
 
Materials  
Faces: The study’s stimuli consisted of 54 black and white images depicting 
the emotions, happiness, sadness, and anger, presented in three conditions: unedited 
human faces, human-like cartoon faces and non-human cartoon faces (Figure 1; see 
Appendix B for full stimuli set). The 18 human faces (nine male) were selected from 
the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expression Set (ADFES) (Van der Schalk, Hawk, 
Fischer & Doosje, 2011). The dynamic facial stimuli were standardised video clips 
of North-European people based upon the prototypes of the ‘basic emotions’ 
according to the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) Investigator’s Guide defined 
by Ekman et al., (2002). The static stimuli were produced by freezing the film at the 
apex (point of most intense muscular contraction) of the model’s expression.  
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The human and non-human cartoon faces were adapted from the dataset of 
Rosset et al. (2008), which had been chosen from cartoon movies. Cartoons were 
selected according to current popularity with children. The computer animation 
program, CrazyTalk Animator (Reallusion Inc., 2011), was employed to create the 
dynamic images, beginning from a neutral expression to display an emotion 
(happiness, anger and sadness). As the static cartoons were already displaying an 
animated expression, it was necessary to first edit them to a neutral expression using 
the freely available photo editing software, GNU Image Manipulation Program 
(GIMP, 2011). The static images were presented as a screenshot of the fully 
animated version of the dynamic image. All faces were presented upright, in full face 
presentation and were cropped at the neckline. Stimuli were displayed in the centre 
of a 14 inch computer screen using Microsoft Power Point Presentation software. 
Each static image appeared on the screen for five seconds and the dynamic film clips 
also lasted for five seconds. 
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Figure 1.Examples of human, human cartoon and non-human cartoon faces 
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Design 
The study’s design was mixed-model with a 3 x (Presentation: Real vs. 
Human vs. Non-Human) x 2 (Motion: Static vs. Dynamic) 2 x (Participant: Deaf vs. 
CA). The first two factors were within participants and the third factor was between 
participants. The trials were randomized into three versions of presentation (A, B, C) 
for both the static and dynamic presentations. The order of these presentations was 
counterbalanced between participants. Whether the static or dynamic presentation 
was initially shown was also counterbalanced. 
Procedure 
The children were asked to identify the emotion displayed in each image as happy, 
sad or angry, displayed on the screen of a portable 14-inch computer. In order to 
ensure that participants understood the test instructions, they were presented with 3 
training trials with feedback. Following this, they were presented with 108 trials 
corresponding to 2 blocks of 54 trials: one containing static human faces and one 
containing dynamic human faces. Each block comprised six human faces, six faces 
of human cartoons and six faces of non-human cartoons, each presented as 
happiness, sadness and anger. Stimuli were displayed on the screen until the subject 
responded. 
A short break was given between each block if necessary. Verbal or signed 
responses were recorded by the experimenter. A score of one was given for a correct 
response and a score of zero if incorrect. The experimenter’s signing level (BSL 
Level 2; minimum requirement for teachers of the deaf) was proficient enough to 
interpret the signed responses. 
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Results 
The number of errors in the recognition of each emotion was the main unit of 
measurement4. Table 4 displays the percentage means and standard deviations for the 
number of errors for Presentation of face (real face, human cartoon, non-human 
cartoon) and level of Motion (static or dynamic) for deaf and control group 
participants. The mixed analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect of 
Participant, F (1, 60) = 4.20, MSE = 3.83, p = .05, η² = .07, showing that overall deaf 
children were less accurate at identifying emotions than hearing children (mean 
difference = .416, p =.05).  A main effect of Presentation was found, F (2, 120) = 
179.99, MSE = 1.36, p< .001, η² = .75; overall, real faces had significantly less 
errors than human (mean difference = 1.82, p<.001) and non-human cartoon faces 
(mean difference = 2.76, p<.001), and cartoon faces had significantly less errors than 
non-human cartoon faces (mean difference = .95, p<.001).  A main effect of Motion 
was also present, F (1, 60) = 87.02, MSE = 1.08, p< .001, η² = .59, so that overall, 
static faces had significantly more errors than dynamic faces (mean difference = 
1.01, p<.001).  
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The error scores presented positive skewness in both groups so the data was 
subjected to a logarithmic transformation plus a constant (lg10 +1) in order to 
normalise the data. No differences in the analysis were found so the original data 
was used in the presented analysis and throughout this thesis. 
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Table 4. Mean and SD of Errors by Participant, Presentation and Motion (Max.18) 
 Real human  Human-Cartoon  Non-human cartoon Total 
 Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Deaf 
.37 
(.72)a 
.07 
(.25)b 
2.77 
(1.68)a 
1.87 
(1.68)b 
3.7 
(1.64)a 
2.67 
(1.79)b 
6.83 
(2.89) 
4.6 
(3.47) 
Hearing 
.22 
(.55)a 
0.03 
(.18)a 
2.63 
(1.62)a 
.69 
(.86)b 
3.53 
(1.37)a 
1.84 
(.99)b 
6.38 
(2.8) 
2.72 
(1.49) 
Total  
.29 
(.64) 
.05 
(.22) 
2.69 
(1.64) 
1.26 
(1.44) 
3.61 
(1.5) 
2.24 
(1.48) 
6.6 
(2.83) 
3.63 
(2.72) 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. For each type of face (Real, Human-Cartoon, 
Non-Human cartoon), means in the same row with different subscripts are significantly 
different with Bonferroni adjusted significance level p< .02. 

The Participant x Motion interaction was significant, F (1, 60) = 5.94, MSE = 
1.08, p = .02, η² = .09; post-hoc analysis with Bonferroni corrections showed no 
significant differences between the groups when comparing static presentation, t (60) 
= .64, p = .53; Cohen’s d = .17, but that deaf children made significantly more errors 
than hearing children in the dynamic presentation, t (60) = 2.88, p = .006; Cohen’s d 
= .70. Importantly, the Presentation x Motion interaction was significant, F (2, 120) 
= 17.02, MSE = .80, p< .001, η² = .22.  Post-hoc tests with Bonferroni corrections 
revealed that identification of emotions was significantly and consistently lower in 
static faces compared with dynamic faces across the three presentations ( human 
faces: t(61) = 3.22 p=.002, Cohen’s d = .50; human cartoon: t(61) = 6.67, p <.001, 
Cohen’s d = .93;  and non-human cartoon: t(61) = 6.92, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .92). 
The Presentation x Participant interaction was not significant, F (2, 120) = 1.95, 
MSE = 1.36, p = .15, η² = .03. 
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All these effects were qualified by a significant three way interaction 
between Presentation × Participant × Motion, F (2, 120) = 3.33, MSE = .80, p = .04, 
η² = .05. Post-hoc analyses with Bonferroni corrections (adjusted significance level 
of .008) revealed there were no significant differences between the deaf and hearing 
children when identifying real faces, either in the dynamic (t (60) = .20, p = .52, 
Cohen’s d =.18), or the static presentation, (t (60) = .92, p = .37, Cohen’s d =.23 ). 
There were also no significant differences between deaf and hearing children when 
identifying non-human cartoon faces, either in the dynamic (t (60) = 2.63, p = .03, 
ns, Cohen’s d = .57) or static presentation (t (60) = .44, p = .66, Cohen’s d =.11). 
Importantly, results showed that deaf children made significantly more errors than 
hearing children in the human cartoon faces only in the dynamic presentation, t (60) 
=  3.52, p =.001, Cohen’s d =.88 ; but this difference was not significant when 
comparing the static presentation, t (60) = .34, p = .74, Cohen’s d = .08. 
To investigate the effect of IQ, BSL receptive language, lip-reading and CA 
on performance of the deaf children Spearman Rank Correlation tests were 
computed. The results revealed that none of these correlations were significant (all 
ps> .05). Similarly, for hearing control children, IQ, BPVS and CA were not 
significantly correlated with performance (all ps> .05). 
Heterogeneity of deaf children 
Further analyses were carried out to explore whether differences occurred in 
deaf children’s overall performance in emotion recognition depending on the type of 
hearing amplification (CI or HA), level of deafness (moderate-severe or profound), 
communication preference (oral or sign) and whether or not family members signed. 
Table 5 displays mean scores for total static and dynamic errors for each sub-group. 
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Table 5. Mean and SDs for Total Static and Dynamic Emotion Recognition Errors for Subgroups of Deaf Children (Study 1)  
(Divided by hearing amplification, level of deafness, communication preference, and whether have signing family members) 
 
             CI or HA                          Level of deafness                      Communication 
 
 Signing family  
     members 
 CI  
(N = 14) 
HA  
(N= 16) 
 Severe 
(N = 20) 
 Profound 
(N = 10) 
  Oral 
(N = 20) 
Sign 
(N = 10) 
Yes  
(N = 20)  
     
No  
(N = 10) 
 
 
Static 
 
1.57 (1.0) 
 
1.56 (.77) 
 
1.55 (.79) 
 
1.6 (1.05) 
 
1.55 (.89) 
 
1.6 (.88) 
 
1.78 (.80) 
 
1.15 (.88) 
Dynamic  1.04 (.91) .91 (.86) .95 (.86) 1.0 (.94) 1.0 (.90) .90 (.84) 1.03 (.88) .85 (.88) 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
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The possible difference in performance based on the severity of hearing loss 
was examined comparing the children with a hearing loss classed as moderate-to-
severe and profound. Results revealed no significant differences in recognition of 
static, t (28) = .09, p = .93, Cohen’s d = .03; or dynamic faces, t (28) = .23, p = .82, 
Cohen’s d =.09. Further analysis was performed on the sample of deaf children in 
order to investigate whether signing ability, preferences in communication style (oral 
vs. signing), and the type of hearing aid the children had moderated any of the 
effects reported. For signing ability, deaf children were grouped into those who had 
signing family members and those who did not. Errors of static and dynamic faces 
were compared across groups.  The analysis suggested that presence of signing 
family members did not have a significant effect on emotion recognition in static 
images, t (28) = .85, p =.41, Cohen’s d = .31; or dynamic images, t (28) = .340 p = 
.74, Cohen’s d = .13.  
Preference in communication (oral (N = 20), signing (N = 6) or both (N = 4)) 
was analysed.  As the majority of children in this study preferred to communicate 
orally, preference for oral communication was compared with the other two types to 
create a meaningful comparison group. Results revealed that the type of preferred 
communication did not have an effect on the recognition of static, t (28) = .18, p = 
.86, Cohen’s d = .07; or dynamic faces, t (28) = .11, p = .91, Cohen’s d = .31. 
Analysis investigating the effect of type of hearing amplification revealed no 
differences between those with hearing aid and those with cochlear implants on the 
recognition of static, t (28) = -.04, p = .97, Cohen’s d = .72; or dynamic faces, t (28) 
= -.28, p = .78, Cohen’s d = .26. 
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Discussion 
Studies where emotion deficits in deaf children have been reported have 
tended to include a sample of children with lower IQs than the national average, so 
these results may not reflect what is typical of the deaf population (e.g. Dyck et al., 
2004; Ludlow et al., 2010). The three aims of the current study were to assess 
whether differences in emotion recognition would be observed in a group of higher-
functioning deaf children, and to consider the importance of motion cues (static 
versus dynamic) and social relevance (human faces in comparison to cartoon faces) 
in emotion recognition ability.  
This was the first study to examine the effect of dynamic displays of emotion 
on deaf children’s emotion recognition. The current findings indicate that the deaf 
children followed a similar pattern to their hearing controls in demonstrating a 
significant advantage for both the real faces and the use of dynamic displays in 
processing emotion (Ambadar et al., 2005). Reason dictates that dynamic faces have 
greater ecological validity and would be easier to interpret as everyday interactions 
largely involve dynamic face processing. Yet despite testing a group of deaf children 
with average non-verbal IQ, they were still significantly poorer overall at identifying 
basic emotions compared with their hearing controls.  
As predicted by hypothesis one, the results replicate those previously 
reported in some of the literature and appear to suggest that deaf children have some 
differences relative to hearing controls in their emotion recognition ability when the 
stimuli utilized is either cartoons or morphed faces as opposed to real human faces 
(e.g. Dyck et al., 2004; Ludlow et al., 2010; Wiefferink, et al., 2013). However, it is 
important to raise caution in interpreting the results as an actual deficit. When 
looking at the margins of error, even though the deaf children were significantly 
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poorer than their hearing controls, they were still able to identify a substantial 
number of emotions correctly. In particular, the difference in recognising the human 
faces was not significantly different between the deaf and hearing control group as 
was predicted; error rates were low and demonstrated near ceiling effects, as has 
been found in other previous studies on deaf children’s emotion recognition using 
prototypical human faces (Most & Aviner, 2009; Hopsan-Miskyan et al., 2009; 
Hosie et al., 1998; Ziv, et al., 2013).  
By using the continuum of stimuli of real faces - human cartoon - nonhuman 
cartoon faces, the importance of facial features in the ability to recognize emotions 
was able to be tested. The cartoon faces contained fewer and more distinguishable 
features than real faces and, in line with hypothesis two, both deaf and hearing 
children were poorer across the trials using cartoon faces. An advantage for real over 
cartoon faces may reflect the importance of children’s expertise with features of real 
faces. Clearly, real faces hold more important information for emotion recognition 
than cartoons and this difference may be particularly significant to individuals who 
are deaf, due to their reliance of certain facial expressions for both linguistic and 
affective markers (Corina et al., 2007). It appears that with increased social 
relevance of the stimuli, increased performance in emotion recognition is found in 
deaf children. 
The results of Study 1 partly support the view that motion will aid deaf 
children in emotion identification (hypothesis three), in particular, in disambiguating 
the cartoon emotion expressions (Bould & Morris, 2008; Kätsyri & Sams, 2008; 
Wehrle et al. 2000). For the deaf children in this study, the advantage for dynamic 
images existed in human faces also, whereas this was not the case for the hearing 
controls. The result for hearing children replicates results found in previous research 
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where clear prototypical displays of static images reduced the advantage of dynamic 
images (Nelson & Russell, 2011).  However, the effect size of motion was not as 
great for deaf children as it was for hearing controls in improving emotion 
identification in cartoons, which is interesting as motion is a vital cue to perception 
in the world for deaf individuals. The lack of certain facial features in the cartoon 
stimuli, such as skin wrinkling and bulging that are key in natural facial expression 
(Ekman et al., 2002), could explain poorer identification rates in cartoons and point 
to an expertise with the face in children. Indeed, deaf children’s relative difficulty in 
identifying emotions in cartoons in comparison to hearing children, and the 
advantage of dynamic images for emotion recognition in human faces, may further 
highlight their reliance on the non-verbal and certain facial expressions of real 
human faces (Corina et al., 2007). 
Alternatively, a relative difficulty in identifying emotion expressions in 
cartoons, even when in motion, may reflect that deaf children watch fewer cartoons 
in comparison to hearing children. This seems unlikely, however, as deaf children 
have been shown to watch as much television, if not more than their hearing peers 
(Liss & Price, 1981). Yet hearing children are able to follow cartoons before they 
develop reading skills and are therefore more likely to be able to link the emotions 
displayed in cartoons with other emotion cues present in speech, found in the content 
of language, emotional prosody and in contextual/pragmatic cues. Deaf children are 
reliant on captions for such information and yet are known to be delayed in their 
reading abilities (Lewis & Jackson, 2001). Moreover, it has also been identified that 
traditional captioning omits important information such as information about the 
emotive characteristics of the dialogue or music (Fels, Lee, Branje & Hornburg, 
2005). As a result, deaf children may watch cartoons, but subtitles or the narrative 
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and intentions and actions of the characters may be misunderstood (Lewis & 
Jackson, 2001).  
A further alternative explanation of deaf children’s higher error rates in 
identifying emotions in cartoons in Study 1 is that it could signal a difficulty with 
more subtle emotions. Despite containing roughly similar FACS units, as a result of 
technical limitations the cartoon stimuli were likely to be less intense than the natural 
human faces (Kätsyri & Sams, 2008). In everyday life we more frequently 
experience more subtle and less intense changes in emotion.  Intensity has been 
shown to influence recognition accuracy in children’s identification of emotion 
expressions and improve with age (Gao & Maurer, 2010; Montirosso et al., 2010). 
Dynamic images have been shown to enhance emotion identification in subtle 
expressions of low intensity (Ambadar et al., 2001), therefore it is conceivable that 
because the cartoon faces in study 2 contained static cues that were subtle, the 
dynamic effect was pronounced. As the effect size was greater for the hearing 
control children than the deaf children it calls into question whether dynamic 
presentation of subtle human faces would provide a sufficient cue to allow for 
correct identification for deaf children.  
A second limitation of the present study is the near ceiling effects in 
identification, particularly in the human facial expressions of emotion, suggestive 
that the task was too simplistic to effectively test deaf children’s emotion recognition 
abilities. The results may suggest that deaf children’s emotion processing of human 
faces of emotion is intact. Alternatively it could be an artefact of an inconsistency 
between experimental stimuli. The human faces utilized in this study were presented 
in colour while the human cartoon and non-human cartoon faces were presented in 
black-and-white. There is evidence to suggest that stimulus salience - in this 
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instance, colour – has an impact on attention (Parkhurst, Law and Niebur, 2002; 
Treisman and Gelade, 1980). Yet it is also reasonable to expect that deaf children 
can interpret the three most basic emotions of happiness, sadness and anger in clear 
and exaggerated displays in human faces as shown in some previous studies (e.g. 
Hosie et al., 1998). What remains to be seen is whether the deaf children would be 
able to perform accurately with more complex emotions in real, dynamic faces, such 
as fear, disgust and surprise. 
In sum, the results of Study 1 suggest that, while deaf children were poorer at 
recognising the dynamic version of cartoons than hearing children, recognition of 
emotion in human faces – whether presented in a static form or in motion – is intact. 
The near ceiling results for human faces, however, may be precluding differences 
between groups and so a more challenging emotion recognition task inclusive of 
additional, more complex emotions is necessary. For both groups, motion was an aid 
to recognition for the synthetic cartoon stimuli. Motion appeared to improve emotion 
recognition in human faces for deaf children, but again more investigation is 
necessary given the low error scores for both static and dynamic stimuli for deaf 
children. The subtle expressions in the cartoon static stimuli proved difficult for both 
groups to identify emotions, but the dynamic cue was not as great for deaf children 
as it was for hearing children. This indicates that for deaf children, additional cues 
that are provided from human faces are more essential for emotion identification.  
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Chapter Four 
Study Two: Emotion recognition of deaf and hearing children in 
real dynamic faces 
Overview 
 
In the previous chapter it was found that deaf children’s facial emotion recognition 
performance was worse than that of the hearing children’s for cartoon faces but not 
human faces, and that the dynamic presentation facilitated their performance. In this 
chapter, Study 2 further explores deaf children’s facial emotion identification of an 
additional three emotions – fear, disgust and surprise – along with happiness, 
sadness and anger. Emotion recognition was tested in static (still photographs) and 
dynamic (video clips) displays. Results revealed no overall difference between the 
deaf and hearing control group children, but deaf children performed worse on the 
emotion, disgust. Dynamic presentations were shown to significantly aid deaf but not 
hearing children’s emotion recognition.  
 
Introduction 
Study 1 found that deaf children performed better at emotion recognition of 
the three most basic emotions – happiness, sadness and anger - when presented in a 
dynamic rather than a static presentation of real human faces. It is arguable that 
showing at least all six of the basic emotions gives greater ecological validity 
(Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004). This chapter focuses on deaf children’s emotion 
recognition of all six of the basic emotions in real human faces.  
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Ekman (1999) suggested that there are universal visual cues for the 
perception of happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise, the key facial 
indicators being the eyes and the mouth. Facial emotion recognition research with 
typically developing hearing children has shown that the age at which these emotions 
can be reliably identified varies according to age. It has been shown that typically 
developing infants as young as three or four months of age can distinguish static 
displays of happy, sad and surprised faces (Young-Browne et al., 1977) and dynamic 
displays of happy and angry faces by seven months of age (Soken & Pick, 1992). 
Widen and Russell (2003) demonstrated that by the age of four years, typically 
developing children are able to freely label ‘prototypical’ (exaggerated, strong) 
displays of happiness, anger and sadness with near perfect accuracy, and are 
becoming more proficient at recognising fear and surprise. Ekman (2007) proposed 
that happiness is recognised earlier because it primarily involves recognition of the 
mouth movements, whereas the affective facial expression of fear is recognised later 
due to the required integration of information from the mouth, eyes and forehead. 
Only a handful of studies have included all six of the basic emotions when 
investigating the emotion recognition abilities of deaf children using human faces. 
These studies vary considerably in terms of stimuli used and methodology adopted 
making a comparison of studies challenging.  In a recent study, Ziv et al., (2013) 
found deaf and hearing children to be similar in their ability to label emotion 
expressions, however unlike other studies, the scoring system allowed points for a 
‘partially’ correct answer, meaning an emotion of the same valence was credited 
(e.g. 1 point rather than the full 2 points was given if a child labelled an emotion as 
‘sad’ rather than ‘angry’). Hosie et al. (1998) similarly found deaf and hearing 
children to be comparable on both matching and labelling tasks. Moreover, while the 
deaf children, like the hearing children, found disgust and fear most difficult to 
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correctly identify, they were found to be superior to the hearing children at labelling 
disgust and fear.  Hosie et al. reasoned that deaf children were relatively better at 
recognising the two emotions most difficult for hearing children, as usually hearing 
children identify emotions with the auditory as well as visual cues in everyday life. 
Conversely deaf children, reliant on visual cues in emotion processing, may show an 
enhanced sensitivity to facial expressions. It is noteworthy that when emotion 
matching tasks have preceded emotion labelling tasks identification rates have been 
higher (Harrigan, 1984). 
Yet, as aforementioned, some studies investigating emotion recognition in 
deaf children have shown a deficit in comparison to hearing children. Dyck et al.’s 
(2004) study was comparatively more difficult than other studies. Dyck et al. 
compared deaf and hearing children on a composite test – the Fluid Emotions test - 
rather than looking at individual emotions; the more complex emotion of contempt 
was included, which has been shown to be recognised later than the basic emotions 
such as happiness, fear and anger (De Sonneville et al., 2002; Gross & Ballif, 1991; 
Herba & Philips, 2004). Additionally, children were assessed based on speed of 
response as well as accuracy, which places a higher demand on their processing 
skills. 
 
Another theme in the research addressing deaf children’s emotion 
understanding is the crucial contribution of language on their development of 
emotions. Interestingly, when the samples in Dyck et al.’s (2004) study were 
matched for language ability, the deaf children and adolescents’ performance was 
not significantly different from the controls’.  This suggests that either the test 
materials may have been too reliant on language, or that language is an important 
factor in recognising and understanding others’ emotions.  Studies have shown that 
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deaf children of hearing parents have fewer and less complex explanations of their 
own and other people's emotional displays than deaf children of deaf signing parents 
(Marschark, 1993). It has been suggested that this difference can be explained by the 
lack of opportunities to converse and to overhear others’ conversations as a result of 
reduced auditory input (Woolfe et al., 2002). These findings are also supported by 
results showing that once a common language between parents and children is 
present, for example sign language in parents of deaf children, it provides an 
opportunity for the children to talk and learn about emotions (Meristo et al., 2007). 
 
Focusing on the relationship between early language development and better 
emotion understanding, many researchers are beginning to explore the broader 
effects of auditory amplifications, such as CIs or HAs on deaf children’s emotional 
and social development (Wang, Su,  Fang,  & Zhou, 2011). Both CI and HA are one 
of the most significant advances in recent decades, allowing deaf children earlier 
access to some degree of spoken language. Importantly, an increasing number of 
deaf children grow up in hearing families and attend mainstream schools (Lachs et 
al., 2001), with some literature showing the effectiveness of these devices on their 
perception of speech (Lee et al., 2010; Sharma et al., 2002). However, relatively few 
studies have addressed their effect on emotion recognition with the small amount of 
studies carried out yielding mixed results. For example, some studies have found no 
differences in facial emotion recognition when comparing a group of older deaf 
children with early amplification (7-17 years old with CI and HA compared to age 
matched hearing children; Hopyan-Misakyan et al., 2009; Most & Aviner, 2009). In 
contrast, when younger groups of children have been compared, pre-schooler users 
of CI or HA with age matched hearing children, results showed that hearing children 
performed significantly better than those with CI or HA; this suggests that there was 





a delay in pre-schoolers with CI or HA on facial emotion recognition (Wang et al., 
2011). 
Some accounts of typically developing children’s emotion development posit 
that their labelling ‘errors’ reveal how they understand emotions (Gao & Maurer, 
2009; Widen & Russell, 2003). Initially, children only use two labels (usually 
‘happiness’ and ‘sadness’) because their understanding of emotions relates to 
positive and negative valence rather than the discrete categories that are later used as 
adults (Widen & Russell, 2008a). Hosie et al. (1998) is the only study to date to look 
at deaf children’s error patterns in emotion recognition. The results suggested a 
similar pattern of errors to hearing children. Younger children tended to label 
negative emotions as sad; disgust was confused with anger, and fear with surprise, 
reasoned as being similar on a dimension of pleasure and arousal (Bullock & 
Russell, 1984). 
 
 Another possible explanation for errors is that the static images used in 
emotion recognition research do not adequately capture expressions seen in everyday 
life  It has been questioned whether static images are sufficient in terms of ecological 
validity given that a key feature of facial behaviour is its dynamic nature (see chapter 
four for a review). It is important to consider dynamic displays not only because of 
higher ecological validity, but also because of the differential neural activation that is 
evoked (Atkinson & Adolphs, 2005; Krumhuber et al., 2013). Importantly, a number 
of neuroimaging studies have revealed higher brain activity in regions linked to the 
processing of social (superior temporal sulci) and emotion relevant (amygdalae) 
information when viewing dynamic rather than static expressive faces (Kilts et al., 
2003; Klesser et al., 2011). This neuroscientific evidence is suggestive of a neural 
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network that facilitates social interaction by helping us to understand others, identify 
their needs and predict their actions (Krumhuber et al., 2013). Given deaf children’s 
delays in cognitive tasks assessing ToM (the false belief task e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 
1995), it is of particular importance to investigate emotion recognition of more 
socially valid dynamic facial expressions. 
 
 Previous studies investigating deaf children’s emotion recognition had 
utilised static (e.g. Hosie et al., 1998; Ziv et al., 2013) or morphed pictures (Dyck et 
al., 2004), yet it has been suggested that the use of ‘real people’ is required to prompt 
stronger effects with dynamic stimuli (Sato, Fujimura, & Suzuki, 2008). Motion has 
previously been shown to be a vital cue for deaf people in interpreting lip-reading 
and hand signals in sign language (Corina et al., 2007; Haxby et al., 2002), and the 
results of Study 1 suggest this may also be the case for recognising emotion. Study 1 
found that deaf children performed better at emotion recognition of the three most 
basic emotions – happiness, sadness, anger - when presented in a dynamic rather 
than a static presentation of real human faces.  
Study 2  
Typically developed children have difficulty in producing and 
comprehending acceptable verbal labels for expressions of disgust, fear and surprise 
(e.g., Harrigan, 1984; Markham & Adams, 1992; Michalson & Lewis, 1985). In 
order to gain a better understanding of deaf children’s recognition of facially 
expressed emotions, Study 2 explored all six of the basic emotions: surprise, fear and 
disgust, in addition to happiness, sadness and anger, using both static and dynamic 
images of real faces. The human faces were selected from the ADFES (Van der 
Schalk et al., 2011), chosen because the set was carefully developed to represent the 
prototypes of the universal emotion signals based on the FACS (Ekman & Friesen, 




1978). To our knowledge, it is the only standardized set of faces that contains filmed, 
natural expressions of ‘real people’.  
The following hypotheses were drawn on the basis of previous research. 
Hypothesis one: Motion will improve emotion recognition in deaf children. 
Hypothesis two: The more complex emotions of fear and disgust will be 
comparatively more difficult for all children. Deaf children will be poorer at these 
more complex emotions than hearing children due to fewer opportunities to discuss 
emotions.  
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-seven deaf children (16 female) aged between 5 years 9 months and 
11 years 6 months (M = 8 years 8 months; SD = 1 year 7 months) took part in the 
study.  All deaf children were selected from the same schools and had the same pre-
lingual loss characteristics as outlined in Study 1 (21 children had moderate-to-
severe hearing loss and 6 had profound hearing loss). None of the children were 
native signers and the majority of children were oral in their communication 
preference (N = 21). Only two deaf children communicated mainly in BSL and four 
used a combination of oral and BSL. For the purpose of analysis, these six children 
were grouped as ‘signers’.  All children had auditory amplification: 16 children wore 
hearing aids and 11 had cochlear implants. None of the children had any identified 
additional learning difficulties in addition to their deafness.  
A group of 26 control children with no hearing loss (13 female), aged 
between 6 years 1 months and 11 years 2 months (M = 9 years 0 months; SD = 1 
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year 5 months), also participated in the study. The control group was matched to the 
deaf group of children on CA. Mean scores for CA, non-verbal IQ and language 
measures for both groups are shown in Table 6.  An independent t-test confirmed a 
non-significant difference between deaf and hearing children demonstrated that the 
groups were well matched on CA, t (51) = -.865, p = .39. However, the hearing 
control group children had significantly higher non-verbal IQ scores than the deaf 
children, t (51) -2.07, p =.04. 
Materials  
The study’s stimuli comprises 30 unedited videos of five actors (three male) 
portraying the six ‘basic emotions’: happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear and 
surprise. The videos were selected from the ADFES (Van der Schalk et al., 2011) 
and lasted five seconds each. The static version of the videos was created using the 
same procedure as Study 1. All faces were presented in full colour, in full face 
presentation, and were cropped at the neckline (Figure 2). Stimuli were displayed in 
the centre of a 14 inch computer screen using E-Prime v2.0 Professional (Schneider, 
Eschman & Zuccolotto, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Real human face stimuli displaying prototypical basic emotions 
(from top left to right) happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and 
surprise from ADFES (Van der Schalk et al., 2011) 
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Design 
The study adopted a 6 (Emotion: happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear, 
surprise) x 2 (Motion: static vs. dynamic) x 2 (Participant Group: Deaf vs. Hearing) 
mixed-model design. The factors, Emotion and Motion, were within participants and 
the third factor, Participant Group, was between participants. The order in which the 
trials were presented was randomized across the children taking part in the study. 
The order of presentation (static or dynamic) was counterbalanced. 
Procedure 
To ensure that all children understood the task, an adaptation of the Emotion 
Vocabulary Test (EVT, Dyck, Ferguson & Shochet, 2001) was used as a pre-test. 
The EVT is a 24-item test of a person’s ability to define emotion words (e.g. “what 
does angry mean?”). Children were asked to define (either verbally or with sign 
language) the six emotions referred to in this study in the order presented in the EVT 
(fear, sadness, happiness, anger, surprise and disgust). Questions were open-ended 
followed by probing questions to further understand and eliminate ambiguities of a 
child’s response. If the child did not appear to understand the emotion word stated, a 
different form of the lexeme would be presented (e.g. ‘disgusting’ instead of 
‘disgust’). 
Responses were noted on a score sheet and scored using a 3-point scale using 
the scoring key provided (Dyck et al., 2001): 0 for an incorrect response, 1 for a 
partially correct response, and 2 for a satisfactory response (maximum = 12). All 
participants scored 50% or above on this test. Three deaf children were excluded 
from the study because of scores <50% on the EVT. Table 6 displays the mean 
scores on the EVT for deaf and hearing children. Although the deaf children had 
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sufficient understanding of the emotion vocabulary, the hearing children scored 
significantly higher on the EVT, t (51) = -3.46, p = .001.  
Table 6. CA, Non-verbal IQ, Verbal IQ, Language Measure and EVT Mean Scores 
and SDs for Deaf and Control Group Children (Study 2) 
 Children 
 Deaf Control 
 CA (yrs. mnths) 
Non-Verbal IQ 
8.8 (1.7) 
92.52 (17.36) 
9.0 (1.5) 
101.15 (12.59) 
Verbal IQ  104.12 (12.43) 
Lip Reading 99.93 (18.19)  
BSL Receptive 95.52 (12.87) (N = 25)  
EVT 9.67 (1.9) 11.12 (.99) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
 
 
Following this, participants were asked to categorise the emotions presented 
as happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear or surprise. The children were seated at 
approximately 60cm in front of a 14-inch portable computer screen on which the 
stimuli were displayed.  In order to ensure that participants understood the test 
instructions, three training trials with feedback preceded the test trials. The test itself 
consisted of two blocks (one static and one dynamic) each containing 30 trials, 
showing five of each of the six emotions.  

Each stimulus was presented on the screen one at a time in a random order. 
The videos lasted for five seconds beginning from a neutral pose to the apex of the 
expressed emotion, and the static faces were also each presented for five seconds. In 
the dynamic block of trials, a fixation cross was initially presented. Participants were 
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required to press the space bar to begin the video clip. A prompt card with the 
emotion words and iconic faces was provided so to remind the children of the 
response options.  Verbal or signed responses were recorded by the experimenter. A 
score of one was given for a correct response and a score of zero if incorrect.  
Different lexical forms of the target emotion word were accepted as correct as well 
as a number of synonyms (e.g., cross and furious for anger; ‘yucky’ for disgust; 
frightened and scared for fear; and shocked for surprise). The children had a short 
break between the blocks if necessary. 
Results 
Accuracy 
The EVT was used as a control measure to confirm that all the children had 
sufficient vocabulary to name each emotion. Differences in the standardized non-
verbal IQ scores between the hearing and deaf children were analysed first using an 
independent samples t-test. Results showed that deaf children had significantly lower 
scores than hearing children, t (51) -2.07, p =.04. The number of errors was analysed 
using a mixed analysis of covariance, including the non-verbal IQ score as a 
covariant in order to control for the differences in non-verbal ability between the 
groups. Table 7 displays the mean and SD errors for each Emotion (happiness, 
sadness, anger, disgust, fear, and surprise) and level of Motion (static or dynamic) 
for deaf and control group participants. The analysis revealed that there was no 
significant main effect of Participant group, F (1, 50) = 3.02, MSE = 2.73, p = .09, η² 
= .06, suggesting that overall, deaf children’s performance on emotion recognition 
was not significantly different from that of the hearing control children. There was 
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also no main effect of Motion, F (1, 50) =.71, MSE = .47, p =.40, η² =.01, meaning 
that the dynamic presentation gave no advantage to task performance.  
There was a significant interaction between the covariate, non-verbal IQ, and 
Emotion, F (5, 250 = 3.08, MSE = 1.61, p = .01, η² = .06, but the main effect of 
Emotion was still significant, F (5, 250) = 4.42, MSE = 1.61, p = .001, η² = .08, 
showing that some emotion expressions were more easily identified than others. 
Most accurately identified was happiness, followed by anger, sadness, surprise, 
disgust and then fear. Post hoc tests with Bonferroni corrections (adjusted level p 
<.003) showed that happiness was significantly more easily recognised than all other 
emotions except surprise (p = .005). Fear and disgust were significantly less 
accurately recognised than any other expressions, although error scores for fear and 
disgust were not significantly different from one another. 

Table 7. Mean and SD of Errors in Identifying Emotions by Participant and Motion 
 
Deaf Hearing Total 
 
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Happy .07 (.38) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) .04 (.27) 0 (0) 
Sad .33 (.55) .37 (.74) .15 (.37) .65 (.80) .25 (.48) .51 (.78) 
Anger .41 (.75) .19 (.0) .23 (.43) .19 (.49) .32 (.61) .19 (.44) 
Disgust 1.93 (1.84) 2.04 (1.95) .77 (1.11) .88 (1.42) 1.36 (1.62) 1.47 (1.79) 
Fear 2.07 (1.49) 1.26 (1.43) 2.04 (1.73) 1.88 (1.42) 2.06 (1.60) 1.57 (1.45) 
Surprise .78 (1.33) .59 (1.12) .23 (.99) .15 (.78) .51 (1.2) .38 (.99) 
 
Note: SDs are in parenthesis. 
 
The results revealed a significant interaction of Emotion and Participant 
group, F (5, 250) = 5.95, MSE = 1.61, p<.001, η² = .11. Post-hoc comparisons with 
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Bonferroni corrections (adjusted significance level p <.008) displayed a similar 
profile to hearing children for deaf participants for happiness, sadness, anger, fear 
and surprise, however, the hearing children’s performance was superior to deaf 
children for disgust, t (51) = -2.84, p = .006, Cohen’s d =.78. There was also a 
significant interaction of Motion and Participant group, F (1, 50) = 6.25, MSE = .47, 
p =.016, η²= .11. Post hoc tests with Bonferroni corrections (adjusted significance 
level p <.03) showed that deaf children made more errors in static displays than 
hearing children, t (51) = -2.46, p = .017, Cohen’s d = .68; but there was no 
significant difference in error scores for dynamic displays, t (51) = -.84, p = .40, 
Cohen’s d = .22.  Deaf children made significantly fewer errors in dynamic than 
static displays, t (51) = -2.23, p = .03, Cohen’s d = .33; but there was no significant 
difference between static and dynamic displays for hearing children, t (51) = .88, p = 
.39, Cohen’s d = .15. The interaction of Motion x Emotion, F (5, 250) = .50, MSE = 
.44, p =.78, η² = .01, and the three-way interaction between Motion, Emotion and 
Participant group, F (5, 250) = 1.12, MSE = .444, p = .35, η² = .02, were not 
significant.  Non-verbal IQ did not moderate any further effects, all F <1.08, all p 
>.30).  
Factors predicting performance  
Further analysis was conducted to investigate the relationship between CA, 
non-verbal IQ, language (BSL receptive test for deaf children and BPVS for hearing 
children) and overall performance for both groups. As there was a significant 
negative correlation between static and dynamic total of errors for both deaf (r =-.71, 
p <.001) and hearing control group children (r =-.71, p < .001), a combined total 
error score was calculated. While the deaf children had some understanding of each 
of the emotion terms, the hearing children scored significantly higher on the emotion 
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vocabulary test than deaf children (t (51) = -3.46, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .96); 
therefore, emotion vocabulary was added as a predictor.  For the deaf children, lip 
reading ability and the type of auditory amplification (coded as 0 = Cochlear 
implant, 1 = Hearing aid) were also added as predictors (for mean emotion 
recognition scores, see Table 8). Significant moderate negative correlations were 
found between total number of errors made by the deaf children and CA (r = -.44, p= 
.02) and emotion vocabulary (r = -.43, p =.03). In addition, a significant moderate 
positive correlation was found between total number of errors and hearing 
amplification (r = .56, p = .03), suggesting more errors were made by HA wearers. A 
regression analysis revealed that for deaf children’s overall performance (R²= .57, F 
= 3.93, MSE = 18.95, p = .011), the type of hearing amplification was a significant 
predictor (β =- .55, p = .003), suggesting an advantage for CI wearers; however 
neither CA (β =- .22, p = .26) emotion vocabulary (β = -.25, p = .19), non-verbal 
ability (β = .09, p = .63), BSL receptive language (β = -.20, p = .28), nor lip-reading 
(β = .06, p = .75), significantly predicted performance. For the hearing group 
children, there was a significant moderate negative correlation between overall 
performance and CA (r = -.40, p = .04) and emotion vocabulary (r = -.42, p = .03); 
however, a regression analysis (R²= .30, F = 2.25, MSE = 20.08, p = .098) showed 
that none of these factors significantly predicted performance (Ps all > .08). 
Heterogeneity of deaf children 
Table 8 displays the mean and SDs for the sub-group overall scores in 
emotion recognition. The possible difference in performance based on the severity of 
hearing loss was examined comparing the children with a hearing loss classed as 
moderate-to-severe and profound. Results revealed no significant differences in 
overall emotion recognition, t (25) = -1.12, p = .28, Cohen’s d = .55. Further analysis 
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was performed on the sample of deaf children in order to investigate whether signing 
ability, preferences in communication style (oral vs. signing), and the type of hearing 
aid the children had moderated any of the effects reported. For signing ability, deaf 
children were grouped into those who had signing family members and those who 
did not. The analysis showed no significant difference in overall errors in emotion 
recognition between those signing family members than those without, t (28) = 1.61, 
p =.12, Cohen’s d = .71. Preference in communication (oral (N = 21), signing (N = 2) 
or both (N = 4)) was analysed.  As the majority of children in this study preferred to 
communicate orally, preference for oral communication was compared with the 
other two types to create a meaningful comparison group. Results revealed that the 
type of preferred communication did not have a significant effect on emotion 
recognition, t (25) = -1.16, p = .26, Cohen’s d = .56. 
 
Table 8.  Mean and SDs for Overall Emotion Recognition Errors for Subgroups of 
Deaf Children (Study 2) (Divided by level of deafness, communication preference, 
and whether have signing family members) 
 
  Level of deafness         Communication 
 
       Signing family 
            Members 
 
  Severe 
(N = 21) 
 Profound 
(N = 16) 
  Oral 
(N = 21) 
Sign 
(N = 6) 
Yes  
(N = 18)  
    No  
(N = 9) 
       
Overall score 
 (max. 60) 
10.76 (6.54) 7.5  (5.36) 9.29 (6.51) 12.67 (5.43) 11.39 (6.85) 7.33 (4.36) 
 
Note. SDs in parenthesis  
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Heterogeneity of deaf children: CI vs HA 
A possible difference in performance based on the type of hearing 
amplification was examined by comparing total error scores. Table 9 details the 
background characteristics of the deaf children with CIs (N = 11) and HAs (N = 16). 
There were no significant differences between the sub-groups of deaf children in 
CA, non-verbal ability, language or EVT scores. The deaf children with HAs and 
deaf children with CIs were compared to the hearing control group children. A one-
way ANOVA showed a significant effect of group, F (2, 50) = 5.8, MSE = 28.51, p 
= .005. Interestingly, further analysis with Bonferroni corrections (adjusted to p 
<.017) showed that the deaf children with CIs made significantly fewer errors overall 
than deaf children with HAs, t (25) = 2.62, p =.02; Cohen’s d = 1.0; Table 9).   The 
hearing control group children made significantly fewer errors (mean correct = 7.23, 
SD = 4.91) than deaf children with HAs, t (40) = 3.28, p = .002; Cohen’s d = .89; 
however, there was no significant difference in errors between hearing control group 
children and deaf children with CIs, t (35) = -.35, p =.73; Cohen’s d = .12. 
A further series of one-way ANOVAs exploring differences between total 
error scores for each of the emotions showed no significant difference between 
groups for Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear and Surprise (all ps>.05). Further tests 
with Bonferroni corrections revealed a significant difference between groups on the 
emotion disgust, F (2, 50) = 6.97, MSE = 8.02, p =.002). There was no significant 
difference between CI wearers and either HA wearers, t (25) = .82, p = .42; Cohen’s 
d = .75 (Table 9), or hearing control group children (mean errors = 1.65, SD = 2.26), 
t (35) = 1.95, p = .062; Cohen’s d = .26. However, significantly more errors were 
made by the children with HAs for disgust than hearing children, t (40) = 4.04, p 
<.001; Cohen’s d = 1.23)  
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Table 9.  Mean, SDs and Tests of Difference for Deaf children Grouped Based on 
Hearing Amplification (CI or HA) for Background Information and Errors in 
Emotion Recognition (Study 2) 
  
CI (N= 11) 
 
HA (N = 16) 
 
t 
(df = 25) 
Background information    
CA (yrs.mnths) 8.3 (1.4) 8.2 (1.8) -.15 
Non-verbal IQ 89.72 (16.88) 94.44 (17.97) .69 
BSL Receptive 95.1 (8.25) 95.8 (15.48)             .13 (df = 23) 
Lip-reading 97.27 (23.52) 101.75 (13.99) .62 
EVT 9.82 (2.23) 9.56 (1.71) -.34 
Emotion recognition     
Overall errors (max. 60) 6.55 (6.52) 12.44 (5.15) 2.62* 
Disgust (max. 10) 2.45 (3.64) 5.0 (3.1) .82 
Note. SDs are in parenthesis; *p <.05 
Error patterns 
To examine the children’s errors, incorrect responses were recorded for each 
emotion.  Cross tabulations were generated in the form of confusion matrices to 
show the relationship between the actual emotion expression and the emotion label 
given by participants. Table 10 shows the deaf children’s percentage of correct 
response and errors for each emotion, and Table 11 shows hearing children’s 
percentage of correct response and errors for each emotion.  
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Table 10.Cross Tabulations of Actual Emotion Expression (Row) and Expression as Labelled by Deaf children (Columns) 
 Happiness Sadness Anger Fear Disgust Surprise 
Happiness 99.33 0.0 0.0 .00 0.0 0.67 
Sadness 0.0 93.67 2.67 1.67 1.67 0.0 
Anger 0.0 2.67 93.67 0.67 3.0 0.0 
Fear 1.0 8.0 8.0 68.67 8.67 5.67 
Disgust 0.0 1.0 38.67 0.33 60.0 0.0 
Surprise 0.67 0.0 0.0 11.67 0.67 87.0 
 
Table 11. Cross Tabulations of Actual Emotion Expression (Row) and Expression as Labelled by Hearing Children (Columns) 
 Happiness Sadness Anger Fear Disgust Surprise 
Happiness 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sadness 0 91.03 0.34 2.41 5.86 0.34 
Anger 0.0 2.76 95.12 0.69 1.38 0.0 
Fear 0.0 3.79 2.76 62.07 10.34 21.03 
Disgust 0.0 0.69 15.86 0.34 83.1 0.0 
Surprise 0.34 0.0 0.0 5.17 0.0 94.48 
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Happiness was the most accurately labelled emotion for both groups, and fear 
and disgust were the least accurate. Disgust proved to be the emotion that caused 
most difficulty for the deaf children to correctly identify, with 26.1% of deaf 
children’s responses to disgust stimuli being labelled as anger. A similar pattern of 
results was found for the hearing control group children, as the majority of the errors 
made in the presentation of disgust stimuli were also incorrectly identified as anger. 
For the hearing control group children, fear was the emotion most difficult to 
identify, with 21.03% of responses being labelled as surprise, and 10.34% as disgust.  
The deaf children followed a different pattern of errors for the emotion, fear, 
compared to the hearing controls: fear stimuli were most commonly mistaken as 
disgust followed by sadness and anger, and then surprise.  Fewer errors were made 
for surprise, sadness and anger for both groups. Surprise was most commonly 
mistaken as fear, and sadness and anger were confused with other negative emotions 
(disgust, fear, sadness and anger). 
Discussion 
This is the first study to examine emotion recognition in deaf children using 
filmed real time video clips of the six basic emotions of human facial expressions. 
The findings from Study 2 demonstrate that when children have to identify more 
complex emotions using real faces, overall the deaf children performed as well as 
their controls. The overall findings then suggest that when using more ecological 
stimuli (dynamic and real faces) deficits are less likely to be found in deaf children’s 
ability to recognise emotions. Interestingly, the deaf children’s errors followed a 
pattern typically found in young children in previous research: happiness followed 
by anger and sadness, then surprise, fear and disgust (Widen & Russell, 2003). 
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There was not a main effect of motion, so as predicted in hypothesis one, the 
dynamic images did not aid the performance of the hearing children. This non-
uniform effect of motion is consistent with previous research in typically developing 
adults (Kamachi et al., 2001; Kätsyri & Sams, 2008) and children (Nelson & Russell, 
2011). It has been posited that clear, exaggerated facial expressions posed by human 
actors are sufficient for identification of basic emotions (Ekman & Friesen, 1978), 
resulting in near ceiling effects and meaning that dynamic information is 
unnecessary.  
 
The interaction between motion x participant was significant, indicating that 
deaf children made more errors than hearing children in the static but not the 
dynamic presentation as predicted.  While the effect size is moderate, these results 
are suggestive of a role for motion in emotion recognition for deaf children.  
Emotion is important for deaf individuals in distinguishing between signs (Bosworth 
& Dobkins, 2002; Corina et al., 2002) and in lip-reading (Haxby et al., 2002), so it 
seems likely that it would also be important for emotion processing seeing as deaf 
people are reliant on visual information. These results indicate that with the use of 
ecologically valid stimuli – dynamic presentations and, crucially, facial expression of 
emotions in real human faces - deaf children are able to identify basic emotions at a 
similar level to hearing children (Hosie et al., 1998). Further, it is important to 
consider the effect of motion on deaf children’s emotion recognition as the more 
natural content of the dynamic stimuli not only improves ecological validity, but 
given the greater activation of brain regions linked to processing of social and 
emotional information evoked by dynamic relative to those evoked by static images 
(Klesser et al., 2011; Klits et al., 2013; Krumhuber et al., 2013). 
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Contrary to hypothesis two but in line with Hosie et al. (1998), the deaf 
children’s performance on the emotion, fear, paralleled that of the hearing children. 
The deaf children did, however, perform significantly worse than the hearing 
children in the emotion, disgust; previously shown to be a difficult emotion for 
children to label (Harrigan, 1984; Markham & Adams, 1992; Michalson & Lewis, 
1985; Widen & Russell, 2008a). In examining the pattern of errors it was apparent 
that disgust was predominantly mistaken for anger, as has typically been revealed in 
emotion recognition research (Gagnon, Gosselin, Hudon-ven der Buhs, Larocque & 
Milliard, 2010; Widen & Russell, 2003, 2013). It can be supposed that a greater error 
rate for deaf children in mistaking disgust for anger could result from being reliant 
solely on the visual cues in interpreting emotion in the absence of auditory cues; the 
perceptual similarity of disgust and anger, even though they only share some of the 
same muscle movements, such as furrowing the brow and raising the upper lip, could 
account for the confusion (Wilden & Russell, 2008b, 2008c). 
It could be argued that the deaf children did not understand the term disgust, 
yet Widen and Russell (2013) hypothesise, based on a comprehensive review of 
research, that being able to identify emotion in the facial expression occurs long after 
initially being able to identify a bad feeling along with other negative emotion 
concepts (i.e. this situation makes me feel unhappy), followed by linking it to a cause 
(e.g. something smelling bad), followed by assigning a label (as yucky, disgust or 
gross). Therefore a concept of disgust needs to be well developed before it can be 
associated with a facial expression. It would be interesting to further investigate deaf 
children’s understanding of disgust to explore whether they are better at identifying 
this emotion in the context of a story than in facial expressions.  
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A further indicator that difference in language and emotion understanding 
contribute to deaf children’s delay in emotion recognition is the significant 
correlation between scores on the emotion vocabulary and overall errors in emotion 
recognition.  Emotion vocabulary correlated negatively with total number of errors 
for both hearing and deaf children; however the regression analysis showed that this 
no longer predicted performance when other factors were taken into account. 
Feldman-Barrett, Lindquist and Gendron (2007) hypothesise that emotion words that 
become accessible aid in reducing uncertainty that is intrinsic to most natural facial 
behaviours and constrain their meaning to allow for rapid and easy perception of 
emotion. If some deaf children’s emotion vocabulary is poorer than that of hearing 
children it suggests that these emotion concepts are less readily available to be able 
to rapidly distinguish the disgust face from other expressions. 
It is notable that further examination within the deaf group showed a 
significantly poorer performance in total number of errors made for disgust for those 
deaf children with HAs compared with CI wearers and hearing children, yet no 
difference between deaf CI wearers and hearing controls was found. These results 
are consistent with Hopyan-Misakyan et al. (2009) and Most and Aviner (2009)’s 
studies showing deaf children with CIs performing parallel to hearing children. 
Caution needs to be drawn to the interpretation of this difference because of small 
sample numbers, but the effect size was large. Perhaps the children with CIs have 
better access to auditory cues of emotion, yet studies with deaf adolescents have 
shown that current technology does not appear to successfully transmit a speaker’s 
emotional state any better than HAs (Most & Aviner, 2009).  
An alternative explanation is that the success of deaf CI wearers in 
identifying disgust was moderated by their emotion understanding. It is possible that 
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the CI has allowed these deaf children access to the social and linguistic aspects of 
emotions that occur in everyday life, allowing them to develop the appropriate social 
and cognitive abilities to facilitate emotion recognition (De Soneville et al., 2002; 
Most & Aviner, 2009; Peterson & Siegal, 1995). Similarly, some studies involving 
deaf children with CIs have suggested that their implants have benefited spoken 
language ability, leading to sufficient exposure to mental state language to enable 
them to pass theory of mind tasks (Remmel & Peters, 2009; Peters et al., 2009). In 
the absence of these cues, some deaf children could be missing, or delayed in 
acquiring, the ‘emotion script’ that develops by taking clues from their environment 
and matching it to the facial configuration (Action Unit (AU) 9: the nose wrinkle) of 
disgust (Widen & Russell, 2008c).    
It could alternatively be that this small sample of deaf children with CIs were 
an exceptional group and not typical of the population of children who receive 
implants. It could, rather, reflect exposure to language as opposed to a benefit of 
cochlear implantation per say; for instance, some children for whom implants and 
oral communication are ineffective may stop using them (Bat-Chava & Deignan, 
2001). Studies with larger sample sizes need to examine more precisely the 
difference between the facial emotion recognition of deaf children with CIs and deaf 
children with HAs. 
Interestingly, Hosie et al. (1998) found an opposing pattern of results as deaf 
children performed better than hearing children in identifying disgust as well as fear. 
Methodological differences could be accountable. The children partaking in Hosie et 
al.’s study additionally took part in emotion matching and comprehension tasks that 
may have improved performance; viewing the full range of facial expressions prior 
to the labelling task enables comparisons between and within expression types 

	

(Harrigan, 1984; Russell, 1994). Vicari, Reilly, Pasqualetti, Vizzotto and Caltagirone 
(2000) found that free-labeling “accuracy” improved when a prior task was given. 
This suggestion is, however, speculative. A difference in pattern of results may not 
only be accountable to methodological differences but also reflect the heterogeneity 
of deaf children.  
 
The results of Study 2 reveal that deaf children appear to have a similar 
conceptual understanding of the basic emotions to hearing children. As well as  
having a typical pattern in accuracy for each emotion - happiness followed by anger 
and sadness, then surprise, fear and disgust – the deaf participants also displayed a 
common pattern of labelling inaccuracies revealing that the errors made are not 
arbitrary (Widen & Russell, 2003). Like the hearing controls, errors were made by 
confusing emotions with a similar valence and level of arousal (Bullock & Russell, 
1984), for instance disgust was mostly mistaken for anger. The pattern for errors in 
recognising fear was slightly different between groups. While the hearing children 
most commonly mistook fear for surprise, both of which are high in arousal, the deaf 
children mostly confused fear with disgust closely followed by sadness and anger. 
This may also reflect their relative difficulty in labelling disgust. It is important, 
though, to emphasise that many studies with adults have shown difficulties in 
accurately labelling disgust (e.g. Widen & Russell, 2008c). 
While the results of Study 1 and 2 are encouraging in terms of deaf children’s 
emotion recognition in real human faces, it is possible that research has still not 
tested the limit of deaf children’s emotion recognition abilities. As per Study 1, near 
ceiling effects for happiness, sadness, anger and surprise were found, which could 
mean deaf children’s emotion recognition abilities are intact, or that the task was not 
sufficiently difficult to detect potential differences. Near ceiling results are common 
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in emotion recognition research and have been found in previous studies with deaf 
children (Most & Aviner, 2009; Ziv et al., 2013).  First, a potential criticism is the 
use of forced-choice distribution which has been shown to result in the highest rates 
of emotion recognition (Russell, 1994). Arguably, the use of categories affects 
selection probability and increases the likelihood of randomly selecting the correct 
answer and using a process of elimination (Wagner, 1997). However, the advantage 
of a forced-choice method of response is that it is quicker, easier to analyse and 
reduces the variance found between researchers in terms of what is deemed as a 
correct response in a free-choice distribution (Russell, 1994). In a recent study, 
Limbrecht-Ecklundt et al. (2013) found that basic emotions were reliably – i.e. 
significantly better than occurring randomly – recognised without the choice of 
answer being specified. One interpretation is that these results are evidence of the 
universality of emotions and indicate the relevance of basic emotions to 
interpersonal communication. A further advantage is that it minimises the verbal 
demands yet still assesses emotion recognition via semantic categorisation (Camras 
& Allison, 1985) – an important consideration when carrying out research with deaf 
children. 
 
Second, criticism has been directed at use of prototypical, exaggerated 
displays of emotion expressions as is commonly utilised in emotion recognition 
research. While photographs of intense emotion expression have proved to be useful 
as a tool to study the development of emotion recognition abilities, in everyday life 
the expressions we perceive are more frequently much less clear-cut, intense and 
caricature-like (Gao & Maurer, 2010; Manstead, Fischer & Jakobs, 1999; Russell, 
1994).  Indeed, in a study comparing emotion identification in spontaneous and 
posed facial expression, recognition accuracy was found to be higher in the posed 
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condition (Motley & Camden, 1988). Comparing emotion recognition at lower levels 
of intensity has been highlighted as a means of achieving a more sensitive test of 
emotion recognition abilities in a laboratory setting (Montagne, Kessels, De Haan, & 
Perrett, 2007). 
 
In this chapter, deaf children were found to parallel hearing children’s 
emotion recognition abilities for all emotions with the exception of disgust. With 
fewer opportunities to discuss emotions, deaf children may be delayed in developing 
the emotion ‘script’ so to link the facial expression to their conceptualisation of the 
emotion (Widen & Russell, 2008c). Motion was shown to provide an advantage to 
deaf children’s emotion recognition given that overall, dynamic displays were easier 
to identify than static displays. These findings combined with the findings of Study 1 
indicate that real human faces provide an important cue to deaf children’s emotion 
recognition. Largely dependent on the visual domain, motion also provides 
additional information that a still image cannot. This appears to be redundant for 
hearing children who recognise emotion through the auditory and visual domain 
combined. High rates of recognition in some of the emotions in this study with the 
use of stimuli portraying exaggerated facial expressions may preclude differences 
that may be revealed with a more sensitive task assessing emotion recognition at 
varying levels of intensity. 
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Chapter Five 
Study three: the effect of intensity on emotion recognition in deaf 
children 
Overview 
In the two prior chapters, deaf children were found to have better rates of 
emotion recognition with the use of real human faces and with a dynamic as opposed 
to a static presentation. The study presented in this chapter aimed to further test the 
limits of deaf children’s emotion processing skills by taking into account two 
additional factors: that in real life, facial expressions can be both subtle and fleeting.  
Emotion recognition of the six basic emotions was tested in deaf children and 
hearing controls at a reduced presentation time (500ms) at two levels of intensity: 
subtle (0-50% of the full expression) and intense (50-100%). Results showed that 
overall, deaf children’s emotion recognition paralleled the hearing control children in 
demonstrating a significantly higher rate of recognition in the intense than the subtle 
level of intensity.  
Introduction 
In chapter four, the importance of acknowledging the dynamic nature of 
facial expressions was highlighted so to more accurately capture the liveliness and 
true nature of facial expressions of emotion displayed in day-to-day interactions. Yet 
an additional consideration is that we frequently experience briefer, more subtle and 
less intense changes in emotion facial expressions in everyday life than are 
commonly displayed in the prototypical, exaggerated images used in emotion 
recognition research (Gao & Maurer, 2010; Manstead et al., 1999; Russell, 1994).  



When presented with prototypical expressions of high intensity, typically 
developing children are able to identify emotions with a great improvement in 
accuracy when matching or labelling by aged three to seven years (Carmas & 
Allison, 1985; Durand et al., 2007). For instance, Durand et al. (2007) found that 
children as young as five or six were able to recognise sadness and happiness at adult 
level, and by around 10 years of age, children could also recognise fear and anger, 
and by around 11 years of age they could recognise disgust at a parallel level to 
adults.  Thomas and colleagues highlight that the anatomic and functional changes 
that occur during late childhood and adolescence are in conflict with behaviour 
studies that suggest emotion recognition reaches adult levels by late childhood, 
arguing that maturity of emotion recognition abilities may not be reached until 
adulthood (Thomas, De Bellis, Graham & LaBar, 2007). The amygdala, for example, 
most associated with being activated by fearful responses, has been shown to 
develop through to late adolescence (e.g. Schumann et al., 2004). It has been 
suggested that emotion recognition research may be prone to ceiling effects given 
that many studies use prototypical category exemplars of emotion that are not 
sensitive to nuances of emotion facial expressions of a lesser intensity (Thomas et 
al., 2007).  
When increased processing demands are taken into account, emotion 
recognition has been shown to continue to develop throughout adolescence in 
typically developing children (De Sonneville, et al., 2002; Thomas et al., 2007). De 
Sonneville et al. emphasised the importance of considering speed of processing 
given that facial expressions may change rapidly and low processing may hamper 
communication in everyday life. It was found that accuracy did not improve 
considerably between the ages of seven and ten, but processing speed significantly 
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improved. Moreover, the adults were markedly faster and more accurate than the 
children.  
Intensity has also been shown to mediate accuracy in typically developing 
children’s identification of emotion expressions (Gao & Maurer, 2010; Herba et al., 
2006; Montirosso et al., 2010). In this context, intensity can be defined as the 
relative degree of movement away from a neutral expression of muscles that are 
activated in a particular facial expression of emotion (Hess, Blairy & Kleck, 1997).  
The intensity of the emotion facial expression of happiness, for example, can be 
signified by the extent of identifiable activity in the Zygomaticus Major and 
Orbicularis Oculi muscles, moving away from their relaxed states (Ekman & 
O’Sullivan, 1991).  
Children only a few months old have been shown to be able to distinguish 
happy and sad faces from surprise faces, and to differentiate between faces of mild 
and intense happy expressions (Nelson & De Haan, 1997). Yet with the exception of 
happiness, a slower development over age to the detection of all other basic emotions 
has been revealed.  Only a handful of studies have conducted tasks investigating 
typically developing children’s labelling of all six of the basic emotions at varying 
intensity using dynamic human faces. Montirosso et al. (2010) used a morphing 
technique to display facial emotion expressions at four levels of intensity (35, 50, 75 
and 100 per cent). Children were shown to develop with age at recognition accuracy 
of all emotions except disgust, and accuracy was shown to increase as a function of 
intensity.  Gao and Maurer (2010), using 20 levels of intensity, similarly found 
slower development for all emotions except happiness, with recognition increasing 
as intensity of expression increased. It is supposed that because intense affective 
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facial expressions have larger movements, it generally makes them easier to 
recognise (Law Smith, Montagne, Perrett, Gill & Gallagher, 2010).  
In other clinical populations proposed to have emotion processing 
difficulties, such as children with autism, a higher level of intensity has been shown 
to be required for correct identification in comparison to control group children (Law 
Smith et al., 2010; Rump, Giovannelli, Minshew & Strauss, 2009). Law Smith et al. 
(2010) used a morphing video task to test emotion recognition at increasing levels of 
intensity in adolescents with high-functioning autism. Subtle differences were found: 
anger and surprise were shown to be impaired at lower levels of intensity and disgust 
was most impaired, even at 100% intensity level and lower. Whereas, in comparison 
a number of prior studies utilising full blown prototypical faces found no group 
difference (e.g. Grossman et al., 2000), suggesting possible ceiling effects. Rump et 
al. (2009) similarly found that both children and adults performed significantly 
worse when comparing emotion recognition abilities as a function of intensity using 
video clips of filmed real time human expressions. This suggests that testing emotion 
recognition at different levels of intensity may be an effective way of identifying 
atypical patterns in emotion processing. 
The majority of studies investigating emotion recognition in deaf children 
have utilised stimuli displaying prototypical, or relatively intense, expressions of all 
(or some) of the six basic facial expressions of emotion (Hosie et al., 1998; Ludlow 
et al., 2010; Ziv et al., 2013). Hosie et al. (1998) used Ekman and Friesen’s (1976) 
standardised set of Pictures of Facial Affect, containing photographs of exaggerated 
facial expressions at 100% intensity, and found no differences between the deaf and 
hearing group. It is questionable as to whether this stimulus was too simplistic to 
represent emotion recognition that occurs in everyday life.  Ziv et al. (2013) likewise 
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found that deaf children with CIs and signing deaf children performed similarly on 
an emotion recognition task requiring labelling photographs of children. Hopyan-
Misakyan, et al., (2009) used two levels of intensity when assessing deaf children 
aged between 7 and 12 on visual emotion recognition (in addition to speech 
perception and affect speech prosody) and found that their performance paralleled 
that of hearing children. Yet the images utilised were static and only four of the 
emotions - happiness, sadness, anger and fear - were included. On the other hand, 
Wiefferink et al. (2013) and Ludlow et al. (2012) found a deficit in deaf children’s 
emotion recognition, yet the stimuli utilised included cartoons. It has been argued 
that the use of schematic stimuli is oversimplified in comparison to real actors 
portraying validated facial expressions (Williams et al., 2007) as they do not contain 
the nuances of human facial features and temporal dynamics that better reflect day-
to-day emotion interactions.  
Most and Michaelis (2012) tested young deaf children (aged 4 to 6) using the 
Emotion Identification Test (EIT), in which an actress portrayed each expression 
(anger, fear, sadness and happiness) while uttering a nonsense sentence, providing a 
more life-like depiction. The task compared deaf and hearing children in three 
different modes – auditory, visual and auditory-visual combined. The deaf children 
performed significantly worse in all three conditions.  Most and Aviner (2009) 
compared deaf and hearing children (aged between 10 and 17 years) using the EIT 
plus two additional emotions, disgust and surprise. While the hearing children 
performed better in the auditory and combined conditions, the groups performed 
similarly in the visual condition. Yet the results exhibited near ceiling effects as have 
other studies investigating emotion recognition in deaf children (e.g. Ziv et al., 2013; 
Study 2). In addition, in the majority of studies the children were allowed as long as 
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they needed to respond, which may not reflect the processing demands of day-to-day 
life (De Sonneville, et al., 2002). 
 An exception is Dyck et al.’s (2004) study, which tested deaf children’s 
emotion recognition with the Fluid Emotions Test (FET) containing morphed images 
of emotion expressions. While allowing up to four seconds’ identification time, the 
FET scores were based on both accuracy and response time; the deaf children were 
shown to be poorer relative to hearing controls. As aforementioned, however, the 
deaf children in Dyck et al’s study had a mean average IQ that was two standard 
deviations below the deaf national average and the effect was also moderated by 
verbal ability. Further, morphed facial expressions are lower in ecological validity 
than real, dynamic human faces in emotion recognition measurement. It remains a 
possibility that the limit of high functioning deaf children’s emotion recognition 
abilities has not been tested. 
The role of intensity in facial emotion recognition in deaf children could 
reveal important information about their emotion processing abilities. To reiterate, 
one possible explanation for deaf children’s lower performance in some emotion 
recognition tasks is that the spoken language context is important in accompanying 
visual emotional information when developing the ability to perceive emotions.  
Deaf children in a hearing environment are not exposed to the rich environment of a 
natural language and have reduced opportunities to overhear conversations revolving 
around emotion and mental-state talk. If late-signing deaf and oral deaf children 
exhibit difficulties in ToM (e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 1995), it is possible they may 
have difficulties in interpreting emotions of lower intensities. It is plausible that 
improvements in cognitive skills, such as perspective taking, could aid the 
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development of understanding the meaning of subtle emotion expressions 
(Choudhury, Blakemore, & Charman, 2006).  
Deaf children’s experience of non-verbal communication may be indicative 
of how they may respond to level of expressiveness as measured by intensity. A 
study by Goldstein, Sexton and Feldman (2000) found that hearing signers were 
more accurate at conveying emotion expressions than non-signing hearing adults; it 
could be that deaf children are more habituated to animated expressions when 
communicating emotion due to experience with sign language. Hearing children, on 
the other hand, may have become accustomed to interpreting subtle cues from 
emotion facial expressions alongside auditory ones that may be more challenging for 
deaf children. Alternatively, if the pattern of emotion recognition displayed by the 
deaf children parallels that of the hearing children it is more likely that human faces 
are of particular importance and sufficient to enable emotion recognition for deaf 
children. 
Study 3 
The primary aim of this current study was to explore the effects of intensity 
and reduced display time on deaf children’s emotion recognition ability to achieve a 
more comprehensive understanding of the extent of their abilities. The deaf 
children’s facial emotion recognition of the six basic emotions – happiness, sadness, 
anger, fear, disgust and surprise - was examined with the use of brief (500 ms) 
dynamic clips of real human videoed expressions at varying degrees of intensity. To 
our knowledge, Rump et al.’s (2009) study was the first to use filmed clips of real 
human faces to measure the effect of intensity on emotion recognition. In the present 
study, an edited version of the ADFES (Van der Schalk, et al., 2011) was created. 
The ADFES is unique in that it is the only standardised set of natural filmed 
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expressions, which clearly has an advantage in ecological validity over the morphing 
technique that is traditionally employed.  In addition, previous research has shown 
that movement facilitates recognition at low intensities (Ambadar et al., 2005). The 
selected video clips were edited into four levels of increasing intensity (level one: 0-
25%; level two: 25-50%; level three: 50-75%; level four: 75-100%) in a similar way 
to Rump et al.’s (2009) development of experimental stimuli to investigate the 
impact of intensity emotion recognition in individuals with autism. 
A number of hypotheses were explored based on previous research. 
Primarily, the aim was to compare the performance of deaf children’s facial emotion 
recognition to that of hearing children. Due to the paucity and variance in 
methodological approaches taken in deaf children’s emotion recognition research (a 
number of which exhibited near ceiling effects as were also found in Study 2 e.g. 
Most & Aviner, 2009; Ziv, et al., 2013) it was difficult to make a specific prediction.  
However, based on the theory that deaf children have difficulty in emotion 
recognition due to reliance on the visual mode, it was predicted that they would 
perform worse at the more challenging task of identifying the negative emotions 
(sadness, fear and disgust) of low intensity. In particular it was predicted that the 
deaf children would at least show poorer performance in the identification of the 
emotion, disgust, given the increased task demands in this present study. Second, it 
was predicted that performance of all children would improve with increased levels 
of intensity. Third, it was expected that performance would positively correlate with 
age, in particular for the hearing children in line with previous studies (Herba et al., 
2008; Montirosso et al., 2010).  
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Method 
Participants 
Twenty-eight deaf children (15 male) took part in this study aged between 6 
years 11 months and 12 years 1 month (mean CA = 9  years 3 months; SD = 1 year 6 
months) . All participants fulfilled the criteria of a sustained pre-lingual hearing loss 
of either “moderate-severe” (hearing loss > 60 db; N = 15) or “profound” (hearing 
loss > 90 db; N =13). The children all attended one of six schools with an attached 
specialist hearing unit and were educated with a mixture of an oral approach and the 
use of BSL and/or SSE.  The majority of children were oral in their communication 
preference (N = 20). Only two deaf children communicated mainly in BSL and six 
used a combination of oral and BSL. Despite the majority being largely oral, most of 
them used some sign language.  All children received auditory amplification: 15 
children wore cochlear implants (CI) and 13 wore hearing aids (HA). None of the 
children had any identified additional learning difficulties in addition to their 
deafness.  
A group of 28 control children with no hearing loss matched for CA and 
gender (15 male), aged between 6 years 9  months and 11 years 6 months ( mean CA 
= 9 years 3 months; SD = 1 year 8 months), also partook in the study. Table 12 
displays CA, non-verbal IQ scores and language scores for deaf and hearing control 
children. Independent t-tests confirmed that the groups were well matched on non-
verbal ability (t (54) = -1.17, p = .25) as well as CA (t (54) = -.03, p = .99).  
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Table 12. CA, Non-Verbal IQ and Language Measure Mean Scores and SDs for 
Deaf and Control Group Children (Study 3) 
 Children 
 Deaf (N = 28) Control(N = 28) 
CA (yrs. mnths) 
IQ Standard 
9.3 (1.6) 
93.79 (14.7) 
9.3 (1.8) 
98.21 (13.69) 
BPVS standard  96.04 (12.42) 
Lip Reading 99.04 (15.04)  
BSL Receptive 94.17 (14.91) (N = 23)  
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
 
Materials  
To create the experimental stimuli, dynamic clips of human faces were 
selected from the ADFES (Van der Schalk et al., 2011). The ADFES is a 
standardized set of video clips of North-European people based upon the prototypes 
of the ‘basic emotions’ according to the FACS guide (Ekman et al., 2003). Three sets 
of videos clips of the six basic emotions - happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear 
and surprise – portrayed by four of the actors were selected. For two of the actors 
(one male), each of the six basic emotions were used. For a further two actors, three 
of the emotions - happiness, sadness and anger – were selected from one actor 
(male); and the other three emotions - fear, disgust and surprise - were selected from 
the other (female), to ensure a balance of gender in the experimental stimuli (Table 
13).  Carefully examining the selected videos frame-by-frame, they were edited into 
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clips by dividing them into four levels of emotion intensity: 0-25%, 25-50%, 50-75% 
and 75-100%, using the software, VirtualDub (VirtualDub.org).  In total, 72 dynamic 
video clips were created, each lasting 500ms: three sets of the six basic emotions at 
four levels of intensity. The static endpoints for each of these stimuli can be seen in 
Appendix C. 
  
Table 13. Dynamic Video Clips of Emotion Selected from ADFES (Van de Schalk et 
al., 2011) to be edited in Intensity 
 Emotion Video Clips 
Male 11 Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear, Disgust, Surprise 
Male 12 Happiness, Sadness, Anger 
Female 5 Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear, Disgust, Surprise  
Female 1 Fear, Disgust, Surprise 
 
Pilot of Emotion Intensity Stimuli: The set of video clips was piloted on 
university undergraduate students (N = 29; 22 female; mean CA = 23 years 8 
months, SD = 7 years 6 months). To begin each video clip, participants were 
requested to press ‘play’. After each clip was presented, the six emotion words – 
happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise – appeared on the screen. 
Participants were asked to identify the emotion by clicking on the relevant emotion 
word, and also to rate the intensity of the clip on a scale of 1-5: 1- not at all intense; 
2- a bit intense; 3- mildly intense; 4- very intense; 5- extremely intense. The clips 
were presented in a random order. Findings of the pilot study showed that most 
participants were accurately able to identify all emotions by the 50-75% level; 
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ratings of intensity increased accordingly with each increasing level of intensity. See 
Appendix D for accuracy percentages and intensity ratings.  
Design 
The study used a mixed-factor design, with one between subject factor 
(Group) with two levels (deaf vs. controls) and two within-subjects factors: Emotion, 
with six levels (happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear, surprise); and Intensity, with 
two levels (the original four levels were combined into two intensity levels: subtle 0-
50% and intense 50-100%). The order of the video clips was randomised. Results 
were analysed using a mixed factorial ANOVA. 
Procedure 
To ensure the children understood the emotion terms, they were initially 
shown a photograph of each of the six basic emotions and asked to label each one 
(“how does he/she feel?”) and to give an example of when the emotion may be 
experienced (e.g. Experimenter: “when do you feel sad?” Child: “I feel sad when I 
have nobody to play with”). Three deaf children were excluded because they were 
unable to answer the control questions. Each child sat 60 cm in front of a 14-inch 
portable computer on which the video clips were presented. Instructions were given 
verbally or signed, explaining to the child that the task involved watching video clips 
of actors pulling facial expressions of emotion and they needed to tell the 
experimenter whether the face showed happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust or 
surprise.  
As per the pilot study, each video clip was started by pressing ‘play’ once the 
child was attending. Each clip appeared on the screen for 500ms and then 
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disappeared, followed by the emotion words appearing on the screen in a randomised 
order (anger, surprise, sadness, disgust, fear, happiness). After watching the video 
clip, the child needed to select the emotion by telling the experimenter/clicking on 
the appropriate emotion word. Older children clicking on the emotion word 
independently were asked to simultaneously say aloud, or sign, the emotion word, to 
ensure reading errors were not made. Breaks between trials were taken if necessary. 
The procedure took approximately 15 minutes.  
 
Results 
Accuracy 
Table 14 displays the mean and standard deviation scores for each Emotion 
(happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear, and surprise) and level of Intensity (subtle 
vs intense) for deaf and control group participants. Analysis revealed that there was 
no significant main effect of Group, F (1, 54) = .46, MSE = 2.52, p = .50, η² = .01, 
suggesting that overall, deaf children’s performance on emotion recognition was not 
significantly different from that of the hearing control children. As expected, there 
was a main effect of Intensity, F (1, 54) = 943.77, MSE = 1.19, p < .001, η² = .95, 
meaning that more subtle displays of emotion were significantly more difficult to 
recognise than more intense displays.   
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Table 14. Mean and SD of Errors in Identifying Emotions by Intensity and Group 
(Maximum Error of 6 per Emotion and Level of Intensity) 
 Deaf Hearing 
 Subtle Intense Subtle Intense 
Happiness 2.43 (1.29) .04 (.19) 2.21 (1.37) .04 (.19) 
Sadness 2.68 (1.68) 1.04 (1.14) 2.68 (1.36) 1.46 (1.07) 
Anger 4.21 (.74) .32 (.72) 4.04 (1.1) .85 (1.15) 
Disgust 4.21 (1.45) 2.04 (2.3) 3.46 (1.37) 1.21 (1.45) 
Fear 5.25 (.93) 2.36 (1.45) 5.18 (1.19) 2.71 (1.61) 
Surprise 3.89 (1.23) .57 (1.43) 3.82 (1.02) .36 (.91) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis 
 
There was also a main effect of Emotion, F (5, 270) = 50.68, MSE = 1.78, p 
<.001, η² = .48, showing that some emotion expressions were more easily identified 
than others. Most accurately identified was happiness, followed by sadness, surprise, 
anger, disgust and then fear. Post hoc tests with Bonferroni corrections  (adjusted to 
p <.003) showed that happiness was significantly more easily recognised than any 
other emotion and fear was significantly less accurately recognised than any other 
expression (Table 15). 
The results revealed a significant interaction between Intensity and Emotion, 
F (5, 270), = 13.48, MSE = 1.3, p <.001, η² = .20. The intense displays of sadness 
were significantly more easily recognised than fear, but more difficult to recognise 
than happiness, anger and surprise. However, in the subtle display of emotion 
sadness was significantly easier to recognise than all emotions except happiness 
(p<.001).  
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Table 15. Mean Differences between Emotions and Significance Levels (Bonferroni 
Corrected) (Emotion Intensity, Study 3) 
Emotion Anger Disgust Fear Happiness Sadness Surprise 
Anger      
 
Disgust    -.373     
 
Fear -1.518*** -1.143***    
 
Happiness 1.179*** 1.554*** 2.696***   
 
Sadness     .393     .768 1.911*** -.786***  
 
Surprise .196 .571 1.714*** -.982*** -.196 
 
*** p <.001 
 
A marginally significant interaction of Emotion and Group was found, F (5, 
270) = 2.22, MSE = 1.78, p = .052, η² = .04. Further analysis with Bonferroni 
corrections (adjusted to p <.008) displayed a similar profile to hearing children for 
happiness, sadness, anger, fear and surprise (Ps all >.34); the hearing children’s 
performance in labelling disgust showed a trend of being superior to deaf children’s, 
but with Bonferroni corrections this was not significant (t (54) = 2.05, p = .05, ns; 
Cohen’s d = .55). The interaction of Intensity and Group (F (1, 54) = 2.41, MSE = 
1.19, p =.13, η² = .04) and the three way interaction between Intensity, Emotion and 
Group, F (1, 270) =.58, MSE = 1.3, p =.72, η² = .04, were not significant, meaning 
the groups’ overall performance was similar at both levels of intensity. 
Factors predicting performance 
Further analysis was conducted to investigate the relationship between CA, 
non-verbal IQ, verbal ability (BSL for deaf children and BPVS for hearing children), 
and subtle and intense emotion total error scores for both groups. For the deaf 
children, lip-reading and type of hearing amplification (coded as 0 = CI, 1 = HA) 
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were additionally added as predictors (mean scores, see Table 16). A regression 
analysis revealed that for deaf children’s total intense emotion error scores (R²= .34, 
F = 1.72, MSE = 11.0, p = .185), type of hearing amplification (β = 3.26, p = .04) 
significantly predicted performance, but not CA (β = -.07, p = .18), non-verbal IQ (β 
= .03, p = .52), lip-reading (β = .05, p = .31), or BSL scores (β = .06, p = .36). This 
suggests an advantage for those with a CI over HA wearers in performance on the 
intense emotion stimuli. For deaf children’s total subtle emotion error scores, none 
of the factors significantly predicted performance (R²= .16, F = .64, MSE = 12.35, p 
= .68).   
For hearing children, a regression analysis for total intense emotion error 
scores (R²= .34, F = 4.13, MSE = 6.77, p = .02), CA (β =-.08, p = .009) and verbal 
ability (BPVS) (β = -.26, p = .02) but not non-verbal ability (β = .08, p = .09), 
significantly predicted performance, suggesting an improvement in emotion 
recognition with CA and with a higher verbal ability. A regression analysis for 
hearing children’s total subtle emotion error scores followed the same pattern for CA 
(R²= .21, F = 2.08, MSE = 11.13, p = .13): CA predicted performance (β = -.08, p = 
.04), but verbal ability (BPVS) did not (β = -.12, p = .09). Non-verbal ability was 
also not a predictor of performance (β = .005, p = .93).  
 
Heterogeneity of deaf children 
Potential differences within the deaf group were investigated in terms of a 
total number of both intense and subtle errors made. The mean and SDs of total 
intense and subtle errors made for each subgroup are shown in Table 16. Level of 
deafness was explored by comparing moderate-severely deaf to profoundly deaf 
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children; no significant difference was found in total number of either intense 
emotion errors, t (26) = -1.57, p = .13, Cohen’s d =.60; or subtle emotion errors, t 
(26) = -.42, p = .68, Cohen’s d = .16. Preference in communication (oral (N = 20), 
signing (N = 2) or both (N = 6)) was analysed.  As the majority of children in this 
study preferred to communicate orally, preference for oral communication was 
compared with the other two types to create a meaningful comparison group. Results 
revealed that the type of preferred communication did not have an effect on intense, t 
(26) = .72, p = .48, Cohen’s d = .30; or subtle emotion recognition errors, t (26) = -
.31, p = .76, Cohen’s d = .13. A further exploration involved grouping children 
according to whether or not parents signed at home (the majority of those with 
signing family members had either basic or Level 1 BSL; three signed at Level 2 and 
one at Level 3 BSL). No significant difference was found between children with 
signing family members and those without for either number of intense emotion 
errors, t (26) = -2.09, p = .84, Cohen’s d = .08; or number of subtle emotion errors 
made, t (26) = .013, p = .990, Cohen’s d =.002. 
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Table 16.  Mean and SDs for Total Subtle and Intense Emotion Recognition Errors for Subgroups of Deaf Children (Study 3) (Divided by hearing 
amplification, level of deafness, communication preference, and whether have signing family members) 
 
Emotion 
error   
(max. 36) 
CI or HA  Level of deafness  
             
Communication                                                 Signing family   
                                                                                members 
 CI 
(N = 15) 
HA 
(N= 13) 
Severe 
(N = 15) 
Profound 
(N = 13) 
Oral 
(N = 20) 
Sign 
(N = 8) 
Yes 
(N = 19) 
No 
(N = 9) 
 
Subtle 
 
22.1  (3.0) 23.31 (3.82) 22.93 (3.79) 22.38 (2.99) 22.55 (3.39) 23.0 (3.59) 22.68 (3.2) 22.67 (3.97) 
Intense 5.07 (2.4) 7.85 (3.83) 7.23 (3.86) 5.31 (2.5) 6.65 (3.44) 5.62 (3.38) 6.26 (3.31) 6.56 (3.75) 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
  




Type of hearing amplification (CI vs. HA)  
As deaf children with a CI (N = 15) appeared to potentially exhibit an 
advantage over children with a HA (N = 13), further exploration comparing the three 
groups of children (Hearing vs. CI vs. HA) on each emotion separately was carried 
out. Table 17 displays the mean and SDs of the background characteristics of deaf 
children with CIs or HAs. There were no significant differences between the sub-
groups of deaf children in CA, non-verbal ability, or language scores.  
A one-way ANOVA exploring differences between total error scores for each 
of the emotions (maximum 12) showed no significant difference between the three 
groups of children for Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear and Surprise (all ps>.08). 
There was a significant difference between groups on the emotion disgust, F (2, 53) 
= 6.66, MSE = 7.24, p = .003). Further comparisons with Bonferroni corrections 
(significance level adjusted to p <.02) showed significantly more errors were made 
by the children with HAs for disgust than deaf children with CIs, t (26) = 2.58, p = 
.02, Cohen’s d = .98 (Table 17), and hearing control group children (mean error = 
4.68, SD = 2.29; t (39) = 3.67, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 1.16). There was no significant 
differences between the deaf children with CIs and hearing control children (t (41) = 
.23, p = .82, Cohen’s d = .07). 
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Table 17.  Mean, SDs and Tests of Difference for Deaf Children Grouped Based on 
Hearing Amplification (CI or HA) for Background Information and Errors in 
Recognition of Disgust (Study 3) 
  
CI (N= 13) 
 
HA (N = 15) 
 
t 
(df = 26) 
Background information    
CA (yrs.mnths) 9.1 (1.6) 9.5 (1.7) -.66 
Non-verbal IQ 92.0 (13.47) 95.85 (16.31) -.68 
BSL Receptive 93.82 (12.6) 94.5 (17.33)         -.11 (df = 21) 
Lip-reading 98.87 (14.46) 99.23 (16.27) -.06 
Emotion recognition     
Disgust (max. 12) 4.87 (3.0) 7.85 (3.1) 2.58* 
Note. SDs are in parenthesis; *p <.05 
 
Discussion 
In previous studies it was possible that the use of prototypical, exaggerated 
facial expressions, and an unlimited amount of time to view experimental stimuli, 
did not test the limit of deaf children’s ability in facial emotion identification (Hosie 
et al., 1998; Most & Aviner, 2009; Ziv et al., 2013). This study aimed to provide a 
more life-like test of emotion recognition in deaf children, by using dynamic real 
faces, presented briefly and with subtle expressions. The results did not provide 
support for hypothesis one: as per Study 2, the deaf children did not have an overall 
deficit in facial emotion recognition in comparison to hearing controls, even on a 
task placing higher demand on processing skills. The deaf children showed a similar 
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pattern of errors as the hearing children in finding fear the most difficult emotion to 
recognise and happiness the easiest.  
The deaf children’s error profile also closely matched that of the hearing 
control group children in demonstrating a greater difficulty in recognising more 
subtle in comparison to more intense emotions, as predicted by hypothesis two. 
These findings are consistent with previous studies investigating the impact of 
emotion intensity on recognition rates of typically developing children (Gao & 
Maurer, 2010; Herba et al., 2006; Montirosso et al., 2010). It has been supposed that 
poorer recognition at lower levels of intensity may be due to less clear expression of 
some of the features that make emotion expressions distinct enough from one 
another to enable effective encoding (Montirosso et al., 2010). De Sonneville et al. 
(2002) reasoned that the process for distinguishing between similar features requires 
great effort and controlled information processing, and so is likely to make use of a 
featural processing strategy. In which case, a low intensity dynamic display does not 
afford the clear configural information that is usually provided by motion (Ambadar 
et al., 2005). Therefore, this ‘piecemeal’ approach to processing emotion requires 
each feature to be managed separately in a rapid amount of time (Montirosso et al., 
2010).  
Alternatively, being able to correctly identify subtle facial expressions of 
emotion may indicate that an individual is better at making subtle configural 
discriminations (Rump et al., 2009). Configural processing has been defined as the 
ability to detect the spatial distances or relationships between features of the face 
rather than directing attention to single non-spatial features such as the nose (Maurer, 
Le Grand & Mondloch, 2002). When facial expressions are exaggerated, the degree 
of spatial movement from a neutral expression is much greater making emotion 
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expressions easier to detect. To be able to identify subtle expressions, therefore, an 
individual is required to detect small motoric spatial differences in muscles (Rump et 
al., 2009). Either of these theories provides an explanation as to why happiness is not 
so greatly affected by intensity of expression, as was found in the present study and 
in previous research, because happiness is shown to be recognisable through the 
mouth (i.e. the smile) alone. On the other hand, fear is particularly difficult to 
discriminate from surprise in the eye region due to subtle differences in eye 
movement (Ekman, 2003, 2007). 
 
Yet while a more featural processing strategy or more sophisticated 
configural processing may be required at lower levels of intensity, motion has been 
shown to improve recognition for subtle displays of emotion in comparison to static 
images (Ambadar et al., 2005). There may be a potential confounding effect between 
motion and intensity given that both have been shown to facilitate emotion 
recognition (Montirosso et al., 2010). In Study 2, deaf children were found to show 
comparable performance to hearing children on dynamic human facial expressions, 
but were poorer at recognising static faces. This suggested that deaf children are 
particularly responsive to socially valid stimuli and are more dependent on motion 
cues and the features of real human facial expressions. As deaf children were shown 
to perform worse at recognition of intense static stimuli, this effect may be more 
pronounced in static subtle human faces. This could be clarified by comparing the 
perception of static and dynamic images of increasing intensity (Ambadar et al., 
2005). Regardless, the results of the present study also indicate that deaf children’s 
emotion recognition parallels that of hearing children with the use of video clips of 
real human faces, even when viewing the more subtle, fleeting expressions of 
emotion more commonly experienced in everyday life. 
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As predicted, the performance of the hearing children for recognition of 
subtle facial expressions of emotion improved significantly with age, which is 
consistent with previous research with typically developing children (Gao & Maurer, 
2009; Herba et al., 2006; Montirosso et al., 2010). As children get older they become 
increasingly more sophisticated at being able to detect the slight spatial differences 
between features caused by minute muscular movements that are typical of subtle 
facial expressions of emotion. The recognition of intense facial expressions of 
emotion was also shown to improve significantly with age for the hearing children. 
There is also evidence that with age, typically developed children become better at 
categorising emotions, particularly the comparatively more difficult negative 
emotions of fear and disgust (Widen & Russell, 2008b). Attributed reasons include 
the relative complexity and socialisation factors leading to an improved concept of 
these emotions (Montirosso et al., 2010; Widen & Russell, 2003). Interestingly, for 
the deaf children age was not a significant predictor of recognition of either subtle or 
intense facial expressions of emotion. Only hearing amplification (an advantage for 
CI wearers over HA wearers) predicted performance in recognising intense emotion 
expressions. According to the theory that emotion understanding occurs through a 
process of socialisation, some deaf children may have better social and language 
access to relate experience of emotional events to prototypical facial expressions 
(Widen & Russell, 2003). This theory needs confirmation through further studies 
exploring more explicitly differences in emotion understanding and perception 
between deaf children with HAs and CIs. 
It is noteworthy, however, that in line with the results of Study 2 the deaf 
children showed a trend of making more errors in recognising disgust than hearing 
control children. While this was not statistically significant, the children with HAs 
were shown to perform significantly worse at recognising disgust than hearing 
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children and deaf children with CIs, as per Study 2. One plausible explanation is, 
because deaf children are more reliant on visual cues when recognising emotion, 
disgust is more easily confused with anger: an emotion that is similar in terms of 
negative valence and arousal. In the absence of auditory cues, perhaps some deaf 
children are delayed in acquiring the ‘emotional script’ that accompanies disgust, 
which allows interpretation of environmental cues enabling them to distinguish 
disgust from anger (Widen & Russell, 2008b).  It is possible that the children with 
CIs have more access to the social and linguistic aspects of emotions to enable them 
to perform on a par with hearing children. 
Verbal ability was also found to predict the performance of hearing children 
in recognising intense facial expressions of emotion, as has previously been shown 
in a few studies that have considered language when investigating typically 
developed children’s emotion recognition (Beck, Kumschick, Eid & Klann-Delius, 
2012; Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey & Garnham, 2003). In a recent study, 
Beck et al. (2012) found receptive vocabulary to predict typically developing 
children’s emotion knowledge, including emotion recognition. Beck et al. reasoned 
that this link highlights that a wide and varied vocabulary suggests that large parts of 
the conceptual system is verbally encoded, including emotion conceptualisation. 
Emotion recognition and verbal ability may be interrelated as both are dependent on 
learning and categorising via experience. Feldman-Barrett et al. (2007) argue that a 
well-developed vocabulary means that emotion concepts are more readily available 
for emotion categorisation.  
No such relationship was found in the deaf group of children. It is possible 
that the language measures utilised for the deaf children in this study may not have 
sufficiently tapped into their linguistic abilities, or alternatively that other unexplored 
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factors mediated performance. While the deaf children were all using SSE, none of 
the children used sign language (BSL) as their main communication method. A lack 
of standardised language measures for deaf oral populations makes exploring 
language abilities in deaf children challenging (Prezbindowski & Lederberg, 2003). 
Future studies should focus on developing language measures standardised for deaf 
populations and exploring the relationship between deaf children’s emotion 
understanding and language. 
It is not trivial that deaf children broadly parallel hearing children on their 
performance in this study. While deaf children may be more reliant on human facial 
features (Ludlow et al. 2010; Studies 1 and 2), they appear to be no more at a 
disadvantage than hearing children at the more challenging task of detecting emotion 
in subtle displays. These results are consistent with several other studies suggesting 
that emotion recognition in deaf children is comparable to hearing children’s when 
assessment involves the use of static pictures (Hopyan-Misakyan et al., 2009; Hosie 
et al., 1998; Ziv et al., 2013) or video clips (Most & Aviner, 2009) of real human 
faces. However, Dyck et al.’s (2004) study with the more challenging processing 
demand of measuring speed of response as well as accuracy, found opposing results. 
Yet Dyck et al. found that the difference between deaf and hearing groups was no 
longer found to be significant when language ability was taken into account, and the 
task included the additionally more complex emotion of contempt.  
Several researchers have theorised that the early basic social-perceptual skills 
and knowledge, including emotion recognition, underpins the later development of a 
social-cognitive ToM, as measured by the false belief task (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1993; Hobson, 1991, 1993). This idea has been used to explain how individuals with 
ASD have difficulties in processing more belief based emotions such as surprise 
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(Baron-Cohen, Spitz & Cross, 1993) and difficulty with less intense displays of 
emotion (Law Smith et al., 2010). Yet while deaf children have shown significant 
delays in performance on the false belief task, no such delays have been found in 
recognising the emotion, surprise. Neither was a delay shown in recognising subtle 
emotion expressions relative to the hearing control group children as might have 
been expected, given that cognitive skills in perspective taking may be related to 
understanding the meaning of subtle emotion expressions (Choudhury et al., 2006).  
 Language ability has been found to relate to deaf children’s difficulty in 
performing on the false-belief task (Schick et al., 2007), including the theory that this 
relates to having fewer opportunities to discuss emotion (Peterson et al., 1995).  
Potential difficulty in recognising the emotion, disgust, may also reflect that because 
deaf children have reduced opportunities to overhear conversations with emotional 
content, meaning a full understanding of this more complex emotion develops later 
in deaf children. It should be acknowledged that only a subset of video clips from the 
ADFES (Van der Schalk et al., 2011) were selected to render the clips into varying 
levels of intensity. For pragmatic reasons, it can only be expected that a limited 
number of experimental stimuli can be presented to children. Further exploration of 
emotion recognition abilities could be carried out by creating more subtle stimuli 
with the entire ADFES, including the investigation of more complex emotions, such 
as contempt, and the self-conscious emotions contained in the stimuli set (i.e. 
embarrassment, pride).  
The present study shows that deaf children’s overall performance on an 
emotion recognition task examining the ability to identify the six basic emotions was 
on a par with hearing children. This study was unique in that it utilised standardised 
video clips of real human faces and considered the added process demands of a 
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reduced display time and varying degrees of intensity. The evidence suggests that 
deaf children’s processing style is very similar to that of hearing children, indicating 
that deaf children do not have a perceptual difficulty. Rather, a problem with 
recognising the emotion, disgust, is indicative of the role of language in emotion 
understanding (Feldman-Barrett, 2009; Widen & Russell, 2003). Future studies 
should consider the development of the recognition and understanding of more 
complex, social emotions (i.e. pride, guilt and embarrassment), including 
development into adulthood.   
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Chapter Six 
Study Four: Emotion production of deaf children  
Overview 
Studies 1 to 3 addressed deaf children born to hearing parents’ emotion 
recognition abilities. This chapter attends to a novel aspect of deaf children’s 
emotion processing: the ability to voluntarily encode facial expressions of emotion.  
The encoding of the six basic emotions was elicited by three methods: verbal labels, 
emotion production in the context of signed stories, and the imitation of emotion 
expressions of dynamic human faces. Overall, the results showed that the deaf 
children were able to produce more accurate expressions of emotion than hearing 
children in the first two conditions and were rated with similar levels of accuracy in 
the imitation condition. The exception was that deaf children were significantly 
worse than hearing children at encoding disgust in the verbal label and imitation 
conditions, in line with the emotion recognition studies. Deaf children were also 
rated as being more expressive in all conditions, suggesting a high level of 
expressiveness may be important to their display rules. These results strongly 
implicate the process of socialisation in emotion understanding and expression. 
 Introduction 
 
 It is well established that deaf children of hearing parents have difficulty 
in understanding others’ false beliefs suggesting a delay in the development of 
Theory of Mind (ToM) (e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1999). While deaf children’s 
delay in language acquisition is strongly suggestive of a role of language in 
understanding others’ intentions and emotions (e.g. Schick et al., 2007), far less 
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consideration has been given to early social communication that has been implicated 
in ToM development (e.g. imitation, mental state information gleaned from faces and 
voices). Several theorists have argued that more complex social-cognitive abilities 
are underpinned by a foundation of basic social-perceptual knowledge (Baron-Cohen 
1994; Hobson, 1991, 1993; Tager-Flusberg, 2000). This chapter presents three 
studies investigating a more primitive form of affective relatedness in deaf children 
by considering the ability to voluntarily pose and imitate facial expressions of 
emotion. While the ability to encode facial expressions of emotion has been studied 
in other clinical populations with reported ToM difficulties, including children with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (e.g. Volker, Lopata, Smith & Thomeer, 2009), 
and congenitally blind children (e.g. Galati, Miceli & Sini, 2001; Galati, Sini, 
Schmidt & Tini, 2003; Roch-Levencq, 2006), this is yet to be studied in a population 
of congenitally deaf children.  
Deaf children’s early communication experience 
 Emotional development typically takes place in an auditory-linguistic 
context in which sound plays an important communicative role in very early 
interactions before language acquisition (Gray et al., 2007). Once spoken (or sign 
language) is acquired, children are privy to continuous commentary regarding their 
own and others’ expressions of emotion (Dunn & Brown, 1993). Emotion 
understanding is continually refined via social interactions with siblings and peers, 
and both through conversing directly about emotions with parents and indirect 
emotional experiences e.g. when watching television (Dorr, 1985). 
 
 It has been reasoned that the relatively impoverished early 
communication between deaf infants and hearing parents impacts on preverbal deaf 
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infants’ early visual attention, which mirrors later delays in social-cognitive ToM 
(Meristro et al., 2012b). Inter-subjectivity refers to shared involvement with another 
person, recognising the other as a person with emotions and intentions and 
experiencing and sharing own intentions with the significant other (Loots & Devisé, 
2003).   Deaf children of hearing parents have been shown to spend less time in co-
ordinated joint visual attention than hearing children and deaf signing children with 
deaf parents (Loots et al., 2005; Prezbindowski et al., 1998).  While it seems logical 
that non-verbal behaviour in the visual domain could be preserved and even 
optimised in deaf children, research has highlighted that the majority of hearing 
parents are not sufficiently proficient in sign language and gestural communication 
to initiate and sustain social interactions and conversation revolving around others’ 
beliefs (Spencer & Harris, 2006; Vaccari & Marschark, 1997). 
Voluntary production of facial expressions  
Emotion processing is closely linked to beliefs and desires (Astington, 1993; 
Wellman, 1990); a facial expression of emotion can display whether or not a desire 
has been fulfilled (happy or sad), or whether someone has had a false belief 
(surprise). Living in a social world, children develop notions about psychological 
processes that underpin everyday social occurrences (Harris, 1989). Emotion is 
prominent in social communication and it is arguable that it takes a central field in 
children’s theorising; children interpret emotions, determining their relationship with 
desire and reality, facial expressions, vocal patterns, goals and action tendencies 
(Denham, 1997). According to Hobson (1991), early inter-personal relations are 
based upon perceptual-affective responsiveness towards bodily gestures, expressions 
and behaviours of others that leads to the knowledge of others’ minds.  
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 Being able to voluntarily pose facial expressions of emotion is thought to 
be an important aspect of the socialisation of emotion (Lewis et al., 1987). Effective 
non-verbal communication allows the sender to give an indication of emotional state 
or intentions to another person (Harrigan, Rosenthal & Scherer, 2008). The face in 
particular provides an important channel of information that can communicate subtle 
underlying inferences (Cohen & Ekman, 2005). As previously described, there are at 
least six basic facial expressions of emotion – happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust 
and surprise – that are thought to elicit activation of the same facial expressions and 
prototypical patterns of muscle activation (Ekman, 1972, 1978). These recognisable 
facial expressions allow the encoder to accurately convey facial expressions in these 
typical configurations that are similar across individuals (Russell & Fernandez-Dols, 
1997). It is important, therefore, to both be able to interpret another person’s emotion 
state by recognising emotion expressions (decoding), and to successfully 
communicate emotion (encode) through the face. 
 
 Children who communicate their emotions well are hypothesised to have 
better social skills and greater peer acceptance (Boyatzis & Satyaprasad, 1994; Field 
& Walden, 1982). Emotion production studies investigating this ability in typically 
developing children have revealed that children’s accuracy and clarity of expression 
improves significantly with age; certain emotions, in particular, fear, are difficult to 
pose even for adults (Ekman, Hager & Friesen, 1980; Field & Walden, 1982; Lewis 
et al., 1987; Odom & Lemond, 1972). Field and Walden (1982) found a positive 
relationship between pre-schoolers who were more accurate at encoding facial 
expressions of emotion in an experimental situation and emotion expressiveness 
during free play.  
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Research on deaf children’s non-verbal skill has focused solely on ability to 
decode, or recognise, others’ expressions of emotion (e.g. Dyck et al., 2004; Hosie et 
al., 1998; Ludlow et al., 2010; Most & Aviner, 2009; Most & Michaelis, 2012).  
Some studies showing that deaf children make more errors in recognising or 
decoding facial expressions of emotion (e.g. Dyck et al., 2004; Ludlow et al., 2010) 
may be indicative of a difficulty in accurately encoding emotions.  In studies 3 and 4 
of this thesis, the deaf children were shown to be worse at recognising the emotion, 
disgust, in comparison to hearing control children. Being able to accurately 
recognise facial expressions of emotion has been linked to the ability to encode 
facial expressions of emotion in typically developed children (Field & Walden, 
1982), some studies showing the former precedes the latter (Boyatzis & Satyaprasad, 
1994). Impairments in emotion recognition has also been found to be paired with 
difficulties in emotion production, in particular, for the emotions fear, disgust and 
surprise (Goldman & Sripada, 2005), for example in adults with ASD (Macdonald et 
al., 1989) and schizophrenia (Mandal, Pandey & Prasad, 1998). It has been reasoned 
that deaf children’s difficulties in non-verbal behaviour may result from early 
differences in inter-subjectivity and less experience with communication. 
 
 In addition, the ability to voluntarily express emotions may give an 
indication of how well children can modulate and control their facial expressions 
(Lewis & Michalson, 1983). It has been posited that greater control over voluntary 
facial expressivity is useful in regulating and masking emotions (Calkin, 1994). As 
children get older language becomes more important in regulating emotion.  Guided 
by a socialisation process, both via practices of parents and other authorities, 
children develop more effective ways of expressing themselves; for example, using 
words to inform an adult or verbally express a grievance rather than hitting the 
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person who elicited the feeling of anger (Thompson, 1994). ‘Display rules’ are a 
management technique learned that facilitates a person to separate expressions from 
feelings (Ekman & Friesen, 1669); the development of display rules enables children 
to minimise or intensify the expression of felt emotions appropriately depending on 
social context and cultural rules (Elfenbein, Beaupré, Lévesque & Hess, 2007). 
 
Research with deaf children indicates a delay in understanding of display 
rules (Hosie et al., 2000) and difficulty in emotion regulation (Rieffe, 2012; Rieffe & 
Terwogt, 2004; Wiefferink, Rieffe, Ketelaar & Frijns, 2013). While hearing children 
gave pro-social reasons for masking their anger and showed concern for norm-
maintenance, deaf children’s reasons were comparatively self-protective (Hosie et 
al., 2000). Deaf children’s less advanced emotion regulation skills have been implied 
by their more frequent and intense expression of negative emotions (Wiefferink et 
al., 2012). It is therefore conceivable that this may also impact on their non-verbal 
skills and ability to control the production of facial expressions.  
 
 Contrary to this hypothesis, deaf children’s reliance on the face to 
express emotion through sign language may suggest the opposite effect on their 
ability to encode emotion through facial expressions. There is evidence to suggest 
that the ability to decode and encode facial expressions of emotion is linked to the 
amount and quality of experience with nonverbal behaviour (Goldstein et al., 2000).  
In ASL (and likewise in BSL), facial expressions not only convey grammatical and 
syntactical information, but also emotion facial expressions are crucial 
accompaniments to manual signs for emotions. In the same way that pitch and tone 
of voice in English provides important emotion cues, the face is crucial to 
determining emotion meaning in sign language (Figure 3).  
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 Goldstein and colleagues theorised that given the importance of emotion 
expression in sign language, knowledge and experience of signing may result in 
greater adeptness at conveying emotions to others. Among hearing populations, 
Goldstein and Feldman (1996) found that signers were able to more accurately 
decode the six basic facial expressions of emotion than non-signers, and in a later 
study, Goldstein et al. (2000) found that signers were also able to more accurately 
encode facial expressions of emotion than non-signers.  It could therefore be 
expected that deaf people who experience sign may be more successful at encoding 
emotion facial expressions than hearing people. In line with research exploring the 
development of typically developed children’s non-verbal skills (Field & Walden, 
1982), deaf people may develop display rules that adopt a high degree of intensity 
and clarity of expression that reflects the non-verbal style of communication to 
which they have been exposed. Conversely, as the majority of deaf children learn to 
sign late or are oral in their communication preference, this advantage in non-verbal 
communication afforded by experience with sign might not extend to all deaf people.   
Figure 3. Left: BSL manual sign SAD: flat palm straight down across face 
(B2); Right: BSL sign SURPRISE: claw five hand shape. Accompanying facial 
expressions signify the intensity of the feeling. 
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Emotion decoding methodology 
The assessment of encoded facial expressions broadly falls into two 
categories: measurement studies and judgement studies (Volker et al., 2009; Wagner, 
1997). The advantage of measurement studies is the employment of objective 
measures to assess facial behaviour. The emotion production studies presented in this 
chapter utilised Noldus FaceReader™ (version 4): software trained to classify the 
basic emotions as described by Ekman, detecting the features in the facial 
expressions according to the FACS (Ekman et al., 2002). The benefit of using 
FaceReader™ over the typical measurement study method, electromyography, is that 
it is less intrusive: a more covert method is particularly advantageous when 
conducting a study involving children, so to minimise distraction.  
 
While FaceReader™ can provide an objective reading of the intensity of 
movement involved in changing facial expression, it is unable to evaluate internal-
state information of the encoder that is conveyed through these facial movements 
(Wagner, 1997). In addition, a judgement methodology was implemented alongside 
FaceReader™ to provide a socially valid measure by which to assess the encoded 
facial expressions of emotion (Rosenthal, 1982). Social validity is an important 
consideration given the inherent social function of facial expressions: to inform 
others of an experienced emotional state (encode), so that others can interpret these 
signals (decode) within a social context (Rosenthal, 2005). From a developmental 
perspective, young children may only be able to pose partial facial movement, so 
relying solely on an exact coding system (e.g. FACS) may limit the facial expression 
assessment and miss recognisable aspects of emotion expression produced by the 
children (Lewis et al., 1987). This is particularly relevant given that previous studies 
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have shown negative emotions, especially fear and anger, are difficult for both 
children (Ekman, 1980; Field & Walden 1982; Lewis et al., 1987; Odom & Lemond, 
1972) and adults (Ekman, 1985; Ekman & Friesen, 1982) to encode.   

The judges recruited in this study were required to make a categorical 
judgement of each viewed emotion expression by assigning one label from a short 
list, and also a rating of intensity in terms of degree the muscles involved in the 
facial expression (e.g. happiness) move away from a relaxed state (neutral) i.e. 
whether the viewed expression was subtle or exaggerated. The consideration of 
intensity is of value for two reasons. First, it has been shown that perceived intensity 
linearly increases with greater physical intensity and accuracy in judgement (Hess et 
al., 1997), suggesting that when emotion is interpreted out of context, it is a direct 
reading of the underlying emotional state.  Second, intensity of expression has been 
shown to vary according to culture and the display rules adopted by each culture 
(Elfenbein, et al., 2007). Given that non-verbal behaviour is of particular importance 
in deaf communication (Goldstein et al., 2000), ratings of intensity could be 
informative in terms of how clear and expressive the deaf children are at conveying 
emotion in the face in comparison to hearing children. 
Study 4a: voluntary emotion production 
The aim of Study 4a was to compare the ability of deaf children to 
voluntarily encode the six basic emotion expressions in comparison to hearing 
controls. The advantage of using a posed methodology is that the cue for producing 
an emotion expression (e.g. ‘show me anger’) is unambiguous as opposed to eliciting 
an emotion by giving an example of a particular social situation (e.g. if a child builds 
a tower and another knocks it down he/she may be angry and/or sad) (Barth & 
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Archibald, 2003) and is independent of contagion that may occur when imitating a 
facial expression of emotion (Lewis et al., 1987); it therefore provides a picture of 
children’s ability to voluntary encode facial emotion expressions on demand.  
 
Study 4a hypotheses: Based on previous research the following hypotheses were 
drawn: 
Hypothesis one: deaf and hearing children will perform similarly in the 
production of the emotions, happiness and surprise. It is argued the children are 
socialilsed to produce the facial expression of happiness (Field & Walden, 1982; 
Lewis et al., 1989) and even children with ASD have been found to be unimpaired in 
the voluntary production of happiness (Volker et al., 2009). It is thought that 
encoding and decoding happiness is visually simpler than negative emotions. Even if 
the full Duchenne smile (which includes activation of the muscles in the eye regions: 
orbicularis oculi muscle) is not produced, happiness can be easily encoded and 
recognised with a smile, and surprise with an open mouth (Adolphs, 2002). 
 
Hypothesis two: Given that encoding has been shown to be more difficult 
than decoding for typically developing children (Boyatzis & Satyaprasad, 1994), 
deaf children will be worse at producing the negative emotions, in particular the 
emotion, disgust. There is some evidence to suggest that deaf children may be more 
expressive and accurate in producing emotion facial expressions due to use of sign 
language (Goldstein et al., 2000). However, based on Hobson’s (1991) theory that 
perceptual-affective responsiveness towards expressions (as well as other gestures 
and behaviours) underpins the development of mentalising abilities, the deaf children 
of hearing parents may be worse at the production of negative emotions, in particular 
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disgust. This is based upon deaf children of hearing parents’ delays in ToM and 
potential delays in emotion recognition.  
Hypothesis three: all children will be worse at encoding the negative 
emotions according to the Face Reader™ objective measure of facial expression 
behaviour, in particular fear and anger. This prediction is based on previous 
research that suggests that negative emotions are more difficult to produce on 
demand. It is thought that muscle movement is harder to control consciously for 
negative emotions (Ekman, 1985). 
Method 
Participants  
Encoders: Five deaf children (three female) participated in this study ranging 
from 6 years and 7 months to 11 years and 2 months (mean = 8 years 6 months; SD 
= 1 year 9 months; Raven’s IQ = 91.0; SD = 17.46). The children were recruited 
from three mainstream schools in the local area with attached hearing impaired units. 
Four of the children were moderate-severely deaf and one child was profoundly deaf 
with no known concomitant disorders such as mental retardation, attention deficit, or 
autism. All of the children received auditory amplification: three wore CAs and two 
children wore a HA. The deaf children were oral in their communication preference, 
using some SSE or BSL, but none were native signers. Table 18 displays the 
individual characteristics for each deaf participant. 
 
Five typically developing children (3 female) also took part in the study 
matched to the deaf children for non-verbal ability and CA The children were aged 
between 6 years 10 months and 10 years 1 month (mean = 8 years 2 months; SD = 1 
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year 3 months; Raven’s IQ mean = 98.0; SD = 10.37; Table 18). The children were 
recruited from local primary schools and were reported to be of average ability or 
above, with no apparent learning disabilities. Independent t-tests revealed no 
significant difference in CA (t (8) = .33, p = .75) or non-verbal ability (t (8) = -.77, p 
= .46) between the two groups. The deaf children performed within the average 
range on the BSL receptive language test (mean 101; SD = 14.07) and the hearing 
control children scored within the average range on the BPVS receptive language test 
(106.4, SD = 9.61). 
Decoders: Thirty-five (22 female) adults took part in rating the children’s 
emotion expressions, aged between 19 years and 6 months and 65 years and 1 month 
(mean = 30 years and 3 months; SD = 11 years). Participants were either: students 
recruited via Anglia Ruskin’s on-line Psychology Research Participation System, 
receiving a course credit for their participation enabling them to recruit for their own 
studies; or unpaid community volunteers, recruited using an opportunity sampling 
method. Control participants were required to be free of neurologic or psychiatric 
disorders and a have negative family history of both psychiatric disorders and 
autistic spectrum disorder. 
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Table 18. Deaf and Hearing Emotion Encoders’ Individual Characteristics (CA, Non-verbal/Verbal Ability, EVT, Level of Hearing Loss, HA    
vs. CI) 
 
 
Participant Group Gender CA Standardized IQ 
Standardised language 
(D: BSL; H: BPVS) 
EVT (/12) Level of 
deafness 
HA vs. 
CI 
Communication 
preference 
1 D M 9y0m 110 123 11 severe HA oral 
2 D M 7y0m 75 86 9 severe CI oral 
3 D F 11y2m 100 102 12 severe CI oral 
4 D F 8y10m 70 92 6 profound CI oral 
5 D F 6y7m 100 102 10 severe HA oral 
6 H M 8y11m 90 118 12    
7 H M 7y7m 95 103 10    
8 H F 10y1m 90 100 12    
9 H F 6y10m 100 115 11    
10 H F 7y6m 115 96 10    



Materials  
The facial analysis software, Noldus FaceReader™ (version 4), was 
employed to classify the facial expressions of emotion produced by the children in 
this study. The software is programmed to detect and classify, in addition to 
‘neutral’, the six basic emotions – happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and 
surprise (Ekman, 1972). Digital video recordings of the children were taken (using 
Logitech Quickcam Orbit AF) and the videos analysed frame-by-frame.  
FaceReader™ first detects the face using the Viola-Jones algorithm (Viola & Jones, 
2001) and then models the face based on the Active Appearance Method (Cootes & 
Taylor, 2000). The face is modelled according to key points (i.e. lips, eyebrows, nose 
and eyes) and the texture of the face entangled between these points. The texture of 
the face gives important information for classifying emotions, such as wrinkling in 
the skin and changes in eyebrow shape.  
 
The classification itself occurs via an artificial neural network, the training 
for which involved over 10,000 manually annotated images (Bishop, 1995). 
FaceReader™ (version 4) has been validated both by analysing a standardised set of 
pictures of facial expressions: (Radboud Faces Database: Langer et al., 2010) at an 
overall accuracy rate of 90% (Bijlstra & Dotsch, 2011); and by comparing facial 
analysis of FaceReader™ (version 2) with two human observers, ranging from 99% 
agreement for ‘neutral’ to 70% agreement for ‘disgust’ (Terzis, Moridis & 
Economides, 2010; see www.noldus.com for more detail). 
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Procedure 
Facial coding procedure: The ability to voluntarily encode the six basic 
emotion expressions was tested by videotaping the children producing each emotion. 
Prior to the emotion coding, the children completed an adaptation of the EVT (Dyck, 
et al., 2001), previously described in Chapter 4. The aim was to both prime them to 
think of the emotions and to check their comprehension. This involved the children 
having to recall scenarios and provide examples of when they, or another person, 
may experience the emotion (e.g. “I was sad when my pet dog died”). All children 
scored a minimum of 6 out of a total of 12, indicating an understanding of each of 
the 6 basic emotions (see Table 11). Additionally, during this process the children 
were shown labelled prototypical faces of each of the emotions to confirm their 
understanding. When the pre-test concluded, the materials were removed from the 
table. 
The children were seated 60cm in front of a 14-inch portable computer, 
directly facing the screen. A digital video camera (Logitech Quickcam Orbit AF) 
was discreetly positioned behind the computer. To ensure the children were not too 
self-conscious or distracted by the video camera, recording began at the beginning of 
the session and continued throughout. The children’s face and shoulders were visible 
in the camera’s field of view. The experimenter was also sat behind the laptop, 
facing the child. First she explained that she was going to video record the child 
making each of the emotion faces. So not to influence the child’s response, the 
experimenter maintained a neutral facial expression and tone of voice, and smiled 
and praised the child’s response once he/she finished posing. To elicit a response, the 
experimenter said “show me…” followed by each of the six emotions – happiness, 
sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise. If the child seemed to be unfamiliar with 
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the emotion word, a different form of the lexeme, or an appropriate synonym, was 
presented (e.g. ‘disgusting’ instead of ‘disgust’; ‘frightened’ or ‘scared’ instead of 
‘fear’). The instructions were presented both orally and with the use of SSE to the 
deaf children. To prompt the most natural response, the children were not given a 
time limit; typically, they posed the emotion facial expressions for between two and 
seven seconds. Figure 4 shows examples of the peak expression of deaf children’s 
production of the emotions, surprise and anger.  
 
[Images removed for confidentiality] 
  
Figure 4. Screen shots of deaf children’s encoding of surprise and anger 
 
Facial decoding procedure: The videos of the children’s encodings of the six 
basic emotions were decoded both via Noldus Face Reader™ (version 4) and via the 
ratings of 35 adult judges. In preparation for decoding, the experimenter watched the 
video recordings of each participant and noted the onset and end time of each 
emotion expression. Video editing software (VirtualDub 1.10.3) was used to analyse 
the videos to produce video clips of each emotion for each participant. The videos 
were then analysed frame-by-frame by running the clips through the Face Reader™ 
software. The software automatically calibrates to correct any bias towards a 
particular emotion expression for each face analysed, and then classifies the presence 
of each emotion with a value between ‘0’ and ‘1’: ‘0’ meaning that the expression is 
absent and ‘1’ meaning that it is fully present.   
The adult decoders were informed that they were taking part in a study 
investigating children’s production of emotion facial expressions, but were kept 
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blind of the knowledge of the characteristics of the two groups and the research 
hypotheses. To maintain social validity, the adult judges received no training in 
emotion expression decoding (Rosenthal, 2005). Each of the adult decoders rated the 
video clips individually in a quiet well-lit room in Anglia Ruskin University.  Each 
decoder sat 60 cm in front of a 14-inch portable computer on which the video clips 
were presented. Instructions were given verbally explaining that to begin each video 
clip, the decoder needed to press ‘play’. After watching the video clip, the adult 
raters first needed to select the emotion they thought the child was attempting to 
portray by clicking on the appropriate emotion word. The six emotion words 
(happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise) were presented on the screen 
in a random order. Second, the adult decoders were asked to rate the intensity of 
emotion facial expression on a scale of 1-5: 1- not at all intense; 2- a bit intense; 3 – 
mildly intense; 4- very intense; 5 – extremely intense. If the adult decoder did not 
select the intensity rating, it was not possible to move onto the next video clip. A 
total of 60 video clips were shown to the decoders and the procedure took 
approximately 15 minutes. Once completed, the adult decoders were fully debriefed 
of the purpose of the study. 
 
 
 


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Design 
A 2 (Group: Deaf vs. Hearing) x 6 (Emotion: Anger vs. Disgust vs. Fear vs. 
Happiness vs. Sadness vs. Surprise) mixed model experimental design was 
implemented.  The factor, Group, was between participant, and the factor, Emotion, 
was within participant. 
The children (encoders) were asked to produce the six emotion expressions in 
one of three randomized orders (A, B or C). These three versions were 
counterbalanced between participants. When rating the emotion expressions, the 
order of the 60 video clips presented to the decoders (adult hearing) was randomized. 
Results 
 Judgement data: decoders’ ratings of emotion encodings 
The frequency of agreement between encoders (deaf and hearing) and the 
decoders (adult hearing) was calculated. Cross tabulations were created in the form 
of confusion matrices to show the relationship between the intended meaning of 
facial expressions (i.e. encoded targets) and the meaning (i.e. emotion labels) 
attributed by the decoders. Table 19 shows the raters’ decoding of the deaf children’s 
emotion production and Table 20 shows the raters’ decoding of the hearing 
children’s emotion production. 
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Table 19. Cross Tabulations of Original Meanings (Row) of Deaf Children’s Expressions (elicited by a Verbal Label) and Meaning Attributed by 
Judges (Column) 
 Happiness Sadness Anger Fear Disgust Surprise Total 
Happiness 95.4 1.7 .6 0.0 2.3 0.0 100.0 
Sadness 0.0 85.7 11.4 0.6 1.7 0.6 100.0 
Anger 0.0 4.6 72.6 3.4 17.1 2.3 100.0 
Fear 0.0 4.6 1.1 66.9 8.0 19.4 100.0 
Disgust 0.0 9.7 29.1 2.3 58.9 0.0 100.0 
Surprise 0.6 0.0 0.6 10.9 1.1 86.9 100.0 
 
Table 20. Cross Tabulations of Original Meanings (Row) of Hearing Children’s Expressions (elicited by a Verbal Label) and Meaning Attributed by 
Judges (Column) 
 Happiness Sadness Anger Fear Disgust Surprise Total 
Happiness 96.6 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 100.0 
Sadness 0.6 78.3 0.0 0.0 18.3 2.9 100.0 
Anger 8.0 16.0 46.3 2.9 22.3 4.6 100.0 
Fear 1.1 1.1 0.0 31.4 25.7 40.6 100.0 
Disgust 8.0 0.6 2.3 4.0 72.6 12.6 100.0 
Surprise 0.6 1.7 0.0 30.3 1.1 66.3 100.0 
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For both groups, there was considerable difference between emotions in 
terms of how recognisable they were to the adult decoders; these accuracy values are 
summarised in Table 21. Happiness, followed by sadness and surprise were the most 
easily recognized emotions, followed by disgust, anger, and, finally – fear was the 
most difficult emotion facial expression to recognise. Overall, the expressions of the 
deaf children were recognised with higher accuracy than those of the hearing 
children. A chi-squared test of independence showed that this difference was 
statistically significant (Table 21). Deaf children also produced facial expressions for 
the emotions, sadness, fear, anger, and surprise, significantly more accurately 
recognised by the decoders. Conversely, hearing children’s production of the 
emotion facial expression, disgust, was significantly more accurately recognised by 
decoders.  
Table 21. Chi-squared Test of Independence to show differences in Accuracy of 
Ratings for Target Expressions between Deaf and Hearing Children’s Portrayals of 
Emotions (elicited by a Verbal Label) 
 Percentage correct  
χ²  
 
Φ 
Emotion Deaf Hearing 
Overall 75.62 65.24 40.08*** .14 
Happiness 95.4 96.6 .03 .01 
Sadness 85.7 78.3 3.27* .10 
Anger 72.6 46.3 13.37*** .20 
Fear 66.9 31.4 43.94*** .36 
Disgust 58.9 72.6 7.3** .14 
Surprise 86.9 66.3 17.8*** .26 
NB. All χ² have 1 degree of freedom; *** p<.001, **p<.005, * p <.05  
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Judgement data: decoders’ ratings of intensity 
Table 22 displays median intensity ratings of intensity for each emotion 
expression for deaf and hearing children. Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests were 
conducted to determine whether there were differences in decoders’ ratings of 
intensity between the two groups. The decoders’ ratings of intensity were 
significantly greater for deaf children’s production of all emotion facial expressions 
in comparison to hearing children’s expressions (Table 22). 
 
Table 22. Median Ratings of Intensity (1: not at all intense, to 5: extremely intense) 
and Mann-Whitney U-Test of difference between Encoder’s Ratings of Intensity of 
Deaf and Hearing Children’s Encodings of Emotion Facial Expressions (elicited by 
a Verbal Label) 
 Median rating 
U z r 
Emotion Deaf Hearing 
Happiness 3 (2) 3 (1)      12138.5*** -3.49 -.19 
Sadness 3 (2) 2 (1)      12827.5** -2.75 -.15 
Anger 4 (1) 3 (2)      11483.5*** -4.18 -.22 
Fear 4 (1) 3 (2)      11473.5*** -4.24 -.23 
Disgust 4 (1) 3 (2)      10719.5*** -5.06 -.27 
Surprise 4 (1) 3 (2)      11313.5*** -4.39 -.23 
Note. Inter-quartile range in parenthesis; ** p<.005, *** p <.001 
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Objective ratings of emotions 
The sample videos were analysed via Noldus Facer Reader™ (version 4). 
The facial expressions in each clip were classified and transformed into ratings of the 
emotions of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise, ranging from 0 
(the emotions is not detected by the software at all) to 1 (the expression detected 
corresponds uniquely to one emotion) in each analysed frame of the video. The 
scores obtained were averaged to create one score for each emotion displayed in 
each video. These scores were averaged in each group creating one score of intensity 
per group for each emotion (Table 23). 
A Mixed ANOVA5 was carried out to investigate whether the emotion 
expressions of both groups were different across the six emotions (Emotion x 
Group). Results revealed a non- significant main effect of Group F (1, 8) = .91, MSE 
= .02, p = .37, η² = .10, showing that overall, the expressions of deaf (M = .41, SD = 
.58) and hearing children (M = .34, SD = .53) were of similar intensity. A significant 
main effect of Emotion was present, F (5, 40) = 8.15, MSE = .08, p < .001, η² = .51. 
Further tests with Bonferroni corrections (adjusted significance level p <.003) 
revealed that surprise was rated as significantly more intense than anger and fear, 
and happiness was rated as being significantly more intense than fear (Table 24). The 
Group x Emotion interaction, F (5, 40) = .89, MSE = .08, p = .50, η² = .10, was not 
significant. 
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5
 The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test revealed similarly non-significant difference 
between the two groups’ FaceReader™ ratings for all emotions. 
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Table 23. Means and SDs of FaceReader™ Recordings of Intensity of the 
Production of Emotions (elicited by a Verbal Label) by Deaf and Hearing 
Participants 
 Hearing Deaf Total 
Emotion Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Happiness .82 .09 .68 .36 .75 .26 
Sadness .58 .31 .63 .23 .61 .26 
Anger .29 .31 .21 .34 .25 .31 
Fear .23 .19 .15 .16 .19 .17 
Disgust .14 .27 .41 .33 .27 .29 
Surprise .62 .38 .82 .11 .72 .28 
 
 
Table 24. Mean Differences between FaceReader™ Recordings of Production of 
Emotions (elicited by a Verbal Label) and Significance Levels (Bonferroni 
corrected) 
Emotion Anger Disgust Fear Happiness Sadness Surprise 
Anger       
Disgust -.019      
Fear .066 .085     
Happiness -.500 -.480 -.566**    
Sadness -.354 -.335 -.420 .146   
Surprise -.465** -.446 -.532** .034 -.112  
** p<.003 
 
 
 
 



Discussion 
This study was the first to investigate deaf children’s ability to encode facial 
expressions of emotion. Both the judgement and FaceReader™ ratings are consistent 
with previous studies that have shown that children are best socialised to encode 
facial expressions of happiness on cue (Field & Walden, 1982; Lewis et al., 1989; 
Volker et al., 2009). The results are in support of hypothesis one as no significant 
differences in encoding of happiness was found between deaf and hearing children. 
While it can be argued that fixed-choice judgement studies with a bias towards 
negative categories make happiness easier to identify (Friedrickson, 1998; Russell, 
1994), FaceReader™ provides an objective reading of facial movement that suggests 
that deaf and hearing children are both able to engage the muscles to successfully 
pose, at least partially, the prototypical configuration of the facial expression of 
happiness. As the children are able to pose ‘happiness’ on demand in the 
experimental setting, it can be supposed that it is within their control to manage this 
expression in a naturalistic setting (Lewis et al., 1987). 
  The judgement ratings of study 4a suggest that the deaf children encoded 
clearer facial expressions of emotion than hearing children as the expressions were 
significantly easier to decode for adult raters. In addition, deaf children were rated as 
producing significantly more intense expressions for all emotions, suggesting a 
higher level of expressiveness. These results do not support fully support hypothesis 
two, as deaf children encoded the typically more difficult negative emotions of 
sadness, fear, and anger (Field & Walden, 1982; Lewis et al., 1987; Ohman et al., 
2001), as well as surprise, significantly more accurately than hearing children as 
judged by the adult raters.  
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These results support the alternative hypothesis that suggests that experience 
with non-verbal communication improves ability to produce facial expressions of 
emotion (Goldstein et al., 2000). Ekman (1972) acknowledged cultural variability in 
terms of when to mask, inhibit and exaggerate facial expressions of emotion. 
Goldstein et al. (2000) proposed that deaf signers may adopt a set of display rules 
that includes the expression of intense emotion that reflects exposure to non-verbal 
communication. This finding is interesting as none of the deaf children taking part in 
this study were native or even late-signing BSL users; all of the children were oral, 
but they had some experience with sign language  (SSE and/or BSL) and all scored 
within the average range on the BSL receptive language test (Table 18). It could be, 
however, that this sample of deaf children were exceptional in their level of 
expressiveness and a wider sample of deaf children with a variety of sign language 
experience would need to be tested to confirm this suggestion. 
It has been suggested that the ability to encode emotions requires the 
knowledge of display rules about controlling emotion expression (Lewis et al., 1987; 
Saarni, 1989). Being able to pull a happy face, for example, may reflect a child’s 
understanding of the necessity to ‘put on a good face’ (Boyatzis & Satyaprasad, 
1994). Yet anger is a non-affiliative emotion (Hess, Blairy & Kleck, 2000). It could 
be that the hearing children were more inhibited in encoding negative emotions, 
particularly anger, through a process of socialisation – it is less socially acceptable to 
display outbursts of anger (Lewis et al., 1987). Deaf children growing up in a 
hearing environment, with less frequent access to conversations about emotions, 
have been shown to be less likely to conceal anger. This has been attributed to a 
delay in the development of social display rules (Hosie et al., 2000); regulating 
emotions to protect the feelings of others may develop more slowly in deaf children 
(Wiefferink et al., 2012). A naturalistic study would shed light on how deaf children 
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produce emotion expressions in a social context. Galati et al. (2003) found that blind 
children, who similarly display delays in understanding others emotions and 
intentions, were less likely to mask negative emotions than their sighted peers. At 
present, this remains a speculative explanation given that there was no direct 
assessment of display rules and it may be that deaf children were better at encoding 
anger because of greater experience and necessity to communicate via non-verbal 
methods.  
As predicted, the deaf children were significantly poorer at producing the 
emotion, disgust, in comparison to the hearing children according to the adult raters. 
Given that deaf children were shown to be significantly poorer at recognising disgust 
in Studies 2 and 3, this result is not surprising given that impaired encoding of 
emotions has been linked with impaired recognition of emotion (Goldman & 
Sripada, 2005). The error scores reveal that deaf children’s encodings of disgust 
were most commonly mistaken for anger. While this can partly be explained as 
misattribution errors of the human raters given that disgust is commonly mislabelled 
as anger even for adults (Widen & Russell, 2008c), it remains that a higher 
proportion of deaf children’s emotion encodings of disgust were labelled as anger. It 
is possible that the deaf children may be delayed in developing an understanding of 
the term disgust. According to Russell and Widen (2003), children begin by 
generally differentiating emotions as positive and negative until they have a firm 
understanding of individual emotions which is learned through a process of 
socialisation. Young typically developed children use basic language with respect to 
physical disgust, such as yucky and icky, and a full understanding of the emotion 
term does not emerge until later (Russell & Widen, 2002). It is possible that some 
deaf children may be re-calling examples of moral disgust when encoding the 
emotion and interpreting this as being interchangea
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developed children have been shown to choose an angry scowl over a disgust face 
for moral disgust stories (Pochedly & Zeman, in preparation). Yet this is unlikely 
given that typically developed children do not readily associate disgust with moral 
events as often as physically disgusting events (Danovitch & Bloom, 2009).  Further 
exploration is needed to fully understand the emergence of deaf children’s 
conceptualisation of disgust.  
However, it is noteworthy that while the difference was not significant, the 
Face Reader™ rating for the production of disgust was higher for the deaf children 
than the hearing children. An anecdotal observation from watching the videos is that 
a feature of the hearing children’s production of disgust was the distinctive tongue 
protrusion, which consequentially makes the encoding easier for the adult judges to 
recognise. Interestingly, in a laboratory study Reisenzein (2007) found that less than 
10% of participants displayed the prototypical configuration of disgust (including 
AU 9) despite high self-reportings of experiencing the emotion. The nose scrunch is 
just one feature of the disgust expression, providing a signal aimed at avoiding 
smelling an unpleasant odour. In other naturalistic studies, the open mouth and 
tongue protrusion have also been identified as typical responses to disgust similarly 
to the hearing children in this study (Von dem Hagen et al., 2009).  
For all children, the negative emotions – in particular, fear, disgust and anger 
- were the hardest to produce, providing support for hypothesis three and consistent 
with previous studies investigating emotion encoding abilities in typically developed 
children (e.g. Field & Walden, 1982; Lewis et al., 1987). The Face Reader™ data, in 
particular, showed low ratings of intensity for the negative emotions. Ekman (1985) 
suggested that the muscle movements for fear, disgust and anger are harder to 
consciously control, which suggests that the children (deaf and hearing) are less able 
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to voluntarily produce the prototypical facial configurations of negative facial 
expressions. While developmentally young children may only be able to partially 
pose the basic facial expressions of emotion, the results of this study suggest 
children are still able to convey emotion through the face that is recognisable to adult 
decoders.  
The higher rates of recognition of the adult rates emphasises the importance 
of including human judgement in emotion decoding assessment because, as social 
beings, they are able to decipher the socially inherent meaning that the children 
convey in their expressions of emotion (Rosenthal, 2005). Lewis et al. (1987) 
described children’s emotion expressions as containing ‘affect emblems’ rather than 
the configuration of muscles typically associated with the prototypical expressions. 
One example is the alternative version of disgust (tongue protrusion) as previously 
discussed. Emotion has been shown to not only be recognised facially but also via 
associated gestures and movements e.g. cowering backwards for fear (Gelder, 
Snyder, Greve, Gerard & Hadjikhani, 2004). Krumhuber et al. (2013) suggest that 
emotion perception needs to be considered as a process involving a number of 
dynamic components that are combined together to produce meaning. Human raters’ 
sensitivity to these emotion cues points to the advantage of using video clips, as 
opposed to the more common method of decoding emotion in still photographs to 
achieve a greater level of social and ecological validity. 
  
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Study 4b: emotion production in the context of signed stories 
An alternative to using verbal prompts to ask a child to voluntarily produce a 
facial expression of emotion is to provide a contextual emotion story detailing a 
stereotypical emotion event (Boyatzis & Satyaprasad, 1994; Profyt & Whissell, 
1991). Previous studies have shown that deaf children have been delayed in 
understanding emotion stories when responding verbally or by identifying the correct 
emotion facial expression (Gray et al., 2001, 2007; Rieffe, Terwogt & Smit, 2003). 
Gray et al. (2007) showed deaf children a series of illustrations depicting emotion-
provoking events and asked them to match each scenario to a photograph of an 
emotion expression for the six basic emotions and to name that expression. While 
the deaf children showed a marked improvement with age, both younger and older 
children, overall, performed significantly worse than hearing controls.  
In a different study of 9 and 11-year old deaf children who communicated in 
sign-supported Dutch, Rieffe et al. (2003) focused on short stories about sadness and 
anger to assess the emotion understanding. Results revealed that deaf children’s 
explanations and emotional attributions concentrated on sadness caused by unfilled 
desires, where hearing children referred also to anger. It was suggested that as a 
result of limited opportunities to learn from their own and others’ experiences via the 
auditory channel, deaf children have a constricted and less adaptable perception of 
emotional situations (Ziv et al., 2013).  
In contrast, when carrying out a similar study to Gray et al. (2007), Ziv et al. 
(2013) found that while deaf Israeli signers displayed significantly worse 
performance, the deaf children with CIs’ performance was comparable to the hearing 
children.  It possible that some deaf children, despite having less opportunity to 
overhear conversations about emotions, can carefully observe prototypical situations 
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and develop the knowledge that certain events provoke certain emotion reactions 
from others.  
 
Interestingly, for typically developed children, when comparing emotion 
identification in the context of a story to emotion recognition in faces, a face 
inferiority effect has been found for some emotions (including disgust and fear) as 
opposed to a story detailing the cause and consequence of an emotion (Widen & 
Russell, 2010). It is reasoned that being able to identify emotion in stories is based 
upon a ‘script’ based understanding of emotions. However, it is also possible that 
deaf children may display delays in emotion understanding due to reduced 
opportunities to converse about their experiences, which in effect delays the 
acquisition of these scripts (Gray et al., 2007). 
 There are several potential limitations to the way in which emotion 
understanding of prototypical events has been studied in deaf children. In previous 
studies testing understanding of emotion stories, the story was signed and then 
shown in a series of illustrations (Gray et al., 2001; 2007), some deliberately leaving 
the protagonists’ face blank (Odom et al., 1973; Ziv et al., 2013). Arguably, as 
emotion spontaneously occurs in an everyday context, when a deaf child tries to 
determine another’s emotional and mental state, non-verbal cues, including facial 
expressions, are available as prompts. With the absence of auditory information, the 
contextualisation of stories and available non-verbal information is potentially even 
more crucial for deaf children.  
A further disadvantage lies in presenting a story in two modes (signing 
followed by illustration), which creates a divide in attention in the same way that an 
interpreter poses a divide in deaf children’s attention during a false belief task 
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(Schick et al., 2007). It is clearly more life-like and ecologically valid to have a 
signer simultaneously showing sign and facial expressions for all children using 
SSE. The importance of considering the socialisation of emotion has previously been 
acknowledged and operationalised by the experimenter’s dramatisation of an 
emotional story to include emotional facial expressions and gestures (Denham, 1986, 
1997; Denham, Zoller & Couchoud, 1994). Pre-recording emotion signed stories 
provides a further advantage to experimental validity due to the consistency that this 
provides in task administration. 
Study 4b aimed to investigate deaf children’s production of the six basic 
emotion expressions in social context by signing prototypical stories aimed at 
eliciting each of the emotions. Arguably a context-dependent task better reflects the 
processing occurring in everyday life for understanding emotions in the social 
contexts from which they stem (Ziv et al., 2013). The children were asked how the 
protagonist would feel in each situation. Whether the deaf children could verbally 
determine the target emotion of the story was considered, but they were also asked to 
display this by producing the emotion facial expression.  
While a similar study was carried out with blind children (Roch-Levecq, 
2006), this was the first study to assess deaf children’s emotion understanding of 
stories by being asked to produce a facial expression of emotion in context. It is also 
the first study that examined deaf children’s emotion understanding of stories 
through a battery of pre-recorded stories in SSE: a medium closer to that which deaf 
children experience in everyday life. In addition, being asked to encode a facial 
expression of emotion involves an entirely non-verbal response, which is an 
important consideration given that there may be a delay in deaf children’s 
understanding of emotion terms/vocabulary.  
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Study 4b hypotheses: Based on the literature discussed, the following 
hypotheses were drawn. Hypothesis one: Deaf and hearing children will show 
comparable performance both in verbal labelling and facial expression production 
of the emotions, happiness, sadness, fear and disgust. Both hearing and deaf children 
have previously been shown to be able to identify situations that cause happiness and 
sadness (Gray et al., 2007; Ziv et al., 2013). These are reported to be the earliest 
emerging emotions (Widen & Russell, 2003). Given research suggesting a face 
inferiority effect for the later emerging emotions, disgust and fear (Widen & Russell, 
2010) it was predicted that both deaf and hearing children would be able to encode 
and label fear in context. However, in light of the results of Study 4a, the deaf 
children may be rated as displaying more intense expressions of emotion. 
Hypothesis two: all children will display greatest difficulty in identifying the 
emotion, surprise, in particular the deaf children. With the occurrence of an 
unexpected event, understanding surprise requires the attribution of a belief (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1993). With delays in ToM understanding (Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 
1998), this may pose particular problems for deaf children.   

Method 
Participants 
See Study 4a. 
Materials 
 To elicit an emotion response a series of 12 short stories of emotional events 
were created to present to the children in video format: two stories aimed at eliciting 
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each of the six basic emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise). 
The English translations of the twelve stories are displayed in Appendix E.  An 
example of a photo story board for one of the emotion signed stories can be found 
Appendix F. Five of the stories included were based on those used in a previous 
study by Widen and Russell (2002). The names of the children were changed to 
familiar English names that were easy to finger spell and American English terms 
were exchanged for British English ones (e.g. closet was exchanged with wardrobe). 
An additional seven stories were created for the purpose of this study. All stories 
were altered for ease of translation into Signed Supported English. 
Pilot of Emotion Signed Stories: Prior to creating the video clips, the set of 
stories was piloted in an online study to ensure each story elicited the intended 
prototypical emotion. Fifty-three (39 female) Anglia Ruskin undergraduate students 
were recruited via the university’s Psychology Research Participation System. Each 
student received a course credit for their participation enabling them to recruit for their 
own studies.  
The students were shown a written version of each story in a random order 
and asked to first read the story and then freely state the key emotion thought to be 
experienced by the main character, typing the emotion word in the box provided. It 
was explicitly stated that only one emotion word should be provided. Participants 
were also asked to rate the intensity of the story on a scale from 1 (not at all intense) 
to 7 (very intense). An example story with an appropriate response was provided to 
ensure that the task was understood (Story: "After school, Ann’s friend came to play. 
They rode on their bikes in the garden. Ann’s mum had baked a big chocolate cake"; 
Response: Emotion – happy; Intensity - #).  The percentage of undergraduates who 
stated the target emotion (or an accepted synonym) for each story and the median 
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rating of intensity can be found in Appendix E. High levels of accuracy were found 
for the stories eliciting happiness, sadness, anger, fear and disgust ( >88.68%).  
The second surprise story proved to be more difficult to produce the intended 
response (55.6%) in comparison to the first story that centred on the prototypical 
event of a surprise birthday party (81.13%). Many participants responded with the 
second emotion of happiness felt when receiving a new pet, which is typical as 
surprise, the event of something unexpected, is followed by either a positive or 
negative reaction. Some argue that surprise is a cognitive state rather than an 
emotion (Ortney & Turner, 1990). However, there is evidence for the universality of 
emotions, including surprise (Ekman et al., 1897), so it was decided that the surprise 
stories would still be included in this study, while remaining mindful of the potential 
confusion with happiness.  
Following the pilot study, the stories were recorded in Signed Assisted 
English (SSE: BSL signs in English word order accompanied with Spoken English). 
Both the experimenter, who recorded the stories being signed, and the actor, had 
Level Two BSL. The actor was experienced in signing and using SSE with children 
as she worked as a teaching assistant in a primary school. 
Procedure 
Facial coding procedure: The procedure for data collection was similar to 
that of Study 4a. The ability to encode the six basic emotion expressions was tested 
by videotaping the children producing each emotion after having watched a signed 
story in SSE aimed at eliciting each emotion. The video recordings of the children’s 
emotion facial expressions were then decoded, both via the ratings of 35 adult judges 
and analysis via the Noldus Face Reader™. 
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Study 4b followed immediately after Study 4a, meaning that the children had 
already been tested for comprehension of each of the six basic emotions. The 
children remained seated 60cm in front of a 14-inch portable computer, directly 
facing the screen. The video camera (Logitech Quickcam Orbit AF) was again 
discreetly positioned behind the computer and was set to record the whole session so 
not to be a distraction. The children’s face and shoulders were visible in the camera’s 
field of view. The experimenter was also sat behind the laptop, facing the child. First 
it was explained that the child needed to watch a story and then respond by saying an 
emotion/feeling word that explained how the main character felt, and to also make a 
face to express this. The instructions were presented both orally and with the use of 
SSE to the deaf children. An example story (the same as the pilot study example) 
was signed to the child by the experimenter to ensure that the task procedure was 
understood. Once each story had finished, the experimenter paused the video and 
asked the child to “show me with your face how Ben/Ann feels.” To ensure the story 
had been comprehended, the child was also asked to explain why.  If the child had 
misunderstood aspects of the story, the video clip was shown a second time. 
Additionally, the verbal or signed response of each child was recorded by the 
experimenter. The task lasted approximately 15 minutes. 
Facial decoding procedure: The preparation for decoding was as per Study 4a. The 
decoding procedure was the same with the exception of the task duration being 20 
minutes and a total of 120 video clips were presented to the raters.  
Design 
The study’s design was the same as Study 4a. 

	

Results 
Judgement data: decoders’ ratings of emotion encodings 
The frequency of agreement between encoders (deaf and hearing) and the 
decoders (adult hearing) was calculated. Cross tabulations were created in the form 
of confusion matrices to show the relationship between the intended meaning of 
facial expressions (i.e. encoded targets) and the meaning (i.e. emotion labels) 
attributed by the decoders. Table 25 shows the raters’ decoding of the deaf children’s 
emotion production and Table 26 shows the raters’ decoding of the hearing 
children’s emotion production. 
For both groups, there was considerable difference between emotions in 
terms of how recognisable they were to the adult decoders; these accuracy values are 
summarised in Table 27. For the hearing children, happiness, followed by sadness 
and disgust were the most easily recognised emotions, with fear, anger and surprise 
being more difficult emotion facial expressions to recognise. For the deaf children, 
sadness was the easiest emotion to recognise, followed by happiness, disgust and 
fear, with anger and surprise being the most difficult facial expression of emotion to 
recognise. Overall, the expressions of the deaf children were recognised with higher 
accuracy than those of the hearing children (71.0% vs. 66.05%). A chi-squared test 
showed that this difference was statistically significant (Table 27). 
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Table 25. Cross Tabulations of Original Meanings (Row) of Deaf Children’s Expressions (elicited by Stories) and Meaning Attributed by Judges 
(Column) 
 Happiness Sadness Anger Fear Disgust Surprise Total 
Happiness 76.86 .86 .29 5.14 8.86 8.0 100.0 
Sadness .86 93.14 1.14 0.57 2.57 1.17 100.0 
Anger 0.0 31.14 56.86 6.86 3.43 1.71 100.0 
Fear 0.0 8.0 .86 70.86 4.57 15.71 100.0 
Disgust 0.0 2.57 5.43 12.0 77.71 2.29 100.0 
Surprise 38.57 .57 0.0 10.9 0.0 50.57 100.0 
 
Table 26. Cross Tabulations of Original Meanings (Row) of Hearing Children’s Expressions (elicited by Stories) and Meaning Attributed by Judges 
(Column) 
 Happiness Sadness Anger Fear Disgust Surprise Total 
Happiness 93.43 .57 .57 .57 .86 4.0 100.0 
Sadness 0.0 90.86 .29 4.0 4.57 .29 100.0 
Anger 8.86 30.29 44.57 4.0 11.43 .86 100.0 
Fear 0.0 10.29 0.0 47.71 10.86 31.14 100.0 
Disgust 1.43 1.14 1.71 10.29 78.29 7.14 100.0 
Surprise 41.71 .57 1.43 12.86 2.0 41.43 100.0 
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Table 27. Chi-squared Test of Independence to show differences in Accuracy of 
Ratings for Expressions between Deaf and Hearing Children’s Portrayals of 
Emotions elicited by Stories 
 Percentage correct  
χ²  
 
Φ 
Emotion Deaf Hearing 
Overall 71.0 66.05 11.94*** .05 
Happiness 76.86 93.43 37.99*** .23 
Sadness 93.14 90.86 1.24 .04 
Anger 56.86 44.57 10.57*** .12 
Fear 70.86 47.71 38.83*** .24 
Disgust 77.71 78.29 .03 .01 
Surprise 50.57 41.43 5.89* .09 
Note. All χ² have 1 degree of freedom; *** p<.001, **p<.005, * p <.05  
 
Deaf children also produced facial expressions for the emotions, fear, anger, 
and surprise, significantly more accurately recognised by the decoders. Conversely, 
hearing children’s production of the emotion facial expression, happiness, was 
significantly more accurately recognised by decoders. There was no significant 
difference between recognition rates of deaf and hearing children’s production of 
sadness or disgust. 
Verbal responses to signed emotional stories 
Table 28 shows the percentage of correct verbally (or signed) responses to 
the question, “how does Ann/Ben feel?”, in terms of correctly labelling the target 
emotion of the stories (Children’s individual results for their verbal responses can be 
found in Appendix G). Happiness, sadness, fear and disgust were correctly identified 
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by all of the deaf and hearing children (‘excited’ was accepted as a synonym for 
happiness; ‘scared’ and ‘afraid’ were accepted a synonyms for fear; and ‘didn’t like’ 
was accepted for disgust). For anger, most other responses were labelled as sadness 
(or stressed), and for surprise, the majority of other responses were labelled as 
happiness (or excited).  
Table 28. Percentage Correct Identification of Target Emotion for Verbal Responses 
to Signed Emotional Stories 
Emotion story Deaf Hearing 
Happiness 1 5/5 5/5 
Happiness 2 5/5 5/5 
Happiness 100% 100% 
Sadness 1 5/5 5/5 
Sadness 2 5/5 5/5 
Sadness 100% 100% 
Anger 1 2/5 4/5 
Anger 2 4/5 3/5 
Anger 60% 70% 
Fear 1 5/5 5/5 
Fear 2 5/5 5/5 
Fear 100% 100% 
Disgust 1 5/5 5/5 
Disgust 2 5/5 5/5 
Disgust 100% 100% 
Surprise 1 3/5 3/5 
Surprise 2 2/5 2/5 
Surprise 50% 50% 
Note. Children identifying happiness in addition to surprise were scored as correctly 
identifying the target emotion 
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Judgement data: decoders’ ratings of intensity 
Table 29 displays median intensity ratings of intensity for each emotion 
expression for deaf and hearing children. Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests were 
conducted to determine whether there were differences in decoders’ ratings of 
intensity between the two groups. The decoders’ ratings of intensity were 
significantly greater for deaf children’s production of all emotion facial expressions 
in comparison to hearing children’s expressions. 
Table 29. Median Ratings of Intensity (1: not at all intense, to 5: extremely intense) 
and Mann-Whitney U-Test of difference between Encoder’s Ratings of Intensity of 
Deaf and Hearing Children’s Encodings of Emotion Facial Expressions (elicited by 
Stories) 
 Median rating 
U Z r 
Emotion Deaf Hearing 
Happiness 3 (1) 3 (1) 42781.5*** -7.15 -.27 
Sadness 3 (2) 3 (1) 46949.0*** -5.64 -.21 
Anger 4 (1) 3 (1) 36159.0*** -9.70 -.37 
Fear 3 (2) 3 (1) 47780.5*** -5.25 -.20 
Disgust 4 (1) 3 (1) 52286.0*** -3.51 -.13 
Surprise 4 (1) 3 (1) 38568.0*** -8.91 -.34 
NB. Inter-quartile range in parenthesis; *** p <.001 
 
Objective ratings of emotions 
The sample videos were analysed using the software FaceReader™. To 
recap, the software detects the features in facial expressions associated to the FACS 
(Ekman et al., 2002) and transforms such values into ratings of the emotions ranging 
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from 0 (the emotions is not detected by the software at all) to 1 (the expression 
detected corresponds uniquely to one emotion) in each analysed frame of the video. 
The scores obtained were averaged to create one score for each emotion displayed in 
each video. These scores were averaged in each group creating one score of 
intensity/accuracy per group for each emotion (Table 30). 
A Mixed ANOVA was carried out to investigate whether the emotion 
expressions of both groups were different across the six emotions (Emotion x 
Group). Results revealed a non- significant main effect of Group F (1, 18) = .16, 
MSE = .08, p = .69, η² = .01, showing that overall, the expressions of deaf and 
hearing children were of similar intensity and accuracy. A significant main effect of 
Emotion was present, F (5, 90) = 20.6, MSE = .07, p < .001, η² = .62. Further tests 
with Bonferroni corrections (adjusted significance level p <.003) revealed that 
happiness was significantly more intense and accurately detected than all other 
emotions except sadness, and sadness was significantly more intense and accurately 
detected than anger, disgust and surprise (Table 31). The Group x Emotion 
interaction, F (5, 90) = 2.27, MSE = .08, p = .05, η² = .07, was not significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

	


Table 30. Means and SDs of FaceReader™ recordings of Intensity of the Production 
of Emotions (elicited by Stories) by Deaf and Hearing Participants 
 Deaf Hearing  Total 
Emotion Mean SD Mean SD Mean  SD 
Happiness .70 .27 .87 .10 .79 .21 
Sadness .64 .23 .68 .36 .66 .30 
Anger .10 .20 .27 .34 .19 .28 
Fear .04 .06 .20 .26 .12 .20 
Disgust .35 .31 .11 .17 .23 .27 
Surprise .45 .36 .28 .38 .36 .37 
Total .38 .29 .40 .29 .39 .28 
 
 
 
Table 31. Mean differences between FaceReader™ recordings of Emotions (elicited 
by Stories) and Significance levels (Bonferroni corrected) 
Emotion Anger Disgust Fear Happiness Sadness Surprise 
Anger       
Disgust -.040      
Fear .068 .108     
Happiness .601*** -.561*** -.669***    
Sadness -.474*** -.434*** -.542*** .127   
Surprise -.179 -.139 -.247 .422*** .295  
** p<.001 

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Discussion 
This was the first study to investigate deaf children’s emotion understanding 
through the production of facial expressions in the context of emotion signed stories. 
As predicted in hypothesis one, the deaf and hearing children showed comparable 
performance on sadness, both in terms of the verbal response and in encoding the 
emotion.  Similarly for happiness, all children correctly labelled the emotion, yet 
surprisingly deaf children’s encodings were recognised significantly less accurately 
by the adult raters than the hearing children’s. Yet the objective FaceReader™ 
results revealed no significant difference between deaf and hearing children’s 
expressions. Examining the confusion matrix shows that deaf children’s expressions 
of happiness were confused with fear and disgust by some of the adult raters. It is 
possible that the adult raters were confused by the deaf children’s intensity of 
expressions. An anecdotal observation from watching the videos is that some of the 
deaf children appear screw up their face in excitement which might be mistaken for a 
negative emotion of the same intensity.  
 A striking finding is that deaf children’s labelling of all other basic emotions 
was comparable to the hearing group children in contrast to the majority of previous 
research on deaf children’s understanding of emotion stories (Gray et al., 2001; 
2007; Rieffe et al., 2003) but in line with the oral deaf children with CIs in Ziv et 
al.’s (2013) study: all children were correctly able to label fear and disgust, in 
addition to happiness and sadness, with 100 per cent accuracy. A distinction between 
the present study and previous studies lies in methodology. Clear contextual cues 
were provided in the signed emotion stories including facial expressions and gesture 
that illustrated the emotive content of the stories. Despite being unable to overhear 
conversations revolving around emotions and mental states, it appears that deaf 
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children have the potential to carefully observe events that typically provoke certain 
emotion reactions (Ziv et al., 2013). In addition, three of the deaf children were aided 
with CIs and all children’s language was within the average range, meaning these 
children potentially had sufficient access to emotion conversation. Caution should be 
drawn to this interpretation due to the small sample in this study - emotion 
understanding assessed through the signed emotion stories needs to be tested on a 
wider sample of deaf children with varying language abilities to better support this 
theory. However, these results are suggestive that some deaf children are able to 
develop emotion understanding at a similar rate to their hearing peers. 
Anger and surprise were more difficult emotions for both groups to label, 
with anger most commonly mistaken as sadness, and surprise as happiness. This is 
consistent with previous research examining labelling errors in both deaf children 
(Gray et al., 2007; Ziv et al., 2013) and younger hearing children (Widen & Russell, 
2008b) for more complex emotions. It is reasoned that younger children typically 
label sadness as anger because sadness is applied generally to negative emotions 
until children can more effectively discriminate between characteristics that elicit 
different negative emotional states (Russell & Widen, 2003). The error data showing 
that surprise was most often interpreted as happiness is also consistent with prior 
research that shows that young children tend to link surprise to happy events rather 
than negative ones (Gray et al., 2007; Hadwin & Perner, 1991). Some children, 
however, labelled the surprise stories as fear. These results were also in line with the 
adult ratings of surprise stories in the pilot study (Appendix E): lower accuracy rates 
for surprise were found as participants attributed happiness to the character receiving 
a new pet rabbit, which could be anticipated assuming that the child would be happy 
to receive a new pet. Ortney and Turner (1990) criticise the inclusion of surprise as a 
basic emotion as it always is followed by a positive (happiness) or a negative (fear) 

	

response. Despite the controversy surrounding the emotion, surprise, deaf children 
paralleled hearing children in the pattern of response, both in terms of level of 
performance and in errors, indicating a common conceptual understanding of 
emotion (Gray et al., 2007).  
Importantly, deaf children’s production of sadness, fear, anger and surprise 
was recognised with a significantly higher level of accuracy by the adult raters, and 
all emotions produced by deaf children were rated as significantly more intense than 
hearing children’s. As per Study 4a, these results support the theory that experience 
with sign and non-verbal communication results in a greater ability to voluntarily 
encode facial expressions of emotion (Goldstein et al., 2000). Consistent with Study 
4a, however, there were no significant differences between the FaceReader™ ratings 
of emotion encodings of the deaf and hearing children again suggesting little 
difference between the two groups of children specifically in the activation of 
muscles involved in producing the prototypical configurations of facial expressions. 
Again this suggest that while there were no differences in the two groups in terms of 
ability to produce the prototypical expressions, the deaf children were more able to 
encode emotion expression that were more readily recognisable to adult raters. As 
the deaf children’s emotion encodings were rated as being significantly more intense 
than the hearing children’s, this is again indicative of a higher level of 
expressiveness that may reflect the display rules of deaf communication (Goldstein 
et al., 2000). 
Another noteworthy finding is that all deaf children were able to correctly 
label disgust in both stories, and no differences were found between deaf and hearing 
children’s encodings of emotion facial expressions. This suggests that the deaf 
children in this study did have a conceptual understanding of physical disgust. Deaf 
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(and hearing) children’s better performance in labelling and producing the emotion 
expression of disgust in the context of a story over a facial expression is consistent 
with Widen and Russell’s (2013) research on disgust.  A face inferiority effect over 
cause and consequence elicited through a story has been found for disgust (Russell, 
2002, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2013) as well a fear and the later emerging self-conscious 
emotions (Widen & Russell, 2010). In opposition to the theory that facial 
expressions are an innate signalling system (e.g. Ekman, 1994; Izard, 1994), Widen 
and Russell (2010) theorise that a child’s understanding of emotion is rooted within a 
narrative structure that is absent in a facial expression, known as ‘scripts’ that are 
operationalised in stories.  It is important to highlight, however, that the results of the 
present study may be exceptional as identification rates of disgust in stories was 
100% as opposed to 69% overall in the studies referred to by Widen and Russell 
(2013). Alternatively, the high level of labelling accuracy may be reflective of the 
additional gestures and expressions afforded by presenting the tasks in signed 
English alongside a spoken rendition of the story, further drawing attention to the 
importance of contextual cues in emotion understanding. 
 
Study 4c: voluntary imitation of emotion facial expressions 
A third way to elicit the encoding of facial expressions of emotion is to ask 
participants to voluntarily imitate emotion facial expressions of others.  Imitation is 
thought to be important to the acquisition of social skills as it aids ‘self-other 
processing’ that may provide the basis for inferring goals and intentions of others in 
social interactions (Meltzoff & Decety, 2003; Shih et al., 2010). It has been proposed 
that the internal simulation of an observed facial expression enables the 
understanding of others’ emotions. There is evidence to suggest that imitation occurs 
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during the recognition of emotions in the form of contagion: a visual representation 
allows us to experience what another person is feeling, and so infer their emotional 
state (Atkinson & Adolphs, 2005). Harris’ (1992) simulation theory argues that ToM 
is an evolving process of being able to focus on another’s perspective while putting 
aside your own point-of-view.  The first step of this model according to Harris is the 
echoing of another person’s intentional stance via their own perceptual or emotional 
system. Imitation bears a resemblance to attributing mental states in that both 
involve transferring the perspective of another individual to oneself (Williams, 
Whiten, Suddendorf & Perrett, 2001).  
 
Being able to understand and identify with how others feel is critical to 
success in social interactions. It has been argued that being able to overtly 
(voluntarily) mirror emotions displayed by others is likely to play a crucial role in 
social situations as it sends a signal to the other person that they have been 
understood (Pfeifer, Iacoboni, Mazziotta & Dapretto, 2008). When a person 
experiences intense sorrow or happiness it is expected that another person will 
respond with appropriate emotion expression. Upon identifying that someone 
appears deeply sad it would be considered inappropriate to respond either with flat 
affect or with a grin of intense happiness reflecting the person’s own emotion state.  
 
Imitation of emotion expressions has not previously been studied in a 
population of deaf children which is surprising given the reported delays in ToM and 
some evidence of difficulties in emotion recognition. Rogers and Pennington (1991), 
based on Hobson’s (1991) inter-subjectivity theory proposed that observed problems 
in imitation in children with ASD were linked to deficits in emotion perception and 
ToM. While deaf children do not display the same level of social and communication 
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difficulties as children with ASD, with the indication of a possible difficulty in 
emotion recognition (e.g. Dyck et al., 2004; Ludlow et al., 2010) and joint attention 
(Loots et al., 2005; Prezbindowski et al., 1998), it is conceivable some difficulties in 
emotion mimicry may also be found in some deaf children. However, the results of 
the emotion recognition studies in this thesis (Studies 1, 2 and 3) have found deaf 
children’s abilities that are comparable with hearing controls consistent with some 
other prior studies (e.g. Hosie et al., 1998; Most & Aviner, 2009; Ziv et al., 2013), 
with the exception of the more difficult emotion of disgust, suggesting that it is 
probable that imitation – an early indication of understanding the minds of others – 
will not be impaired.  
 
Study 4c aimed to test deaf children’s ability to voluntarily imitate facial 
expressions of emotion. The majority of imitation studies conducted with other 
populations have utilised static images to elicit a response (e.g. children: Field & 
Walden, 1992; ASD: Oberman, Winkielman & Ramachandran, 2009). In this study, 
the deaf and hearing children were shown a series of video clips taken from the 
ADFES (Van der Schalk, et al., 2011), which were selected given that dynamic 
emotional displays have been shown to be more physiologically arousing (e.g. Sato 
& Yoshikawa, 2004) and prompt stronger facial mimicry (e.g. Sato et al., 2008) than 
static images. Moreover the inclusion of real human faces is closer to natural 
expressions experienced in everyday life, meaning that dynamic stimuli have greater 
ecological validity. 
 
Study 4c Hypotheses: While some studies have found poor performance in 
emotion recognition tasks for deaf children, Studies 2 and 3 of this thesis showed 
similar performance to hearing children in emotion recognition, and Studies 4a and 
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4b have shown similar performance in emotion production. It was predicted that deaf 
children would show comparable imitation of emotion expressions to hearing 
children, with the exception of a poorer production of disgust. Based on the results 
of Studies 4a and 4b, it was expected that the adult raters would consider the deaf 
children’s emotion encodings to be more intense than the hearing children’s.  
Method 
Participants 
 See Study 4a. 
Materials  
Experimental stimuli composed of 18 dynamic clips of human faces selected 
from the ADFES (Van der Schalk et al., 2011). Three sets of videos clips of the six 
basic emotions - happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, fear and surprise – portrayed by 
four of the actors were selected. For two of the actors (one male), each of the six 
basic emotions were used. For a further two actors, three of the emotions – sadness, 
fear and disgust – were selected from one actor (male); and the other three emotions 
– happiness, anger and surprise - were selected from the other (female), to ensure a 
balance of gender in the experimental stimuli (Table 32).  Stimuli were displayed in 
the centre of a 14 inch computer screen using E-Prime v2.0 Professional (Schneider 
et al., 2002). Each clip was 5 seconds in duration. For a description of Face 
Reader™, see Study 4a. 
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Table 32. Dynamic Video clips of Emotion selected from ADFES (Van de Schalk et 
al., 2011) for Emotion Mimicry 
 Emotion Video Clips 
Male 2 Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear, Disgust, Surprise 
Male 6 Sadness, Fear, Disgust  
Female 2 Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear, Disgust, Surprise  
Female 5 Happiness, Anger, Surprise 
 
 
Procedure 
Facial coding procedure: The ability to mimic the six basic emotion 
expressions was tested by videotaping the children copying 18 video clips of real 
human actors displaying each of the six emotions. The video recordings of the 
children’s emotion facial expressions were then decoded, both via the ratings of 35 
adult judges and analysis via the Noldus Face Reader™ software. 
The children were tested for comprehension of each of the six basic emotions 
as detailed in Study 4a. The children were seated 60cm in front of a 14-inch portable 
computer, directly facing the screen. The video camera (Logitech Quickcam Orbit 
AF) was again discreetly positioned behind the computer and was set to record the 
whole session so not to be a distraction. The children’s face and shoulders were 
visible in the camera’s field of view. The experimenter was also sat behind the 
laptop, facing the child. First it was explained that the child needed to watch the 
emotion video clips and copy the facial expressions that they saw. The instructions 
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were presented in SSE to the deaf children. Three examples were given initially to 
ensure to ensure that the task procedure was understood. The test itself consisted of 
one block with 18 video clips showing three of each of the six emotions. Each 
stimulus was presented on the screen one at a time in a random order. The videos 
lasted for five seconds beginning from a neutral pose to the apex of the expressed 
emotion. The task lasted approximately 5 minutes.  
Facial decoding procedure: As per Studies 4a and 4b, the experimenter 
watched the video recordings of each participant and noted the onset and end time of 
each emotion expressions in preparation for decoding. Video editing software 
(VirtualDub 1.10.3) was used to analyse the videos frame-by-frame and produce 
video clips of each emotion for each participant. The decoding procedure was the 
same as Study six with the exception of the task duration being approximately 30 
minutes and a total of 180 video clips were presented to the raters. A break between 
watching video clips could be taken if necessary.  
Design 
See Study 4a. 
Results 
Judgement data: decoders’ ratings of emotion encodings 
The frequency of agreement between encoders (deaf and hearing) and the 
decoders (adult hearing) was calculated. Cross tabulations were created in the form 
of confusion matrices to show the relationship between the intended meaning of 
facial expressions (i.e. encoded targets) and the meaning (i.e. emotion labels) 
attributed by the decoders. Table 33 shows the raters’ decoding of the deaf children’s 
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production of mimicked emotions and Table 34 shows the raters’ decoding of the 
hearing children’s production of mimicked emotions. 
For both deaf and hearing children, there were differences in terms of how 
recognisable the production of the mimicked emotions was to the adult decoders.  
For all children, happiness followed by surprise was the easiest, and fear followed by 
anger was the hardest emotions to recognise. In contrast to the previous two emotion 
production studies, overall the expressions of the hearing children were recognised 
with higher accuracy than those of the deaf children. A chi-squared test showed that 
this difference was statistically significant (Table 35). However, group comparisons 
for each of the separate emotions showed that hearing children only mimicked the 
emotion, disgust, significantly more accurately recognised by the decoders. There 
was no significant difference between recognition rates of deaf and hearing 
children’s production of all other emotions. 
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Table 33. Cross Tabulations of Original Meanings (Row) of Deaf Children’s Mimicked Expressions and Meaning Attributed by Judges (Column) 
 Happiness Sadness Anger Fear Disgust Surprise Total 
Happiness 91.81 .76 .38 .57 3.62 2.86 100.0 
Sadness 2.29 69.71 10.48 2.29 12.57 2.67 100.0 
Anger .19 29.90 58.29 2.67 8.00 .95 100.0 
Fear 3.43 3.81 1.71 52.76 18.67 19.62 100.0 
Disgust .00 9.33 19.62 3.81 62.29 4.95 100.0 
Surprise .00 .57 .38 18.48 1.33 79.24 100.0 
 
Table 34. Cross Tabulations of Original Meanings (Row) of Hearing Children’s Mimicked Expressions and Meaning Attributed by Judges (Column) 
 Happiness Sadness Anger Fear Disgust Surprise Total 
Happiness 92.95 .57 .19 1.52 2.86 1.90 100.0 
Sadness .38 73.52 10.10 2.86 10.29 2.86 100.0 
Anger .00 21.14 63.05 2.10 11.62 2.10 100.0 
Fear .57 11.62 6.29 49.71 9.33 22.48 100.0 
Disgust .19 3.62 18.67 2.86 73.52 1.14 100.0 
Surprise .57 2.48 .57 15.43 1.33 79.62 100.0 




 
Table 35.  Chi-squared Test of Independence to show differences in Accuracy of 
Ratings for Mimicked Expressions between Deaf and Hearing Children’s Portrayals 
of Emotions 
 Percentage correct  
χ²  
 
Φ 
Emotion Deaf Hearing 
Overall 69.02 72.06 7.04** .03 
Happiness 91.81 92.95 .49 .02 
Sadness 69.71 73.52 1.87 .04 
Anger 58.29 63.05 2.49 .05 
Fear 52.76 49.71 .98 .03 
Disgust 62.29 73.52 15.21*** .12 
Surprise 79.24 79.62 .02 .004 
Note. All χ² have 1 degree of freedom; *** p<.001, **p<.01  
Judgement data: decoders’ ratings of intensity 
Table 36 displays median intensity ratings of intensity for each emotion 
expression for deaf and hearing children. Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests were 
conducted to determine whether there were differences in decoders’ ratings of 
intensity between the two groups. The decoders’ ratings of intensity were 
significantly greater for deaf children’s production of all emotion facial expressions 
in comparison to hearing children’s expressions, with the exception of disgust. 
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Table 36. Median Ratings of Intensity (1: not at all intense, to 5: extremely intense) 
and Mann-Whitney U-Test of difference between Encoder’s Ratings of Intensity of 
Deaf and Hearing Children’s Mimicked encodings of Emotion Facial Expressions 
 Median rating 
U z r 
Emotion Deaf Hearing 
Happiness 3 (2) 3 (1) 99343.5*** -8.22 -.25 
Sadness 3 (1) 2 (1) 109201.5*** -6.14 -.19 
Anger 3 (2) 2 (1) 93928.5*** -9.43 -.29 
Fear 3 (1) 3 (1) 94171.5*** -9.40 -.29 
Disgust 3 (1) 3 (1)            137075.0 -.16 -.01 
Surprise 3 (1) 3 (2) 103020.5*** -7.45 -.24 
Note. Inter-quartile range in parenthesis; *** p <.001 
 
Objective ratings of emotions 
The sample videos were analysed using the Noldus software, FaceReader™. 
Features in facial expressions associated to the FACS (Ekman et al., 2002) were 
detected and transformed into ratings for each emotion ranging from 0 (the emotions 
is not detected by the software at all) to 1 (the expression detected corresponds 
uniquely to one emotion) in each analysed frame of the video. The scores obtained 
were averaged to create one score for each emotion displayed in each video. These 
scores were averaged in each group creating one score of intensity/accuracy per 
group for each emotion Table 37. 
A Mixed ANOVA was carried out to investigate whether the mimicked 
emotion expressions of both groups were different across the six emotions (Emotion 
x Group). Results revealed a non- significant main effect of Group F (1, 28) = .14, 
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MSE = .10, p = .71, η² = .01, showing that overall, the expressions of deaf and 
hearing children were of similar intensity and accuracy. A significant main effect of 
Emotion was present, F (5, 140) = 14.73, MSE = .11, p < .001, η² = .35. Further tests 
with Bonferroni corrections (adjusted significance level p <.003) revealed that fear 
was significantly less intense and less accurately detected than all other emotions 
except disgust, and disgust was significantly less intense and accurately detected 
than happiness and surprise (Table 38). The Group x Emotion interaction was also 
significant, F (5, 140) = 2.34, MSE = .11, p = .05, η² = .08. Deaf children trended 
towards producing more intense and accurate expressions of anger, and hearing 
children trended towards producing more intense and accurate expressions of 
disgust, but further comparisons with Bonferroni corrections (adjusted significance 
level p <.008) showed that there were no differences between the groups for any of 
the six emotions (Table 37). 
 
Table 37. Means and SDs of FaceReader™ recordings of Intensity of the Production 
of Mimicked Emotions by Deaf and Hearing Participants 
 
Deaf Hearing  Total Multiple comparisons 
(deaf vs hearing) 
Emotion Mean SD Mean SD Mean  SD  
Happiness .69 .33 .73 .38 .71 .35  t(28) = -.34, p = .74 
Sadness .56 .36 .55 .37 .55 .36 t(28) =.14, p =.89 
Anger .57 .37 .29 .33 .43 .37 t(28) = 2.23, p = .03, ns 
Fear .06 .22 .14 .26 .10 .24 t(28) = -.94, p =.35 
Disgust .21 .27 .44 .33 .33 .31 t(28) = -2.12, p = .04, ns 
Surprise .75 .30 .59 .35 .67 .33 t(28) = 1.32, p = .20 
Total .48 .31 .46 .34 .47 .33  
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Table 38. Mean differences between FaceReader™ recordings of Mimicked 
Emotions and Significance Levels (Bonferroni corrected) 
Emotion Anger Disgust Fear Happiness Sadness Surprise 
Anger       
Disgust .101      
Fear .325*** .225     
Happiness -.279 -.379*** -.604***    
Sadness -.126 -.226 -.451*** .153   
Surprise -.243 -.344*** -.569*** .036 -.118  
*** p<.001 
 
 
 
Discussion 
This is the first study to investigate voluntary emotion mimicry in deaf 
children. As predicted, no differences were found between adult ratings of deaf and 
hearing children’s productions of the emotions, happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and 
surprise, but deaf children’s encoding of disgust was significantly less accurately 
recognised than hearing children’s encoding. While not statistically significant, the 
Face Reader™ data revealed a trend towards hearing children producing more 
accurate and intense productions of disgust than deaf children. These results mirror 
the earlier findings of Studies 2, 3 and 4a, which demonstrated that some deaf 
children showed difficulty in identifying disgust in facial expressions and producing 
the expression with a verbal label as a prompt. If the visual representation is not 
recognised, or misinterpreted, then imitation and correct identification (potentially 
via ‘emotion contagion’; Atkinson & Adolph, 2002) both cannot occur.  
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With only a difficulty in imitating disgust, the results are encouraging for 
deaf children, suggesting that the ability to perform this more primitive form of mind 
reading is intact. Pfeifer et al. (2008) suggested that overt mimicry is an important 
social skill in being able to give a non-verbal response to another individual to 
indicate that their emotional state has been understood. First the emotional state 
needs to be recognised and then being able to imitate a response allows an individual 
to respond empathically e.g. to respond with concern when someone is crying 
involves a certain degree of a subtle imitation of the other person’s emotion state.  
Pfiefer et al. (2008) draws attention to the importance of the role of overt 
mimicry, yet what remains unanswered is whether deaf children spontaneously 
mimic emotions, given that in everyday life mimicry occurs rapidly and without 
effort. Children with ASD have been found to be impaired on spontaneous but not 
voluntary mimicry of emotion expressions (McIntosh, Reichemann-Decker, 
Oberman et al., 2009; Winkielman & Wilbarger, 2006). It has been suggested that 
mimicry is linked to a prefrontal ‘mirror circuit’ where neurons discharge when a 
similar action is executed and observed (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi & Gallese, 
2002). If deaf children had a spontaneous mimicry deficit and emotion contagion did 
not naturally occur, this could impact the development of inter-subjectivity that is 
necessary for understanding others’ minds and social learning and contribute to 
difficulties in performance on social-cognitive ToM tasks (Meltzoff & Gopnik, 
1993).  
Yet the level of expressiveness displayed by the deaf children and clarity of 
their production of emotions suggests that this is an unlikely explanation in 
comparison to children with ASD who have been shown to produce significantly 
odder facial expressions of emotion than their typical peers (Volker et al., 2009) and 
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for whom emotion deficits are a characteristic of the clinical descriptions of the 
disorder (Kanner, 1943). Importantly, deaf children were rated as producing more 
intense expressions of emotions by the adult raters as hypothesised and in parallel 
with Studies 4a and 4b, with the exception of disgust, suggesting a higher level of 
expressiveness. Difficulty in imitating disgust is more likely to be related to having 
fewer opportunities to discuss this emotion.  
Summary of Study 4a-c 
These are the first emotion production studies investigating voluntary 
encoding abilities of deaf children. With the exception of disgust, deaf children were 
rated by adult decoders as being overall more accurately at producing recognisable 
emotion expressions of greater intensity. Deaf children also showed a parallel 
performance in the imitation of dynamic human facial expressions. These findings 
need to be confirmed by testing a wider sample of deaf children, however a key role 
for the socialisation of emotion is indicated:  it appears that clarity of emotion 
expression is important to deaf children’s display rules (Goldstein et al., 2000); with 
a delay in the development of the concept of disgust, deaf children were able to 
encode the emotion when provided by the scaffold of a contextual story, yet it was 
more challenging to imitate or encode based upon a verbal label. 
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Chapter Seven 
Study five: Reducing the visual attentional demands of the false 
belief task 
Overview 
 
This chapter presents a study on deaf children’s social-cognitive ToM as 
measured by a battery of first and second order false belief tasks. Both a  CA 
matched control group and a younger group of ‘preschool aged’ hearing children 
were compared to a group of deaf children born to hearing parents. Efforts were 
made to remove the additional attentional demands of an interpreter by producing 
pre-recorded video-clips of the tasks enacted by a hearing native signer in a choice of 
BSL, SSE or English. There was no difference in performance between the deaf and 
young hearing children, but the deaf children performed significantly worse at the 
unexpected content and second order false belief tasks than their CA-matched 
controls. These findings imply a delay rather than a deficit, likely to be related to 
delays in language and reduced opportunities to overhear conversations about mental 
states. 
Introduction 
The studies presented in this thesis have demonstrated that deaf children’s 
emotion processing, while subject to some delays attributed to a reduced opportunity 
to converse about emotions, parallels that of hearing children. This chapter presents a 
study examining another important area of social cognition in which deaf children of 
hearing parents have displayed delays: social-cognitive ToM as measured by the 
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‘false belief task’ (e.g. Peterson, 1995; Schick et al., 2007). There is little doubt that 
this ability is to some extent linked to language, but whether this is due to language 
ability (Harris, Rosnay & Pons, 2005), opportunities to discuss emotions and mental 
states, or as a result of the language and attentional demands of tasks measuring 
ToM, remains to be clarified (Bloom & German, 2000).  
ToM is the cognitive ability that enables an individual to understand human 
behaviour and accurately interpret social situations by attributing mental states, 
which includes beliefs, desires, intentions and emotions (Remmel & Peters, 2008). 
Central to the development of a social-cognitive ToM is the capacity to understand 
‘false’ beliefs – essentially, mistaken beliefs about situations - an ability typically 
developing children acquire between 4 and 5 years of age (Wellman et al., 2001). 
This aspect of ToM has been termed ‘social-cognitive’ as it appears to relate to other 
cognitive abilities such as memory, and in particular, language (Roth & Leslie, 1998; 
Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000).  
 In the standard false belief task – the litmus test of social cognitive ToM - 
the child is told a story in which the central character holds a mistaken belief 
regarding the location of an object (e.g. the Sally Ann marble task: Baron Cohen et 
al., 1995) or the content of a container (e.g. the Smartie’s task, Perner et al., 1987). 
As the story unfolds, the child being tested becomes aware of events that the main 
character does not witness. In the unexpected contents task, a second character 
moves an object from its initial location when the main protagonist is absent.  The 
child is then asked where the main character will look for the object. To pass this 
task, the child must hold in mind that the character does not know that the object has 
been moved. While most 5 year olds can easily differentiate their own view from 
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that of the main protagonist in the story, typically developing children aged 3 and 
younger do not understand that the this character will act upon their mistaken belief 
rather than according to the child’s own knowledge (Wellman & Liu, 2004).   
Beyond this age, children begin to extend their understanding to grasp the 
concept of multiple perspectives and appreciate that two people can interpret the 
same situation differently (Selman, 1980). By around age seven, a ‘second-order’ 
false belief task is passed by typically developed children, requiring the attribution of 
a first-order belief (Person A thinks X) to another person (Person B thinks “Person A 
thinks X”) (Baron-Cohen, 1989). The original version of this task, the “ice cream 
task” (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), involves a situation in which a boy (“John”) knows 
that an ice cream van has left the park to go to the school, but he believes that a girl 
(“Mary”) does not know this. The girl did in fact did see the ice-cream van on its 
way to the school, as it passed by her house when the boy was elsewhere. The boy 
goes to the park expecting to find the girl because he does not know she knows the 
van is at the school. In order to pass this task the child must understand that the 
knowledge of the van’s location was acquired by the boy and girl at different times, 
and he or she must differentiate between factual reality and the knowledge of each 
character (Perner & Wimmer, 1985). 
 
To date, research has focused on first order false belief tasks in deaf children. 
The vast majority (more than 90%) of deaf children are born to hearing parents, and 
have typically demonstrated, at best, a delay in false belief understanding (de Villiers 
& de Villiers, 2001; Peterson, 2002, 2004; Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 2000, 2004; 
Schick, et al., 2007). In one of the first studies, Peterson and Siegal (1998) found that 
in middle childhood, between the ages of 8 and 13, deaf children performed poorly 
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on the first order false belief task. Yet these children were able to perform with 
success on the procedurally similar false photograph task, suggesting that that a 
general problem with meta-representation is not the cause.   
 
Extending these results to include a wider battery of tests, Peterson and 
Siegal (1999) found that the performance of late signing deaf children of hearing 
parents was impaired relative to hearing controls, native signing and oral deaf 
children, and paralleled that of a group of autistic children.  Peterson and Siegal 
(1995) proposed ‘the conversational hypothesis’, positing that it is the dearth in 
experience of conversing about mental states that leads to difficulty in acquiring 
ToM for both late signing deaf and autistic children, albeit for different reasons. A 
positive correlation with age was suggestive of a delay rather than a deficit in ToM, 
however a comparison with typically developed children is problematic given that 
the mean age of the control group was five years younger than the group of deaf 
children. Subsequent studies by Peterson and colleagues similarly found that late 
signing, and also oral, deaf children were outperformed by pre-schoolers (Peterson, 
2002, 2004). The difference between the oral deaf children in these latter studies in 
comparison to Peterson (1999) is that the children were severe-profoundly rather 
than moderately deaf, suggesting the children in the earlier study were more likely to 
have access to early communication.    
 
In contrast, studies have shown that deaf signing children of deaf parents 
have performed in parallel or better than hearing children on the false belief task 
(Courtin, 2000; Courtin & Melot, 2005).  Courtin (2000) asserts that the grammatical 
structure of sign language usage promotes the visual perspective taking and structure 
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necessary to represent a point-of-view that is needed to pass false belief tasks. Many 
late-signing children’s families have limited or no skills in sign language, so it is 
plausible that this reduced opportunity and faculty to converse about mental states 
leads to such mind-reading difficulties (Vaccari & Marschark, 1997). Given the link 
between joint attention and ToM in pre-schoolers (Nelson et al., 2008) and that some 
late-signing and some oral deaf children display less occurrences of joint attention 
than deaf children and hearing children, it is an interesting proposition that sign 
language may facilitate communicative experiences that result in mental state 
understanding. Yet sign language ability was not considered in these studies as no 
standardised measure of French sign language existed. Not including a language 
measure relies on the assumption that deaf parents communicate well in sign 
language, which is not necessarily always the case (Tomasuolo, Valeri, Di Renzo, 
Pasqualetti & Volterra, 2013; Van Den Bogerede, 2000).  
 
A later study by Schick et al. (2007) demonstrated that the performance by 
late signing and oral children was not a poor as earlier studies had indicated. Schick 
et al. compared deaf children of different backgrounds between the ages of 4 and 7 
with hearing children aged 4 to 6 years (7 year olds were excluded due to previous 
studies indicating likely ceiling effects). Schick et al. (2007) found that while oral 
and late-signing deaf children’s overall performance was poorer than that of native 
signers and hearing children, by age 7 the oral children’s performance on the low 
verbal false belief tasks was equivalent to the comparison groups’ and the late-
signing deaf children were comparable on both the low verbal and verbal false belief 
tasks. These results reveal a lesser delay than earlier studies suggest.   
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One important distinction between Schick et al. (2007)  and the majority of 
other studies is the experimenter, Schick, is a CODA meaning that she has a native 
level of sign language (ASL) and can also communicate equally well with signing 
and oral deaf children. Many other studies investigating deaf children’s false belief 
tasks have relied upon an interpreter, which adds an additional demand on children’s 
attention as switching back and forth between the interpreter and experimenter is 
required. Peterson and colleagues are hearing and thus an interpreter was used to 
translate the instructions into sign language (e.g. Peterson, 2002, 2004, 2009; 
Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1999; Peterson & Slaughter, 2006), and Courtin (2000) is 
Deaf and so task instructions were required to be translated into spoken French by an 
assistant for oral deaf children. 
Studies comparing oral deaf children with different types of hearing 
amplification have revealed inconsistent results. While Peterson’s (2004)  study 
revealed a delay of  between 3 to 5 years in ToM acquisition of deaf children with 
CIs, studies by Peters and colleagues found only marginal delays in children between 
3 and 12 years (Peters et al., 2009; Remmel & Peters, 2008). In a more recent study, 
Ziv et al. (2013) found that younger deaf Israeli children (aged 5 – 7) with CIs’ 
performance was higher than previously found and paralleled hearing children’s 
performance. Yet there is much variability in false belief performance between 
children with CIs. Peters et al.’s (2009) study revealed positive correlations between 
false belief scores and duration of implantation. In addition, Ziv et al. (2013) noted 
that a number of children with CIs who performed poorly also had low verbal ability. 
The heterogeneity of deaf oral children’s communication and linguistic background 
warrants caution in directly linking levels of performance with cochlear 
implantation. 
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Given the undoubtable link to language it may seem surprising that only a 
handful of studies have considered the language or signing ability of deaf children. 
Yet there is difficulty in standardising measures for deaf populations. Many deaf 
children use a combination of sign (ASL/BSL) and oral English in communication, 
and there is difficulty in assessing these languages simultaneously as the languages 
do not always directly correspond in terms of difficulty. Therefore a signed response 
may be ambiguous and could purely reflect a guess (Schick et al., 2007). While some 
researchers have taken only subjective measures of language ability such as class 
teacher reports (e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 1999), others have attempted to use more 
stringent measures like the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT: Dunn & Dunn, 
1997) (e.g. Peterson, Wellman & Liu, 2005). However, these tasks have not been 
standardized with a deaf population and so require a minimum level of hearing to be 
valid (Prezbindowski & Lederberg, 2003). A receptive language measure 
standardised for oral deaf children currently does not exist. 
Similarly, very few studies have examined sign language abilities and 
performance on the false belief task. Meristo, Falkman, Hjelmquist and Tedoldi 
(2007) adapted the BSL receptive language test into Italian sign language and found 
no link between sign language ability and scores on tests measuring ToM reasoning. 
However, as highlighted by Haug and Mann (2008), there are difficulties in 
translating sign language tests from one language to another; while cultural 
differences can be relatively easy to accommodate (e.g. by changing images to fit the 
target culture), language related changes require more significant modifications, 
bringing into question how well the psychometric properties of these measures 
translate. 
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In a comprehensive study, Schick et al. (2007) found that vocabulary, as 
measured by the standardised receptive ASL vocabulary test (Schick, 1997), 
significantly predicted ToM performance.  Similarly, Jackson (2001) found that BSL 
receptive language scores predicted performance on false belief tests of late signing 
deaf children, as did vocabulary predict oral deaf and hearing children’s 
performance.  Other links between false belief and language have also been 
proposed. Schick et al. (2007) additionally found that both signing and oral deaf 
children’s understanding of sentence complementation predicted performance on 
ToM tasks, as de Villers and de Villiers (2001) had previously found with only oral 
deaf children. Others argue that pragmatic, conversational abilities (Meristo et al., 
2007) or mental state vocabulary is important. For example, Moeller and Schick’s 
(2006) study provided evidence for a link between mother’s mental state talk and 
deaf children’s ToM. It is difficult to currently pinpoint the exact role of language.   
Equally, it is important to consider that assessing deaf children’s ToM 
abilities is challenging due to the inherent impact language has on the development 
of the concept. As hearing impaired children are documented to have lower levels of 
language comprehension (Marschark & Wauters, 2008), it is possible that the 
difficulty lies in pragmatics due to the verbal nature of the task. Indeed, some 
previous studies have included those children who fail control tasks: a clear 
indication that the task was not understood (Steeds, Rowe & Dowker, 1997; Jackson, 
2001). 
Attempts have been made to overcome the language barrier presented by 
ToM tasks by adopting non-verbal (de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000; Figueras-Costa 
& Harris, 2001) or pictorial (Woolfe et al., 2002) versions of false belief tasks, so to 
make them more accessible to deaf children. De Villiers and de Villiers (2000) found 
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that oral deaf children performed no better on a non-verbal sticker-hiding ToM task 
than the standard tasks. In another study using a pictorial task, Woolfe et al. (2002) 
found that late-signing deaf children showed deficits in ToM understanding, even 
when controlling for syntax ability, spatial ability and executive functioning. 
However, Woolfe et al.’s (2002) task is arguably not entirely non-verbal and was 
administered in BSL to late-signing deaf children, some of whom scored poorly on 
their BSL receptive language tests. In addition, difficulties arise when using pictorial 
and linguistic tasks with deaf signing children because of the absence of pragmatic 
cues that can be gleaned from facial expressions (Napoli & Sutton-Spence, 2010). 
As many deaf children either have problems with learning BSL or use 
English to communicate, the possibility remains that difficulty with ToM tasks is due 
to problems with comprehension. In particular, oral deaf children are heavily reliant 
on lip-reading, which is challenging to follow both with BSL and by watching a 
speaker’s lip patterns alone, especially when that person is unfamiliar. Importantly, 
since the majority of deaf children grow up in hearing families and attend 
mainstream schools, BSL is not often the primary method of communication that is 
adopted. With hearing amplification - increasingly, the use of CIs - many deaf 
children rely on lip-reading in addition to residual hearing to communicate in a 
hearing environment, often accompanied by signed English i.e. SSE. SSE offers deaf 
children with poorer signing skills or who are predominantly oral, additional 
communication cues. 
Study 5 
This present study aims to address a number of issues outlined in the above 
literature review in assessing deaf children of hearing parents in their false belief 
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understanding. Previous research has been variable in its procedural methods and 
control measures employed. The majority of tasks have been carried out with the use 
of an interpreter (e.g. Peterson, 2002, 2004, 2009; Peterson & Slaughter, 2006; 
Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1999), or an experimenter who is neither a native signer or 
fluent in the relevant sign language (e.g. BSL: Jackson, 2001). The problem an 
interpreter poses is a divide in attention between the experimenter enacting the false 
belief task and the interpreter, which is visually strenuous particularly for late-
signing deaf children who sign less confidently.  Given the evidence that suggests 
that hearing-impaired children have significant deficits in visual selective attention in 
comparison to CA-matched peers (Dye, Hauser & Bavelier, 2008), the added task 
demand of switching attention between the experimenter and interpreter could pose 
an unfair disadvantage.  
Schick et al.’s (2007) study overcame the added task demand placed by using 
interpreters as the experimenter was a native signer of ASL. The ToM tasks in this 
study were similarly presented by a CODA, fluent in both BSL and English, to 
maintain one focus and maximise understanding. In addition, the aim was to 
overcome the language demands by presenting a battery of ToM tasks in SSE in 
addition to BSL and English. The inclusion of SSE provided late-signing or oral deaf 
children with the option of viewing the task in the language they communicate in, or 
with additional cues instead of relying solely on lip-reading. Pre-recording each task 
allowed greater control over administration; each participant viewed the same 
version of the task to avoid variation between participants and disparity from the use 
of multiple experimenters (e.g. Schick et al., 2007) - an important consideration due 
to the inherently social and emotional nature of ToM tasks. The battery of tasks also 
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included a second-order false belief task that, to our knowledge, has only been 
attempted once before with deaf children (Jackson, 2001).  
A second aim was to control more carefully for language ability of the deaf 
children. As language is clearly implicated in the development of ToM is it vital to 
obtain an objective measure. In this study, the BSL receptive language (Herman et 
al., 1999) measure was utilised with those deaf children who used sign language. As 
many of the oral deaf children relied on lip-reading, the Craig’s Revised Lip-reading 
Inventory (Updike et al., 1992) was also administered to control for task failure 
resulting from a lack of understanding. 
In sum, the present study tested a group of deaf children who represent the 
majority of deaf children in the UK: deaf children of hearing parents who all 
communicate orally with some sign language. To control task administration, the 
tasks were presented in pre-recorded video clips conducted by a native signer. A 
choice of language – BSL, SSE or English - was given to account for potential 
different communication preferences. The children were compared to two control 
groups of hearing children: one group matched for non-verbal ability and CA (older 
hearing) and a second ‘age appropriate’ group for the false belief task (younger 
hearing i.e. 4 and 5 year olds). Based on previous findings it was predicted that: 
Hypothesis one: deaf children would perform similarly to the younger group 
of hearing children but may be delayed in comparison to the older group of hearing 
children on the first order false belief tasks.  
Hypothesis two: on the second order false belief task, the older hearing 
children would perform better than the younger hearing children and, based on the 
findings of Jackson (2001), the deaf children. Second order false belief 
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understanding has been shown to develop later than first order belief understanding 
(Hughes et al., 2000; Miller, 2009; Perner & Wimmer, 1985). 
Hypothesis three: general language ability (BSL receptive skills/BPVS 
scores) would predict deaf children and younger hearing children’s ToM task 
performance. Also vocabulary was predicted to relate to better performance on the 
second order false belief task for older children given that language ability has been 
shown to predict typically developing children’s performance in previous studies 
(Filippova & Astington, 2008; Hasselhorn, Mӓhler & Grube, 2005; Miller, 2009). 
 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-three children participated in the study. The deaf group consisted of 
16 girls and 11 boys aged between 6 years 7 months and 12 years 1 month (mean CA 
= 9 years 0 months, SD = 1 years 6 months). Their non-verbal IQ scores ranged from 
70 to 125 (Table 39). The criterion for selection of deaf children was: 1) the presence 
of either severe or profound pre-lingual hearing loss. Eleven children were 
profoundly deaf (hearing loss > 90 db) and 16 children were moderate-severely deaf 
(hearing loss > 60 db); 2) CA between 6-12 years: the age at which both first and 
second order belief tasks are usually passed in a hearing sample; 3) exposure to oral 
language; 4) no known learning disabilities or concomitant disorders such as 
attention deficit or autism; and 5) parents who were both hearing.  
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Twelve of the children had one or more parents who had some knowledge of 
sign, and for the other 15 children there was no member of the family identified who 
could sign. Of the 12 children who had a family member who could sign, nine of 
these children had one family member and three had at least two members of the 
family who could sign. However, only three parents in this sample of children were 
proficient at BSL signing (BSL Level 2 or above; minimum requirement for school 
teachers). All children received auditory amplification: 14 wore CIs and 13 wore 
HAs. Each participant attended one of five mainstream schools with special units for 
hearing impaired children. All children were oral in their communication preference, 
using some SSE or BSL, although none were native signers.  
Two controls groups were included in the study, and they were categorized as 
an older group of children and a younger group. The older group of controls included 
23 children with no hearing loss aged between 6 years 1 month to 11 years 6 months 
and were matched with the deaf children on gender (15 female), CA (M = 8 years 8 
months, SD = 1 year 6 months) and non-verbal IQ . Table 39 displays mean CA, 
non-verbal ability and language scores for deaf and hearing older and younger 
control groups. Independent t-tests confirmed no significant difference in non-verbal 
IQ between the deaf and older hearing children, t (48) =-.09, p=.93, or CA, t (48) = 
.77, p =.45.   The younger group consisted of 23 children (12 female) with no 
hearing loss were aged between 4 years 5 month and 5 years 9 months (M = 5 years 
2 months, SD= 4 months). This group was purposefully included as the children 
were all at the age at which the first order belief tasks would be expected to be 
passed, but not the second order belief tasks. 
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Table 39. CA, Non-verbal IQ, Verbal IQ and Language Measure Mean Scores and 
SDs for Deaf and Older Hearing and Younger Hearing Control Groups (Study 5) 
 Children  
 Deaf Hearing older Hearing younger 
CA (yrs.mnths) 
Non-Verbal IQ 
9.0 (1.6) 
97.26 (15.33) 
8.8 (1.6) 
97.61 (12.51) 
5.2 (.4) 
105.43 (11.86) 
Verbal IQ (BPVS)  104.0 (13.28) 103.57 (11.47) 
Lip Reading 105.48 (10.6)   
BSL Receptive 96.23 (13.79) (N= 22)   
Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis 
 
Materials  
Standard false belief tasks: Two unseen change-in-location tasks were 
presented. The first task was a slightly modified version of Baron-Cohen et al.’s 
(1985) version of Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) ‘Sally-Ann false-belief’ task:  in the 
original paradigm, it was necessary to finger spell the name of the dolls, which 
places further demands on both the children’s attention span and memory (Peterson 
and Siegal, 1995). A boy, therefore, replaced a second female character (Peterson & 
Siegal, 1995; Steeds et al., 1997). The child being tested was initially introduced to 
the characters and asked which doll was the girl and which was the boy (naming 
question). The task began with the girl hiding a marble in a basket and then leaving 
the scene. Once she departed, the boy appeared and moved the marble from the 
basket and put it in his own box. When the girl returned, the child was asked, 
“Where will the girl look for the marble?” followed by two control questions: 
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“Where is the marble now?” (reality) and “Where did the girl put the marble in the 
beginning?” (memory).  In order to pass the task, the children needed to correctly 
answer both the test question and the control questions. 
In the second trial of the false belief transfer task –‘ Hidden Cakes’ - a boy 
placed a tray of cakes (plastic) in a green cupboard to cool down, and then went out 
to play. A second character, a girl, removed the cakes from the green cupboard and 
placed them in the blue cupboard. When the boy returned and the child was asked 
the belief question, “Where will the boy look for the cakes?”  This was followed by 
the same two control questions. 
The misleading-container tasks were based on the Smarties task described by 
Perner, Frith, Leslie, and Lekam (1989) and presented in two trials. In this study, the 
first trial involved a misleading tube of sweets that instead contained a red crayon. 
The sweets were the favourite of the hungry doll presented in the scene. Once the 
unexpected object was revealed to the participant, they were asked what the hungry 
doll initially believed the closed tube of sweets to contain, and what their initial 
belief had been.  In the second trial, a cereal box was used, which actually contained 
two pencils.  
Second order false belief task: ‘Ice-cream story.’ The second order false 
belief task was based on the ice-cream story used by Perner and Wimmer (1985). 
The story involved three locations: a park (where the ice-cream van was located 
originally), the girl’s house and a school (the new location of the ice-cream van). The 
ice-cream van and the girl’s house were used as props, as well as puppets 
representing the four characters: the girl, the boy, the ice-cream man and the mother. 
To be able to pass the task, the child needed to understand what two people were 
thinking sequentially: the boy had a false belief about what the girl thought because 
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an element of the story had not been seen. The actor narrated the task and asked a 
series of probe and control questions to ensure the key elements and sequences of the 
story had been understood and remembered. The children's responses were recorded 
in written format. Feedback and correction was given before continuing onto the 
next section of the narrative. The second-order ignorance question was then asked as 
the first test question and no feedback was given. Following a memory aid, the story 
ended with two open-ended test questions: the second-order false-belief question and 
justification (Sullivan, Zaitchik and Tager-Flusberg, 1994) (see Appendix H for all 
story scripts).  
Procedure and design  
All the children were tested on a battery of tasks that included four standard 
first order false belief tasks, (two unseen change-in-location tasks, and two 
unexpected contents tasks), and one second order false belief task. Each child was 
tested individually in a quiet vacant classroom in their school in one session lasting 
approximately 30 minutes. 
The tasks were presented using a pre-recorded ToM script. Each of the false 
belief stories was presented by a hearing, native signer. The actor both animated 
puppets and props and narrated the stories, so to maintain one focus rather than 
dividing the children’s attention between an experimenter and an interpreter. Three 
versions of each task were produced in BSL, SSE and spoken English to account for 
the first language of all participants involved in this study. Twenty-one deaf children 
chose to view the task in SSE and two in BSL. The stories were pre-recorded on a 
digital camcorder, and a clip was created for each ToM task (see Appendix I for an 
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example story board). All of the clips were validated by two deaf adults (both at BSL 
Level 3). 
The children were seated in front of a computer screen. The order in which 
the four first-order false-belief tasks were presented was counterbalanced, followed 
by the presentation of the second order false belief task. The answer to the children’s 
questions (signed or verbal response) was recorded by the experimenter. The 
children were given a short break before continuing onto the second-order false 
belief task if necessary. Although the experimenter was competent in BSL, a 
teaching assistant competent in both sign languages (BSL; SSE), accompanied the 
deaf children to ensure accuracy of answers recorded.  
False belief task scoring: Children were given one point if they correctly 
answered “where will X look?” in response to the changed-location tasks and one 
point if they correctly answered their own belief and the other’s belief questions on 
the unexpected-contents tasks, giving the highest possible score of two for each task. 
Six deaf participants were excluded from this study due to failure to pass the control 
questions. As the standard false belief tasks involve open questions that require a 
child to respond depending on their own belief, chance is deemed to be zero (Schick 
et al., 2007). Participants were awarded one point if they correctly answered the 
second-order false belief task. 
 
 
  
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Results 
Overall Performance 
The data was not normally distributed and there was a lack of homogeneity 
of variance, so non-parametric test were carried out. Table 40 displays the means and 
SDs scores of the unexpected location, unexpected content and second order false 
belief tasks for the three groups. Kruskall Wallis tests were conducted comparing the 
three groups of children – deaf, hearing younger, hearing older – on each of the (first 
order) false belief tasks. No significant difference was found between the groups’ 
performance on the unexpected location trials (H (2) = 4.23, p = .12, η² = .06). 
Group differences did, however, emerge in performance on the unexpected content 
trials (H (2) = 73) = 9.08, p = .01, η² =.13) and the second order false belief task (H 
(2) = 30.14, p <.005, η² =.42).   
Post hoc Mann Whitney U tests (with Bonferroni corrections of p <.02) 
testing differences between groups on the unexpected content task showed that the 
older hearing children performed significantly better than the deaf children (U = 
206.0, z = -2.81, p = .005, r = .21) and the younger hearing children (U = 170.5, z = -
2.87, p = .004, r = .42), but there was no significant difference between the younger 
hearing children and the deaf group children (U = 310, z = -.01, p = .99, r = .001).  
Figure 5 shows that a much greater percentage of older hearing children 
(69.5%) passed the second order false belief tasks than both the deaf children (3.7%; 
one child) and the hearing younger children (13%; three children). Chi square tests 
of independence confirmed that these differences were significant (deaf: χ² = 24.01, 
df = 1, p <.001, Φ = .69; hearing young: χ² = 30.56, df = 1, p <.001, Φ .82). There 
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was no significant difference between the number deaf and hearing young children 
passing the second order false belief task (χ² = 1.47, df = 1, p = .22, Φ = .17). 
These results suggest that deaf children’s performance on the unexpected 
contents and second order false belief tasks lagged behind the CA matched hearing 
control group, but paralleled that of the younger group of hearing children within the 
age range that is typical for passing the false belief task. This is illustrated in Figure 
5, which shows the percentage of children who passed both trials on the two first 
order false belief tasks, and the percentage of children who passed the second order 
false belief task. A within subject analysis (Wilcoxon) of deaf children’s unexpected 
content and unexpected location task scores found no significant difference (z = -
1.08, p =.28, r = .21), suggesting that the unexpected contents task was not more 
difficult than the unexpected location task for the deaf group children.  
 
Table 40. Mean Performance of Deaf and Hearing Children on the False Belief 
Tasks 
 Mean rating 
Task Deaf Hearing younger 
Hearing  
Older 
Unexpected location 1.59 (.69) 1.35 (.93) 1.87 (.34) 
Unexpected content 1.41 (.84) 1.43 (.79) 1.96 (.21) 
Second order .04 (.19) .13 (.34) .70 (.47) 
Note. SDs in parenthesis 
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Figure 5. Percentage of deaf, young hearing and older hearing children passing both 
trials of first order tasks and the second order task 
Factors predicting false belief performance 
Further analysis was conducted to investigate the relationship between CA, 
non-verbal IQ, verbal ability (BSL receptive language for deaf children and BPVS 
for hearing children) and performance on each of the false belief tasks. For the deaf 
children, lip-reading, type of hearing amplification (coded as 0 = CI, 1 = HA) and 
signing ability of the parents (coded as 0 = no experience, and 1 = at least one of the 
parents can sign) were also included for the sample of deaf children. Mean and SDs 
of scores for subgroups deaf of children grouped on hearing amplification and 
whether a member of their family signed are displayed in Table 41. 
A regression analysis revealed that for deaf children’s scores on the 
unexpected location false belief task, R²= .38, F = 1.42, MSE = .57, p = .27,  lip 
reading ability score was the only significant predictor of performance of the group 
of deaf children (β = .54, p =.04); CA (β = .43, p =.11), BSL receptive language (β = 
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-.30, p =.26),  family’s level of sign language (β = -.19, p =.51), type of hearing 
amplification (β = -.20, p =.49) and non-verbal ability (β = .17, p =.48) were not 
significant predictors.  For the older group of hearing children, none of the factors 
significantly predicted performance (R²= .19, F = 1.48, MSE = .11, p = .25; CA: β = 
.47, p =.07; non-verbal ability: β = -.03, p =.91; BPVS: β = .18, p =.44). Similarly, 
none of the factors predicted performance of the younger hearing children’s 
performance on the unexpected change of location false belief task (R²= .27, F = 
2.36, MSE = .74, p = .10; CA: β = .26, p =.26; β = .23, p =.33; non-verbal ability: β 
= .32, p =.17). 
For the unexpected content task, BSL receptive score was a positive and 
significant predictor of deaf children’s performance (R²= .55, F = 2.84, MSE = 1.21, 
p = .05; BSL receptive: β = .47, p =.05) and lip-reading ability marginally predicted 
performance (β = .37, p =.08), but CA (β = -.14, p =.52), family’s level of sign 
language (β = .18, p =.48), type of hearing amplification (β = -.05, p =.85) and 
nonverbal ability (β = -.31, p =.15) were non-significant.  None of the factors 
significantly predicted the older hearing children’s performance (R²= .09, F = .65, 
MSE = .05, p = .59; CA: β = -.03, p =.98; non-verbal ability: β = .17, p =.53; BPVS: 
β = -.33, p =.20). Verbal ability was found to be a strong, positive predictor of the 
younger hearing group of children’s performance on the unexpected content task 
(R²= .39, F = 3.96, MSE = .44, p = .02; BPVS: β = .67, p =.004), and both CA (β = 
.40, p =.07) and non-verbal ability (β = -.44, p =.052) were marginal predictors.  
 Due to floor effects in both the deaf and younger hearing children’s scores on 
the second order false belief task, it was not possible to examine factors predicting 
the performance of these groups of children. For the older hearing children’s 
performance on this task (R²= .21, F = 1.72, MSE = .20, p = .20), CA was found to 
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be a significant predictor (β = .52, p =.04), whereas non-verbal ability (β = .20, p 
=.42) and verbal ability were not (β = .00, p =.99). 
 Finally, the deaf children were compared on their first order false belief 
performance according to level of deafness – profound or moderate-severe (mean 
and SDs of scores are displayed in Table 41). Mann Whitney U tests showed no 
significant difference between moderate-severely deaf and profoundly deaf children 
on either the unexpected location tasks, U = 68, z = -1.23, p = .34, r = .18, or the 
unexpected content tasks, U = 75.5, z =-.72, p =.54, r =.11. 
 
Table 41.  Mean and SDs of Scores on Unexpected Content and Unexpected 
Location ToM tasks for Subgroups of Deaf Children (Study 5) (Divided by hearing 
amplification, level of deafness, communication preference, and whether have 
signing family members) 
 
           CI or HA                   Level of deafness             Signing family 
                                                                                            member 
 
 CI  
(N = 14) 
HA  
(N= 13) 
 Severe 
(N = 16) 
 Profound 
(N = 11) 
Yes  
(N = 12 )  
     
No  
(N = 14 ) 
 
 
Unexpected 
location 
 
1.57 (.65) 
 
1.62 (.77) 
 
1.67 (.70) 
 
1.45 (.69) 
 
1.5 (.80) 
 
1.64 (.63) 
 
Unexpected 
content 
 
1.43 (.85) 
 
 
1.38 (.87) 
 
 
1.5 (.82) 
 
 
1.27 (.90) 
 
 
1.17 (.94) 
 
 
1.64 (.74) 
 
 
 
  




Discussion 
An aim of the current study was to control more carefully for the language 
demands of the ToM tasks. Administration was controlled by employing a native 
signer (a CODA) to conduct the tasks, which were pre-recorded and presented as 
film clips in a choice of BSL, SSE or English. The majority of deaf children selected 
to view the tasks in SSE demonstrating the usefulness of signed English as an 
additional aid to understanding, even for predominately oral deaf children.  
As predicted by hypothesis one, the deaf children’s performance on the first 
order false belief tasks – both the unexpected location and unexpected content trials - 
paralleled the younger deaf children. As expected, the older group of hearing 
children performed at near ceiling level on the first order tasks. While the deaf 
children were significantly worse than the chronological CA matched controls (older 
hearing) at the unexpected contents task, there was no significant difference between 
the groups on the unexpected location task. These results are similar to those found 
by Schick et al. (2007), suggesting a delay rather than a deficit in social-cognitive 
ToM. No finding of a delay in comparison to preschool age children contrasted the 
results found in several previous studies involving late signing and oral deaf children 
(Peterson, 2002, 2004; Peterson & Siegal, 1995, 1998). The more favourable results 
than those found in studies involving interpreters to administer the false belief tasks 
emphasise the advantage of the employment of a CODA to administer false belief 
tasks to maximise clarity, understanding and minimise demands on visual attention.  
Despite the better performance of the deaf children of hearing parents in this 
study in comparison to some previous studies, a delay was nevertheless evident. No 
advantage of CIs was found in comparison to HA, neither was a difference found 
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between moderate-severely deaf and profoundly deaf children. The sub-group of 
deaf CI wearers was too small to explore the age of implantation, which has 
previously shown that early implantation results in better ToM performance 
(Remmels & Peters, 2009). This nevertheless suggests that potential for greater 
auditory access is not directly resulting in better performance on first order false 
belief tasks for these deaf children. Interestingly, there was no significant 
relationship with age and performance within the deaf group. Rather, the great 
performance variability within this group likely reflects the differences in 
communication experiences and language ability. 
Because the ToM delay in late-signing and oral deaf children has been linked 
to language, a second aim of this study was to control for language ability. Where 
children who failed control tasks have previously been included (Jackson, 2001; 
Steeds et al., 1997), only children who passed the control questions were included in 
this study. Many previous studies with deaf children have included only a subjective 
measure (e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 1999) of oral English (e.g. Peterson et al., 2005; 
Prezbindowski & Lederberg, 2003) or sign language measures (Meristro et al., 2007) 
that were not standardised for use with deaf populations. The deaf children in this 
study were tested on both standardised BSL receptive language test (Herman et al., 
1999) and the Craig’s lip-reading inventory (Updike et al., 1992). 
Although communicating with a mixture of sign language and English (SSE), 
the late signing deaf participants scored within the average range on the BSL 
receptive language test and also within the average range on the Craig’s lip-reading 
inventory (Updike et al., 1992). Notably, the deaf children in this study scored 
significantly higher on the BSL receptive test than late-signing and oral children in 
previous studies (Jackson, 2001; Woolfe, et al., 2002). As predicted, a significant 
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positive relationship was found between performance on the unexpected contents 
task and the false belief task, but this relationship was not a predictor of performance 
on the unexpected location tasks. However, a significant positive relationship 
between lip-reading ability and performance on the unexpected location tasks was 
found. In addition, lip-reading also marginally predicted performance on the 
unexpected contents tasks. This suggests that a good level of sign language and 
access to spoken language (as indicated by lip-reading) are linked to better success 
on false belief tasks, in line with some previous studies (Jackson, 2001; Schick et al., 
2007). Consistent with these results, receptive vocabulary (as measured by the 
BPVS) also predicted the younger hearing children’s unexpected contents task 
performance.  
Previous research has focused on deaf children’s understanding of first order 
false belief tasks and little attention has been given to the attribution of second order 
beliefs – that is, the attribution of the belief of one character to another, hence 
demonstrating an appreciation of multiple perspectives (Baron-Cohen, 1989).  The 
third prediction that the older hearing children would outperform both the younger 
and older hearing children on the more complex second order false belief task was 
confirmed by the results of this study.  In agreement with previous research with 
typically developing children, the older hearing children also outperformed the 
younger hearing children (Miller, 2009; Perner & Wimmer, 1985). It is not 
surprising that the younger hearing children (aged 4 and 5) performed poorly given 
that this ability has been shown to emerge around the age of 7. However, both the 
young group of hearing children and the deaf group of children’s performance was 
subject to floor effects. In addition, the deaf children in the current study performed 
worse than those tested in the only other study to have previously tested deaf 
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children’s second order false belief, with only 3% passing in comparison 22% 
(Jackson, 2001). One difference between the current study and Jackson’s (2001) 
study is a variance in scoring, as the justification of belief question was omitted from 
this earlier study; an explanation that requires a child to reflect and verbalise the 
reasoning process about mental states (Miller, 2009).  
The older hearing children’s second order false belief task with a 69% pass 
rate demonstrates considerably better performance. Interestingly verbal ability as 
measured by the BPVS did not predict the older hearing children’s performance as 
has previously been found (Fillippova & Astington, 2008; Hasselhorn et al., 2005), 
but there was a significant improvement with age. If not verbal ability, what can be 
attributed to this improvement in performance with age, and the deaf children’s 
inability to perform at this task? While some believe that increased social knowledge 
from interactions with siblings may be essential to the transition from first- to 
second- order false belief, others argue that the critical difference may lie in 
improvements in executive functions (EF e.g. working memory and inhibition) as 
well as language (Miller, 2009, 2012).  
The specific relationship between ToM and language remains unclear (Harris 
et al., 2005) and this study has not attended to a number of language hypotheses of 
ToM. The BSL receptive language test that has been utilised does not, for instance, 
investigate the syntax of sentence complementation. To understand this aspect of 
language requires the ownership of syntactic structures including those that allow the 
embedding of false propositions within true statements (e.g. “the boy knows that the 
girl [falsely] thinks he’s gone to the park.”). 
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In addition to vocabulary, Schick et al. (2007) found this to be predictive of 
deaf children’s ToM performance, suggesting that complements may have a role in 
the ability to discuss and represent mental state concepts. More recently, de Villiers 
and de Villiers (2012) found sentential complements task with verbs of 
communication the best predictor amongst language measures over and above 
vocabulary or general syntax. Tomasuolo et al. (2012) found that children’s ability to 
construct and narrate a story revealed a strong relationship with ToM performance 
than other linguistic factors. The current study’s results suggest that further research 
concerning more specific language abilities of deaf children is necessary given that 
general language ability may not be the only factor in the development of ToM. 
 
There are also the constraints to language measures for deaf children as 
outlined in the introduction of this chapter. While the deaf children scored within the 
average range on the sign language task, it is possible that this measure did not 
capture the extent of their language abilities. There is a definite need for the 
development of language measures that are standardised for oral deaf children that 
can be responded to both in signed and spoken English (Haug & Mann. 2008; Schick 
et al., 2007).  
Criticism could be cast for using the second order false belief task with deaf 
children due to its highly verbal nature.  Interestingly, Hollebrandse, van Hout and 
Hendriks (2012) found that typically developing hearing 7 year old children 
performed better in the verbal than the non-verbal false belief tasks. Hollebrandse et 
al. (2012) suggested that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs possibly 
assisting the cognitive system to monitor and keep in mind beliefs attributed by 
people to other people; in contrast, the non-verbal task did not have the questions 
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throughout that helped to keep track of this process of reasoning. In keeping with 
these results, deaf children perform no better on non-verbal than verbal first order 
false belief tasks in a number of previous studies (de Villiers & de Villier, 2000; 
Figueras-Costa & Harris, 2001; Woolfe et al., 2003).  
Future research could consider a non-verbal task in assessing deaf children’s 
second order false beliefs, and be inclusive of older children to determine the age at 
which deaf young people are able to pass such a task. As native signing young deaf 
children are able to pass first order false belief tasks at a comparative age to 
preschool hearing children (e.g. Courtin, 2000), it is important to establish the 
performance of this group of children on second order false belief tasks to determine 
whether this pattern extends to more complex mental state understanding. 
  In sum, the results of Study 5 suggest that the problem does not lie with the 
verbal demands of the task. However, controlling administration with the use of pre-
recorded stories, and reducing attentional demands by employing a native signer to 
narrate the stories, revealed a delay rather than a deficit in false belief understanding 
in deaf children in comparison to their CA-matched controls (Schick et al., 2007). 
Language and access to conversation is clearly implicated to be of importance in 
securing false belief understanding, however, these findings suggest it is unlikely to 
relate solely to verbal ability. 
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Chapter Eight: 
Overall discussion and conclusions 
The primary aims of this thesis were to clarify deaf children’s ability in facial 
emotion recognition, to provide an initial investigation of emotion production in deaf 
children, and finally to relate these findings to the original focus of deaf social 
cognition research – the social-cognitive abilities in ToM as measured by the false 
belief task. This chapter draws together the experimental findings and provides a 
critical discussion in the context of previous research and theoretical underpinnings. 
Methodological strengths and weaknesses are highlighted and suggestions for future 
directions for research outlined. The conclusions have relevance for deaf children’s 
social and emotional development, particularly emphasising the importance of 
maximising access to conversation and language.  
Deaf children’s emotion recognition 
Prior research on deaf children’s facial emotion recognition abilities is sparse 
and has revealed mixed findings. Some studies revealed similar emotion recognition 
abilities to hearing children (e.g. Hosie et al., 1998), whereas others studies have 
indicated poorer performance (Dyck et al., 2004), which has been linked to fewer 
opportunities to discuss emotions in the absence of auditory input. The first three 
studies of this thesis sought to clarify deaf children’s facial emotion recognition 
abilities through the employment of more ecologically valid methods that better 
reflect deaf children’s everyday experience of communication. Three aspects were 
considered: the use of real versus cartoon/synthetic faces, the role of motion and the 
role of intensity in deaf children’s emotion recognition. First, the results of Study 1 
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confirmed the hypothesis that deaf children would perform poorly in comparison 
with hearing controls in the recognition of cartoon facial expressions of the 
emotions, happiness, sadness and anger, as had previously been found in studies 
utilising synthetic stimuli (Dyck et al., 2004; Ludlow et al., 2010; Wiefferink et al., 
2013). In contrast, the performance of the recognition of real human faces paralleled 
that of the hearing children.  
These findings suggest that the human face is a particularly important source 
of social and emotional information for deaf children. This social value is well 
established in emotion developmental literature given that typically developing 
infants have a tendency to pay particular attention to human faces (Nelson & 
Horowitz, 1987). Real human faces appear to be even more crucial for deaf people’s 
social and linguistic communication. Eye-tracking studies have demonstrated that the 
human face (especially the eyes) rather than the hands is the focal fixation point 
during deaf communication (Muir & Richardson, 2005; Watanabe et al., 2011). 
Cartoon and synthetic stimuli (e.g. morphed faces) do not contain the detail of the 
naturally occurring features of real human faces such as skin wrinkling and bulging 
(Ekman et al., 2002). In addition, a potential confounding variable of this study was 
that the cartoon images portrayed a lesser degree of emotion intensity. While the 
FACS was adhered to when manipulating the cartoon stimuli to display emotion 
expressions, a lesser degree of intensity may have resulted due to limitations of the 
software. This issue was later addressed in Study 3 when investigating the impact of 
increasing levels of intensity on deaf children’s emotion recognition in real human 
faces. 
Second, Studies 1 and 2 addressed the issue that emotion recognition studies 
to date have utilised static images portraying facial expressions of emotion (e.g. 
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Hosie et al., 1998; Ludlow et al., 2010; Ziv et al., 2013). The importance of motion 
and therefore the use of dynamic stimuli has recently been acknowledged by those 
studying emotion recognition in both typically developed (e.g. Montirosso et al., 
2010; Nelson & Russell, 2011) and other clinical populations (e.g. ASD: Gepner, 
Deruelle & Grynfeltt, 2001), yet the studies presented in this thesis were the first to 
investigate the effect of motion on deaf children’s emotion identification in real 
human faces. Motion is an important consideration given the reality that emotions 
expressions are dynamic in nature. For this reason, dynamic displays are important 
for ecological validity, but also due to the differing neural networks evoked when 
viewing dynamic images in comparison to those activated when viewing static 
images: dynamic images have been shown to activate distinctly social areas (superior 
temporal sulci) (Kessler et al., 2011; Kilts et al., 2003; Krumhuber et al., 2013). 
It was hypothesised that motion may be of particular importance to emotion 
recognition in deaf children for a number of reasons. Motion cues have been 
identified as an important factor in other areas of deaf communication: sign language 
involves hand movements to decipher linguistic communication and mark 
grammatical distinctions and, without auditory input, verbal communication relies on 
the movement of lip-patterns (Corina et al., 2007; Haxby et al., 2002). There is 
evidence to suggest that deaf people have a greater sensitivity to motion in the 
absence of hearing - increased neurological activation has been displayed when 
detecting motion in velocity changes in peripheral stimuli (Armstrong et al., 2002; 
Stevens & Neville, 2006). In Study 1, as predicted, motion enhanced both the deaf 
and hearing children’s emotion recognition of the cartoon faces. This is consistent 
with previous research using synthetic stimuli (Bould & Morris, 2008; Kätsyri & 
Sams, 2008; Wehrle et al., 2000). It has been suggested that as cartoons have fewer 
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clear features it is harder to distinguish between facial configurations of emotions; 
the cue of motion aids in distinguishing between emotion facial expressions. While 
the effect of motion was found in the deaf group of children for real human faces, no 
advantage of dynamic versus static images was found for the hearing controls.  
A limitation to these results is that near ceiling effects were exhibited for 
both groups of children in the identification of emotion in human faces. The focus on 
the three most basic emotions does not encompass all emotions that children begin to 
conceptualise during childhood. Matsumoto and Ekman (2004) highlight that the 
inclusion of at least the six basic emotions demonstrates improved ecological 
validity.  Study 2 aimed to extend this finding to test deaf children’s emotion 
recognition of all six of the basic emotions – happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust 
and surprise – in static and dynamic displays. As expected, hearing control children 
did not exhibit an advantage for dynamic images in line with previous research 
(Nelson & Russell, 2011). It has been reasoned that when clear prototypical facial 
expressions in natural stimuli are used, no advantage is gained by the use of motion. 
In contrast, the deaf children were shown to be significantly worse than the hearing 
children at accurately recognising static but not dynamic images displaying emotion 
in real human faces. Importantly, the deaf children’s overall performance in emotion 
recognition paralleled that of hearing control children when using dynamic and real 
human faces.  
Yet the majority of the emotions (except the more difficult expressions of 
fear and disgust) resulted in near ceiling effects as per the human faces in Study 1, 
meaning the possibility remains that the task was not sensitive enough to tap 
differences between deaf and hearing children. While emotion recognition is a 
natural, unconsciously occurring ability and it is encouraging that the deaf children 
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performed well in comparison to controls, in reality emotion expressions in everyday 
life are more subtle and fleeting than the expressions portrayed by the exaggerated 
displays typically used in emotion recognition research (Montange et al., 2007; 
Russell, 1994).  
Study 3 aimed to take account of the fact that in everyday life emotion 
expressions are subtle by testing deaf and hearing children’s emotion recognition at 
varying degrees of intensity.  It was suggested that because deaf children of hearing 
parents exhibit difficulties in ToM and perspective taking (e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 
1995), it is possible that problems may be faced in interpreting subtle, fleeting 
emotion expressions that are typical of day-to-day experience. Further evidence 
suggesting that deaf children may not be so attuned to subtle expressions of emotion 
is that young deaf individuals are more likely to be exposed to exaggerated 
expressions through communication with parents (Koester et al., 2000) and exposure 
to sign language communication (Goldstein et al., 2000).   
As per Study 2, the deaf children’s overall performance paralleled the hearing 
control group children. The processing demands of this study were higher than in 
previous studies investigating emotion recognition in deaf children with a reduced 
display time of only 500ms, whereas the majority of previous studies gave no time 
limit (Hosie et al., 1998; Ludlow et al., 2010; Ziv et al., 2013). Subtle expressions 
were more difficult for deaf children to recognise, but no more difficult than the 
hearing children. These results are consistent with several other studies suggesting 
that emotion recognition in deaf children is comparable to hearing children’s when 
assessment involves the use of static pictures (Hopyan-Misakyan et al., 2009; Hosie 
et al., 1998; Ziv et al., 2013) or video clips (Most & Aviner, 2009) of real human 
faces. These three studies highlight the importance of socially relevant information 
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necessary for deaf children to make emotion judgements of facially expressed 
emotions, suggesting a particular reliance on salient visual cues in the absence of 
auditory information. 
Deaf children’s emotion production 
This is the first study to investigate emotion production abilities in deaf 
children: a highly important skill given the social role expressions play in being able 
to send a signal of intent or emotional state to another individual (Harrigan et al., 
2008; Lewis et al., 1987). The ability of deaf children to voluntarily encode the six 
basic facial expressions of emotion was examined using three elicitation methods: 
verbal labels, emotion signed stories and mimicry of dynamic clips of real people 
portraying prototypical facial expressions. The overall findings of Studiess 4a-c 
suggest a similar conceptual development of emotion in line with the emotion 
recognition results, implying the importance of socialisation of emotion and a role 
for language in emotion understanding.  
The result indicating that overall deaf children’s imitation of facial 
expressions of emotion parallels that of hearing children is encouraging given the 
socially facilitative role of this function (Fischer & Manstead, 2008). The importance 
of being able to overtly mimic another person’s emotion state is to send a signal to 
indicate that the other person has been understood (Pfieifer et al., 2008). Deaf 
children’s performance in the encoding of the six basic emotions elicited via a verbal 
prompt (i.e. “show me… happy.”) revealed better performance in the accurate 
expression of sadness, anger, fear and surprise according to the judgement of human 
raters. Likewise, better overall performance of the deaf children was found for 
emotion signed stories. Here, clearly the argument that experience with non-verbal 
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communication results in better emotion encoding is upheld (Goldstein et al., 2000). 
Despite research suggesting that some deaf children (of hearing parents) experience 
qualitatively poorer experience of early inter-subjectivity (e.g. joint attention: 
Prezbindowski et al., 1998), the current findings suggest that experience of sign 
language and the greater requirement for deaf children to express themselves through 
non-verbal means results in effective encoding of emotion expressions that are 
readily recognised by others. 
 The finding that both deaf and hearing children were able to produce 
expressions of happiness that received highest recognition by the human raters and 
the Face Reader™ software is unsurprising given the role of happiness in facilitating 
positive social relations (Field & Walden, 1982; Lewis et al., 1989; Volker et al., 
2000). The more difficult emotions of anger, fear and disgust received consistently 
low Face Reader™ ratings, particularly in the label and story prompt conditions, 
suggesting that the children were less able to voluntarily produce the prototypical 
facial configurations. This is in line with Ekman’s (1985) account explaining that the 
negative emotions are harder to voluntarily produce. In addition these findings 
highlight a methodological strength of the emotion production studies presented in 
this thesis – the inclusion of the ecologically and socially valid human judgement 
rating in addition to the more objective measure provided by the Face Reader™ 
software. While children may be developmentally limited in their ability to produce 
the prototypical facial expressions of emotion, the advantage of video clips is that 
human raters are able to benefit from additional dynamic emotion cues, such as 
cowering backwards with fear and the tongue protrusion for disgust (Gelder et al., 
2004).  
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In all three conditions, deaf children’s emotion encodings were rated as being 
consistently more intense than the hearing children’s. As each culture is thought to 
adopt a different set of display rules that dictate the level of intensity of expression 
and when to mask and inhibit emotions (Ekman, 1972), it may be that experience 
with non-verbal emotions and sign language results in an emphasis on clear, intense 
emotion expression in deaf individuals (Goldstein et al., 2000). Of particular interest 
is that deaf children express the negative emotion of anger with greater intensity – an 
emotion that does not have a socially facilitative function (Hess et al., 2000). It could 
be that these emotions are clearly and intensely expressed facially by the deaf 
children due to a need to convey linguistic meaning non-verbally, compared with 
hearing children who may express their anger through language or tone of voice. 
Hearing children in western cultures are often encouraged to subdue expressions of 
anger as it is socially unacceptable to display angry outbursts (Lewis et al., 1987). 
On the other hand, deaf children are less likely to conceal anger to protect the 
feelings of others (Hosie et al., 2000) and demonstrate difficulties in emotion 
regulation (Wiefferink et al., 2012), which may explain the greater ratings of intense 
expressions of anger in Studies 4a-c. Further studies in naturalistic situations would 
be needed to confirm these suggestions in order to directly observe whether or not 
deaf children express or conceal anger to gain an accurate picture of the pattern of 
display rules in a real social context.  
A parallel developmental pathway in emotion processing 
Deaf and hearing children’s comparable error patterns in Study 3, indicating 
a greater difficulty in recognising subtle than intense, exaggerated expressions of 
emotion, suggests a typical processing style in deaf children. These results are in 
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accordance with the emotion recognition literature investigating the effect of 
intensity on typically developing children (Gao & Maurer, 2010; Herba et al., 2006; 
Montirosso et al., 2010). As expected, the hearing children’s performance improved 
with age at recognising the comparably difficult subtle expressions. It has been 
reasoned that with age, either children become better at making subtle distinctions 
between expressions of low intensity suggesting a superior configural processing 
strategy (Maurer et al., 2002; Rump et al., 2009), or children become more effective 
at employing the more demanding featural strategy required to distinguish features in 
subtle expressions (De Sonnerville et al., 2002).  Ludlow et al. (2010) similarly 
found that deaf children’s processing style matched that of hearing control children 
in showing decreased performance on inverted faces, signalling a configural 
processing style. While Study 1 and previous studies suggest that deaf children find 
identifying emotion expressions more difficult in cartoons and synthetic stimuli than 
hearing children (Dyck et al., 2004; Ludlow et al., 2010; Wiefferink et al., 2013), the 
evidence suggests this does not appear to relate to any perceptual differences in 
emotion processing.  
Further evidence that deaf children follow a similar developmental pathway 
to hearing children in emotion recognition lies in the pattern of misattributed 
‘errors’. Widen and Russell (2003) argue that the ‘errors’ in labelling inform how 
children understand emotions. Over the course of childhood it has been posited that 
an increasingly refined process of categorisation takes place, encompassing a 
broader range of discrete emotion terms (Widen & Russell, 2008a). In Studies 2 and 
3, the deaf and hearing children showed a similar pattern in accuracy for each 
emotion, most accurately identifying happiness, followed by sadness, anger and 
surprise. Both the deaf and hearing children made most errors in labelling the more 
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complex emotions of disgust and fear. The analysis of the emotion label 
misattributions in Study 2 showed that ‘errors’ were similar in valence and arousal 
(e.g. disgust was mistaken for anger) to the target emotion for both deaf and hearing 
children, consistent with Widen and Russell’s (2003) differentiation model. These 
results further support Hosie et al.’s (1998) initial finding that the ‘error’ profile in 
deaf and hearing children is comparable when labelling static pictures of real human 
faces.  
Similarly, deaf and hearing children’s parallel pattern of errors in labelling 
(and therefore encoding) the emotion signed stories in Study 4b are consistent with 
Widen and Russell’s (2003) differentiation theory, given that anger was most 
commonly mistaken as sadness and happiness as surprise: in both instances, the 
stories were mistakenly labelled as an earlier occurring emotion category of the same 
valence. An additional complexity of identifying surprise in a story is that an 
understanding that the expectations of another were not met is required (Golan, 
Baron-Cohen, Hill & Golan, 2006). Yet deaf and hearing children did not differ in 
this ability. Interestingly, the deaf children’s performance on the signed stories was 
better than in previous studies (Gray et al., 2007; Ziv et al., 2013). This may reflect 
the use of SSE in the creation of the experimental stimuli, which better represents the 
everyday communication of these deaf children of hearing parents and provides 
additional cues such as facial expressions. Further studies inclusive of a greater 
number of children are needed to confirm this postulation. 
A delay in deaf children’s understanding of disgust  
It is interesting that deaf children’s performance in labelling and encoding 
disgust (elicited via a verbal label and imitation of a dynamic emotion video clip) 
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was consistently poorer than the hearing children’s performance; the finding is 
coherent given that disgust is the last emotion category to emerge in typically 
developing children (Widen & Russell, 2008c, 2013). In Study 2, the difference 
between deaf and hearing children was significant and the difference was marginally 
significant in Study 3. Further within group comparisons found that deaf children 
with HAs performed significantly worse than children with CIs and hearing control 
group children in labelling disgust in both Studies 2 and 3.  
Widen and Russell (2008c) describe that the label, ‘disgust’, is easier for 
children to identify than the prototypical facial expression, contrary to the other basic 
emotion expressions (Widen & Russell, 2004). The disgust facial expression remains 
assimilated to anger until late childhood/adolescence. A reliance on only visual cues 
in absence of auditory cues may lead to a greater confusion with the emotion, anger, 
for deaf children. Given that emotion recognition is paired with emotion production 
(Goldman & Sripada, 2000; Boyatzis & Satyaprasad, 1994), it is reasonable to 
expect a difficulty in producing the expression based on a verbal label and mimicry 
of a dynamic emotion expression as found in Studies 4a and 4c. As emotion 
recognition has been proposed to occur through the process of mimicry via emotion 
contagion (Atkinson & Adolph, 2002), a lack of understanding of the emotion 
expression being viewed results in difficulty in imitating or correctly categorising the 
emotion.  
Further support for Widen and Russell’s (2010) theory of the acquisition of 
the concept of disgust is that all children in Study 4b (deaf and hearing) were able to 
correctly label the emotion signed stories that aimed to elicit disgust. In addition, 
there were no differences in deaf and hearing children’s production of disgust when 
elicited via the emotion signed stories. While it may seem that inferring an emotion 
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in a story is more advanced, research with typically developing children suggests 
that for more complex emotions (disgust, fear, social emotions e.g. embarrassment), 
there is an inferiority effect of face in comparison to a story. Indeed, both the deaf 
and hearing children were also all able to correctly provide a verbal label for the 
signed emotion stories eliciting fear in Study 4b, whereas the highest error rates were 
made for labelling fear in Studies 2 and 3.  
The replication of the face inferiority effect (for disgust and also fear) in deaf 
children makes an important contribution to the debate on emotion development. It is 
not a trivial finding that deaf children are able to perform better in a verbal than a 
non-verbal task. This finding is inconsistent with the emotion signaling theory which 
argues that specific emotions should be easy to recognise via specific facial signals 
(Izard, 1971, 2007). Rather the results are consistent with Widen and Russell’s 
(2010) notion that emotion understanding is rooted in a narrative structure known as 
‘scripts’ operationalised as stories. The advantage stories pose is the 
contextualisation of an emotion within a narrative structure that is not provided by a 
facial expression alone. The finding that deaf children have a difficulty relative to the 
hearing control children suggests that they may have a delay in acquiring the ‘script’ 
for disgust. The ability to recognise disgust from the ‘nose scrunch’ prototypical 
expression alone requires a more sophisticated concept of disgust.  
Deaf children’s delay in social-cognitive ToM  
 The final study aimed to test deaf children’s social-cognitive ToM as 
measured by the first and second order false belief task.  A battery of tasks was 
devised and recorded in BSL, SSE and English by a CODA (a hearing native signer) 
to provide for all communication preferences and to avoid problems posed by a 
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divide in attention between an experimenter and interpreter as had previously been 
faced (e.g. Peterson & Siegal, 1995). The deaf children’s (of hearing parents) 
performance was no different to the group of preschool-aged children for all false 
belief tasks. Although there were no differences between the deaf and CA matched 
hearing children performance on the unexpected location task, the deaf children of 
hearing parents’ performance was significantly worse on the unexpected content and 
second order false belief tasks.  
The results are more encouraging than some earlier studies testing late 
signing and oral deaf children’s ability on the false belief task, indicating a delay 
rather than a deficit, akin to Schick et al.’s (2007) study. The assistance of a CODA 
to administer false belief tasks in Study 5 and Schick et al.’s study emphasises the 
beneficial impact of reducing divided visual attention on task performance. The vast 
majority of deaf children also chose to view the task in SSE, which echoes the 
increasing popularity of this mode of communication.  
Lip-reading ability and BSL receptive language scores of deaf children and 
BPVS scores of hearing children were found to predict performance for the 
unexpected content task, but only lip-reading was found to predict deaf children’s 
unexpected location scores in Study 5. While this suggests that verbal ability is to 
some extent important, other language skills have also been shown to improve 
performance in false belief understanding that were not accounted for in this thesis, 
including sentential complements (de Villiers and de Villiers, 2000) and the ability 
to construct a narrative (Tomasuolo et al., 2012). Others argue that it is not specific 
language abilities, rather a reduced opportunity to discuss mental states, supported 
by evidence suggesting hearing mothers use fewer mental states when talking to their 
deaf infants than mothers of hearing infants (Morgan et al., 2014). 
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None of the deaf children of hearing parents were able to pass the second 
order false belief task, meaning that it is possible that the verbal demands of this task 
made it too challenging. Yet non-verbal first-order false belief tasks found no better 
performance of late signing and oral deaf children then verbal tasks (e.g. Woolfe et 
al., 2003), suggesting that the difficulty lies in a conceptual understanding more 
likely to be related to less experience in discussing mental states and specific 
language abilities (Schick et al., 2007). Future research could consider the use of a 
non-verbal second order false belief task as tested in typically developed hearing 
children (Hollebrandse et al., 2012), including older deaf children and children of 
different communication experiences (e.g. native deaf signers) to determine the age 
and language factors that contribute to mastering the task. 
Linking social-perceptual and social-cognitive ToM 
In the introduction to this thesis the importance of the study of deaf 
children’s social cognition to extend beyond the false belief task to encompass a 
broader range of mind-reading abilities was highlighted, including the less 
considered ability of emotion processing (Hughes & Leekham, 2008). The findings 
suggest possible slight delays in emotion processing in addition to false belief 
understanding that may both be accountable to differences in socialisation for deaf 
children of hearing parents.  
 It has been suggested by several researchers that the early social-perceptual 
skills, including emotion recognition and imitation, are precursors and form the 
building blocks for the later emergence of a social-cognitive ToM (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1993; Hobson, 1991, 1993). Children with ASD have been shown to display 
difficulties in the processing of more subtle displays of emotion (e.g. Law Smith et 
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al., 2010; Volker et al., 2009) and in the belief based emotion of surprise (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1993). The studies in this thesis have shown, however, that deaf 
children have shown no difficulty in comparison with hearing children in 
recognising surprise in faces or emotion stories, or in the overall ability to process 
subtle expressions of emotions. Likewise, no overall difficulty was found in the 
ability to imitate emotion facial expressions. Indeed, deaf children were shown to be 
more effective at encoding emotion expressions that were also greater in intensity. 
The outcome that deaf children faced problems with the false belief task instead 
supports Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan’s (2000) proposal that social-cognitive ToM is 
dissociable from the ‘online’ attributions of emotions through the perception facial 
expressions and imitation (social-perceptual ToM). 
Rather than any indication of an impairment of the neurocognitive structure, 
the within group variance in both deaf children’s delays in the false belief task and 
the emotion processing of disgust is suggestive of difference in language exposure. 
Much less focus has been given to the notion that language ability, or conversational 
experience, may affect the development of emotion concepts. Widen and Russell’s 
(2004, 2008a, 2008b, 2010) suggestion that learning the label is a crucial step in the 
acquisition of an emotion concept and the face inferiority (story superiority) effect 
highly implicates language in emotion concept acquisition (Feldman-Barrett, 2009). 
Deaf children’s poorer performance in the emotion face recognition of disgust (and 
assimilation to anger) is supportive of this suggestion given that in general these 
children display delays in language development and have fewer opportunities to 
discuss emotions and formulate these concepts.  
Feldman-Barrett et al. (2007; Feldman-Barrett, 2009) emphasise the 
importance a readily available emotion vocabulary has in being able to quickly 
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identify and categorise emotion expression. Emotion vocabulary scores negatively 
correlated with overall scores in emotion recognition in Study 2. Verbal ability also 
predicted hearing children’s intense emotion recognition scores in Study 3 - a 
relationship that has also been shown in a number of previous studies (Beck et al., 
2012; Ruffman et al., 2003). Given that emotion recognition and language 
acquisition are both dependent on learning and categorising through experience it is 
a logical finding that the two may be interconnected. Therefore, having a good 
general or emotion vocabulary would suggest that emotion concepts are better 
formed and more accessible for the process of categorisation involved in emotion 
recognition.  
No link between deaf children’s language (BSL receptive scores) and 
emotion recognition scores on Studies 1-3 may reflect the limitation of this measure, 
particularly as the deaf children used SSE rather than BSL. Further efforts need to be 
made in devising appropriate methods to measure deaf children of hearing parent’s 
language abilities to thoroughly explore the links between emotion recognition and 
language (Prezbindowski & Lederberg, 2003). 
The finding that deaf children with CIs performed better than HA wearers, 
potentially suggests that these children may gain better access to language and the 
everyday social and linguistic aspects of emotions, allowing them to develop the 
appropriate social and cognitive abilities to facilitate emotion recognition (Peterson 
& Siegal, 1995). Certainly, the deaf children with CI implants in this study may be 
an exceptional group as there is great heterogeneity within the deaf population and 
CIs work with varying degrees of success (Bat-Chava & Deignan, 2001). There is a 
need for larger studies to further examine the difference between deaf children with 
HAs and CIs considering other factors such as age of implantation, level of hearing 
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and language ability. Nevertheless these results suggest that some deaf children may 
gain better access to communication resulting in better opportunities for the 
socialisation of emotion. 
Deaf children of hearing parents’ delay in false belief understanding provides 
strong evidence for a conversational account of ToM acquisition and the role of 
language in the concept acquisition (Schick et al., 2007). The simulation account of 
ToM is one theory that considers the importance of the social environment that leads 
to opportunities for interaction (Harris, 1991). Similarly, Widen and Russell (2008a) 
propose that emotion processing may be conceptualised in the same way: in trying to 
understand the emotion of others, shown by effectively categorising, imitating or 
encoding a facial expression, children do not rely on an innate module but rather 
simulate the experience instead. Deaf children’s mental state and emotion concept 
understanding develops in the same way as hearing children, but a reduced 
opportunity to overhear conversations about mental states results in some delays in 
acquisition. 
Main strengths, limitations and future directions 
 The strength of the emotion recognition studies presented in this thesis are 
the consideration of ecologically valid and socially relevant measurement through 
the inclusion of real, dynamic facial expressions of varying degrees of intensity, and 
the more realistic reduced display time that better reflects emotion perception in 
everyday life. This study carefully ensured that the deaf children were matched to the 
hearing controls on measures of non-verbal and verbal ability, as well as CA, where 
previously it was uncertain whether emotion recognition findings related to aspects 
of cognition unrelated to deafness (Dyck et al., 2004; Ludlow et al., 2010).  
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 Although ceiling results were found in Studies 1 and 2 in the recognition of 
real human faces, an attempt to overcome this was made by including some of the 
later developing emotions (fear, surprise and anger) and by increasing the task 
demands by reducing the display time and displaying emotions of lesser intensity. As 
the latest emotion to emerge in hearing children, disgust, posed most difficulty for 
hearing children, and Dyck et al. (2004) found delays in deaf children’s emotion 
recognition with the inclusion of the more difficult emotion of contempt, future 
research could consider the development of the more complex emotions into 
adolescence.  Emotion recognition of the social or self-conscious emotions, such as 
embarrassment and shame, could be explored in both facial expressions and emotion 
signed stories (Widen & Russell, 2010). Given that both ToM and self-conscious 
emotions involve an appreciation of social norms and the awareness of others, deaf 
children of hearing parents could face delays in developing this skill (Heerey et al., 
2003). 
 This study was novel as it was the first to thoroughly investigate deaf 
children of hearing parents’ voluntary emotion production abilities using three 
methods of elicitation (verbal prompt, emotion signed stories and imitation), with the 
use of two decoding methods to provide both objective (Face Reader™) and socially 
valid (human decoding) judgements. The generalisability of these findings is 
currently limited, however, due to small participant numbers. Future studies could 
consider the emotion production of spontaneous facial expressions of both deaf and 
hearing children in more naturalistic contexts. Particularly given that deaf children 
have been shown to have difficulties in emotion regulation (Wiefferink et al., 2012), 
studies conducted in a social context may be fruitful in further determining the 
regulation of negative emotions. 
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Social implications of findings 
The theoretical and practical findings of this thesis can inform professionals 
and parents of crucial factors in the development of social and emotion cognition in a 
deaf child with hearing parents. The results of this study support the argument that 
language is important in the conceptualisation of emotion. Delays in social cognition 
and more complex emotions (i.e. disgust) in some deaf children indicates a need for 
educational planning to incorporate the promotion of emotion vocabulary 
development and foster mental state understanding through the provision of a 
linguistically rich environment. Parallel performance with hearing children in 
emotion processing and high levels of expressiveness suggests that improving deaf 
children’s understanding of emotion and mental states in context and real-life social 
settings may be more beneficial than a focus on the visual perception of emotions. In 
addition, improved performance in emotion recognition through the use of socially 
relevant dynamic video clips highlights the importance of using ecologically valid 
materials with deaf children so to maximise understanding and facilitate 
communication.  
Deaf children’s choice to view the false belief task in SSE implies the 
usefulness of this communication method, suggesting the importance of exposure to 
sign and the employment of deaf/proficient signing professionals. Studies have 
suggested that mothers of deaf infants use fewer mental state terms in conversation 
with their infants in comparison with mothers of hearing infants (Morgan et al., 
2014) and yet this type of discussion needs to be encouraged with parents at home as 
well as at school. Access to rich mental-state vocabulary with opportunities to 
express desires, and emotions and thoughts, as well as opportunities to respond to 
those of others, should be provided (Ziv et al., 2013). 
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The clear heterogeneity of deaf children born to hearing parents and great 
variation in individual performance suggests that a differentiated approach should be 
taken to cater for individual needs. Therefore, careful assessment of this group of 
deaf children is necessary to determine their social development. The finding that CI 
wearers did not perform better than deaf children with HAs on the false belief task 
indicates that language alone is not sufficient to develop social-cognitive 
understanding: while many oral deaf children may have good speech and vocabulary 
scores within the average range, these competencies may mask difficulties faced in 
groups and contexts involving multiple people (Punch & Hyde, 2011). The 
promotion of skills in social cognition, therefore, is paramount alongside linguistic 
support. Awareness of these difficulties particularly needs to be highlighted to 
professionals working with deaf children in mainstream schools without the 
additional support of a hearing impaired unit. Focusing on developing both linguistic 
and social abilities will positively benefit deaf children’s well-being and successful 
integration into wider society. 
Conclusion 
 To conclude, deaf children of hearing parents do not show any overall deficit 
in emotion processing. Rather, the emotion production studies encouragingly suggest 
that deaf children are able to voluntarily encode clearer and more intense expressions 
of emotion indicating a greater level of expressiveness. A similar pattern of 
development to hearing children is evidenced by the pattern of errors made in 
attributing an emotion label to faces and stories, and in finding subtle emotions more 
difficult to identify than intense facial expressions of emotion.  
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Difficulties in processing the emotion, disgust, for some children and 
problems with passing the false belief task strongly implicate language and a reduced 
opportunity to overhear conversations resulting in delays in the formulation of both 
of these concepts. The consistency across the emotion processing studies 
highlighting a specific difficulty with disgust is striking. Yet the inconsistency 
within the deaf group of children strongly implies that children can benefit from their 
own environmental experiences in developing mental states and emotion concepts, 
and it is vital that this is promoted for the benefit of their social development.  
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APPENDICIES 
APPENDIX A  
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Child Name: 
 
1.Congenital or acquired deafness? 
 
2. Level of deafness (severe/moderate/profound) 
 
3. Age at which child diagnosed as deaf 
 
4. Cause of deafness 
 
5. Age at which child learnt to sign 
 
6. Child’s communication preference – oral/sign or both 
 
7. Do they wear hearing implants/cochlea aids? If so, what age did they start 
wearing them? 
 
8. Number of members who sign in the family, who they are and level of signing 
(BSL level) 
 
9. Any members of the family who are deaf? If so, who? 
 
 
 
  
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Appendix B: Human, human cartoon and non-human cartoon faces: happiness, 
sadness, anger 
Human faces (source: ADFES; Van de Schalk et al., 2011) 
M12 
 
F4 
 
M8 
 
F3 
 
 
 
 
M11 
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F1 
 
 
Human cartoon faces 
 
 
Human like cartoon faces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


	

 
 
 
 
Non-human like cartoon faces 
 
 
 
 
Non 
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Appendix C: Examples of dynamic video clips of emotion facial expressions of 
increasing intensity (0-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, 75-100%; adapted from ADFES, 
Van der Schalk et al., 2011) 

M11 Happiness

M12 Sadness

F5 Anger 

F1 Fear

M11 Disgust 

F5 Surprise 
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Appendix D: Pilot ratings of emotion stimuli: percentage correct and mean and 
standard deviations for intensity ratings (on a 5-point Likert scale from 1-not at 
all, to 5-extremely intense). 
Emotion Level 
 
Percentage 
correct 
 
Intensity rating 
            M                     SD 
Happiness 0-25% 55.17% 1.46 (.77) 
 
25-50% 98.85% 2.33 (1.02) 
 
50-75% 100% 4.13 (.76) 
 
75-100% 
 
100% 4.45 (.73) 
Sadness 0-25% 71.26% 1.64 (.9) 
 
25-50% 65.52% 2.15 (1.05) 
 
50-75% 88.51% 2.86 (.96) 
 
75-100% 
 
94.25% 3.37 (1.0) 
Anger 0-25% 6.9% 1.57 (.88) 
 
25-50% 55.17% 2.0 (.82) 
 
50-75% 79.31% 2.22 (.96) 
 
75-100% 
 
83.9% 3.67 (.95) 
Fear 0-25% 6.9% 1.66 (.91) 
 
25-50% 8.05% 2.26 (.96) 
 
50-75% 60.92% 3.69 (.78) 
 
75-100% 
 
77.01% 3.84 (.87) 
Disgust 0-25% 28.74% 1.45  (.79) 
 
25-50% 80.46% 2.21 (.79) 
 
50-75% 85.06% 3.26 (.81) 
 
75-100% 
 
83.91% 4.18 (.84) 
Surprise 0-25% 8.05% 1.55 (.86) 
 
25-50% 97.7% 2.43 (.94) 
 50-75% 97.7% 3.98 (.86) 
 75-100% 98.85% 4.08 (.7) 
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APPENDIX E.  Emotion Signed Stories (SSE) and pilot study emotion labels and 
intensity ratings 
Emotion Story 
 
Target 
emotion 
percentage 
correct 
 
Accepted 
synonyms 
 
Median intensity (1 
= not intense; 7 = 
very intense)** 
Happiness 
(1) * 
It was Ben’s birthday. 
All his friends came to 
his birthday party. They 
all ate birthday cake. Ben 
got lots of presents. Then 
Ben and his friends 
played some games. Ben 
gave his friend a big hug. 
98.11% Joyful, 
cheerful, 
loved, 
fondness, 
delight, 
warmth, 
pleased, 
affection 
7 (1) 
Happiness 
(2) 
Ben was on holiday. The 
sky was blue and the sun 
was warm. Ben went to 
the beach with his dad 
and sister. They made 
sandcastles and swam in 
the sea. After, they had 
an ice-cream. 
98.11% Content, 
relaxed, 
cheerful, joy, 
nicely 
pleasant, 
excited 
6 (1.5) 
Sadness 
(1)* 
Ben went to feed his pet 
goldfish. But it wasn’t 
swimming. It wasn’t 
even in the tank. Ben’s 
fish had died. He really 
missed his fish. 
92.23% Misery, 
mourning, 
grieved, 
depressed, 
upset, trauma, 
miserable 
5 (1.75) 
Sadness 
(2) 
Ann looked out of the 
window. Her dad’s car 
drove off and 
disappeared around the 
corner. Ann couldn’t see 
her dad for a month. She 
lay down on her bed. 
96.23% Upset, hurt, 
unhappy, 
lonely, numb 
6 (2) 
Anger 
(1)* 
Ben was at nursery. He 
spent a long time 
building a block tower. 
So long that the tower 
was very tall. A boy 
came and touched his 
tower. Ben said, “Be 
98.11% Frustrated, 
mad, furious, 
aggressive, 
annoyed, 
infuriated 
7 (2) 
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careful.” But the boy 
knocked it over anyway. 
Ben wanted to yell at that 
boy and hit him. 
Anger (2) 
Ben looked in his bag. 
His pen had disappeared. 
He looked up and saw a 
boy running away with 
it. His fists began to 
tighten.  
98.11% Frustrated, 
agitated, rage, 
annoyed, 
outrage 
 
5 (2) 
Fear (1)* 
Ben was in his bed. He 
was all alone and it was 
very dark. He heard 
something moving in the 
wardrobe. He didn’t 
know what it was. He 
wanted to hide under the 
bed. Then he heard the 
wardrobe door open. Ben 
wanted to run away. 
98.11% Scared, 
nervous, 
anxiety, 
terrified 
6 (1) 
Fear (2) 
Ann was walking home. 
It was very dark. She 
saw shadows moving. 
The wind was blowing 
hard. She started to run.  
100% Scared, 
terrified, 
horror, 
worried, 
anxious, 
paranoid, 
panic 
5 (2) 
Disgust 
(1)* 
Ben found an apple. It 
looked big and juicy. 
Ben took a big bite. Then 
he saw that there was a 
worm in the apple. He 
spat it out as fast as he 
could and threw the 
apple on the floor. He 
did not want to touch it. 
88.68% Repulsed, sick, 
dislike, 
revulsion 
6 (2) 
Disgust 
(2) 
It was dinner time. Ben’s 
mum gave him a bowl of 
soup. It smelt lovely. 
Ben started to eat the 
soup. Then he noticed a 
hair floating in it. He 
pushed the bowl away. 
92.45% Sick, horrified, 
dislike 
5 (1.75) 

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Surprise 
(1) 
It was Ann’s birthday. 
When she got home, she 
looked for her family. 
She couldn’t find them 
anywhere. She walked 
into the sitting room. 
Suddenly, the lights 
turned on. All her family 
were there. They 
shouted, ‘Happy 
Birthday!’    
81.13% Shock 6 (2) 
Surprise 
(2) 
Ben was in his bedroom. 
He saw an old cardboard 
box on his bed. He 
picked it up to move it. It 
was heavy. Suddenly, out 
jumped a rabbit. Ben 
dropped the box. It was a 
new pet rabbit. 
56.6% Shock 5 (1) 
 *Adapted from Widen and Russell (2002); ** Inter-quartile range in bracket 
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Appendix F: Emotion Signed Story example: Ann’s surprise birthday  
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Appendix G: Individual results for children’s labelling of emotions felt by characters in signed emotional stories 
Participant Group Age Happy 1 
Happy 
2 
Sad    
1 
Sad   
2 
Angry 
1 
Angry 
2 
Fear   
1 
Fear   
2 
Disgust 
1 
Disgust 
2 
Surprise 
1 
Surprise 
2 
1 D 9y0m H H S S A St F Sc DLi DLi Su H 
2 D 7y0m E H S S A A Sc Sc D D E E 
3 D 11y2m H H S S S A F F D D Su Su & H 
4 D 8y10m H E S S S A F F D D Su & H Su & H 
5 D 6y7m H H S S S A Sc Af D D H H 
6 H 8y11m H H S S A A F F D D Su Su 
7 H 7y7m H H S S S St F F D D H H 
8 H 10y1m H H S S A A F F D D Su & H Su 
9 H 6y10m H H S S A S F F D D H H 
10 H 7y6m H H S S A A F F D D Su F 





Appendix H: False belief task story scripts 
1. Sally-Anne (Girl-Boy) unexpected change in location false belief task: Marble 
Story 
 
Hello! My name is Anthony. I am going to tell you a story and then when we’ve 
finished I’m going to ask you some questions. 
The story I’m going to tell you involves two dolls. Here is the girl [pick up the girl 
sitting on the table]. Here is the boy [pick up the boy sitting on the table]. 
So, which one is the girl? [pause] Which one is the boy? [control/naming question]. 
The girl has a basket [hold up basket]. The boy has a box [hold up box]. 
The girl has a marble [show marble]. And she puts the marble in to her basket and 
goes out to play [act out and remove the girl from view of camera]. 
Now, while the girl’s away and cannot watch, the boy takes the marble out of the 
basket and puts it into his own box [act out]. 
So now, the girl comes back [bring the girl back into the scene between the box and 
the basket]. 
Where will the girl look for the marble? [belief question]. 
Where is the marble now? [reality control question]. 
Where did the girl put the marble in the beginning? [memory control question]. 
NB. Girl and Boy exchanged for Sally and Anne to eliminate need for finger spelling names, 
highlighted by Peterson and Siegel (1995) as placing extra demands on attention span and memory of 
children. 
 
2. Unexpected change in location false belief task: Hidden Cakes  
[Boy and Girl sit in toy kitchen. Girl sits by blue cupboard and Boy sits by green 
cupboard]. The boy has made some cakes, six of them [point to boy]; and he puts 
them in the green cupboard to cool down [act out]. And while they are cooling, he 
goes off to play [act out and remove boy from view of camera]. 
While the boy’s away, the girl goes to the green cupboard, takes the cakes, and puts 
them into the blue cupboard [act out]. 
Now the boy comes back [bring boy back into the scene and sit by blue cupboard]. 
Where will he look for his cakes? [belief question]. 
Where are the cakes now? [reality control question]. 

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Where did the boy put the cakes in the beginning? [memory control question]. 
3. Unexpected content task: Hungry Boy (Cereal) 
Here is a boy [place boy on table in front of camera]. He is very hungry. 
Here is his favourite cereal - Crunchy Nut Clusters [place the cereal on the table 
next to the doll]. 
What do you think is inside the cereal box? [Point to the box. Pause]. 
Let’s look and see what’s inside the box [open box, remove pencils, hold up in view 
of the camera and put back inside]. 
What was inside the box/? [pause]. 
What did the boy think was inside the box before we looked inside? [pause]. 
What did you think was inside the box before we looked inside? [pause]. 
How would the boy feel when he found pencils inside the box? Would he be happy 
or would he be sad?  
 
4. Unexpected content task: Hungry Boy (Smarties) 
Here is a boy [place boy on table in front of camera]. He is very hungry. 
Here are his favourite sweets - Smarties [place the Smarties tube on the table next to 
the doll]. 
What do you think is inside the tube? [Point to the tube. Pause]. 
Let’s look and see what’s inside the tube [open tube, remove red crayon, hold up in 
view of the camera and put back inside]. 
So, what was inside the tube? [pause]. 
What did the boy think was inside the tube before we looked inside? [pause]. 
What did you think was inside the tube before we looked inside? [pause]. 
How would the boy feel when he looked inside the tube and found a crayon? Would 
he be happy or would he be sad?  
5. Second order false belief task: The Ice-Cream Story 
A boy and a girl are playing together in the park. They see the ice-cream man 
coming. The girl really wants to buy an ice-cream cone, but she doesn't have any 
money. She feels really sad. The ice-cream man says to the girl: “Don't be sad, you 
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can go home and get some money. I'll be here all day long.” So the girl goes home to 
get money for an ice-cream. The boy, he stays in the park to play. 
 “Why did the girl go home?” [Probe Question 1] 
 “What did the ice-cream man say to the girl?” [Probe Question 2] 
The ice-cream van started to drive away. And the little boy said, “Hey, where are 
you going?” And the ice-cream man said, “I'm going to the school to sell ice-cream. 
I can sell more ice-cream there.” Look, there goes the ice-cream man, driving away 
to the school. 
 “What did the ice-cream man tell the boy?” [Probe Question 3] 
Now, the boy, he goes home to his house to get some lunch. Remember the girl – 
she’s gone home to her house to get some money for ice-cream.  
The little girl stepped outside of her house. As she did, the ice-cream man came by. 
The girl saw the ice-cream van and she said, “Hey, where are you going?” And the 
ice-cream man said, “I'm going to the school; I can sell more ice-cream there,” says 
the ice-cream man. And the little girl said, “Oh good, because I’ve now I got some 
money for an ice-cream cone; I’ll follow you to the school.” And off they went. 
Do you remember the little boy? 
 “Does the little boy know that the ice-cream man went to the school?” [Probe 
Question 4] 
 “Does the boy know that the ice-cream man told the girl he was going to the 
school?” [Linguistic control question]. 
 “Does the girl know where the ice-cream man is?” [Non-linguistic control question]. 
 “Does the girl know that the boy knows where the ice-cream van is?” [Second-order 
ignorance question]. 
Now, the boy’s finished his lunch and so he goes over to the girl’s house to play with 
her. When he gets there, he knocks on the door. The girl’s mother comes to the door, 
and the little boy asks her where the girl is. So the mother says, “She’s gone off to 
buy an ice-cream cone.”  
The little boy then goes off to try and find the girl.  
Now, remember, the little boy does not know that the ice-cream man told the girl 
where he was going. [Memory aid] 
 “Where does the boy think that the girl went to buy an ice-cream cone?” [Second-
order false-belief question] 
 “Why?” [Justification question]. 
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Appendix I: SSE Boy-Girl unexpected change in location false belief task 
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